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ABSTRACT 
The anti-fracking movement in Bulgaria, 2011-2012, represents a remarkable case of 
citizen mobilization against techno-industrial development. The movement merits scholarly 
interest both as an instance of a larger controversy around a novel technology in a world at an 
energy crossroads and as a social phenomenon in its own right, with its novelty to the cultural 
context, its power, its success. 
Three studies take three different perspectives on the anti-fracking movement (AFM), 
aiming, in their combination, to describe and explain how the AFM shaped and was shaped by 
policy-making in its specific context. The first study advances a conceptual framework, a policy-
making process (PMP) model, for the study of social movements (SMs). The study builds on the 
current accomplishments of SM scholarship and presents an approach that synthesizes important 
theories and emphasizes issue-focused policy-making. The AFM features as a case illustrating 
the application of the PMP model. The model allows for the concise description and deeper 
understanding of a whole SM, and for cross-case comparisons with SMs in other contexts. 
The second study focuses on the content and processes of meaning-making in the AFM. 
It attempts to answer how understandings emerged and developed among activists about the 
issue, the technology, the threat, and the major actors in the conflict. The analysis of meaning-
making is performed and presented in a novel way, reconstructing activist meanings from 
bounded objects to complex higher-order systems. The study presents findings on the meaning-
making mechanisms, the identities, ideologies, discourses, and storylines within the movement, 
and the relationships among them. 
The third study describes and evaluates the internal organization of the AFM as a 
grassroots democracy. A grassroots democracy lens can help understand how the AFM 
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mobilized thousands of first-time activists in a society with only fledgling civil structures and 
networks. Additionally, the study examines how democratic forms helped the AFM community 
mobilize and sustain participation, while also developing an alternative political process. 
Findings on the movement-specific forms of power, equality, participation, and consent are 
presented, with explanations of their origins, legitimacy, and implications for movement actions. 
The mutual influence and impact of the PMP and movement democracy are examined. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background and Significance 
On June 16th 2011, the Bulgarian government announced that Chevron Corporation had 
been granted a license to explore for shale gas in Bulgaria. The conditions of the contract were 
and would remain secret. As was later revealed, a host of other large and small gas companies 
had been invited to bid for licenses covering in total a third of the country – all without any 
public disclosure or discussion. Shale gas is extracted via a controversial technology called 
hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, which involves horizontal drilling of shale formations and high 
pressure pumping of vast amounts of water mixed with chemicals into the shales. Fracking has 
become a major public health issue: it carries significant risks for the air, soil, water, and 
biodiversity of local communities. There are also negative consequences for community 
cohesion and safety due to the separative negotiations of royalties between landowners and 
companies and the influx of outside workers. There are thousands of cases, and now a growing 
number of peer-reviewed studies, of fracking’s risks and detrimental effects on the health and 
well-being of local communities (e.g.  Busby & Mangano, 2017; Cahill et al, 2017; Colborn et 
al, 2011; Jacquet, 2014; Moore et al, 2014; Vengosh et al, 2014). Fracking has spread rapidly in 
the United States in the last 20 years, and so has community opposition to it. 
Between June 2011 and January 2012 local communities in prospective drilling areas in 
Bulgaria organized for protests, petitions, and other forms of non-violent action, to stop the 
tenders and compel the National Parliament to impose a ban on fracking. Fracking, from a 
completely obscure technology, became a major news topic. Local community organizing efforts 
grew into a national movement, with over ten thousand people marching on the streets of 12 
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Bulgarian cities on January 14th 2012. Four days later, the Bulgarian Parliament passed a 
moratorium on fracking by an overwhelming majority. Despite concerted efforts to nullify this 
decision in the following months by pro-fracking experts and U.S. officials in Bulgaria, after 
heated discussions with activists and experts and more protests in the streets, the moratorium was 
refined and confirmed in June 2012. 
The resistance against fracking in Bulgaria and across the globe exemplifies larger 
tendencies. It demonstrates the increasing difficulties citizens face in their attempts to influence 
policy: democracy is weakening in a context of withdrawing national states, globalizing 
corporate powers, and politicized, adversarial expertise. At first sight, the Bulgarian success 
seems even more surprising as Bulgaria is still evaluated as a “semi-consolidated” democracy1, 
with a fledgling civil society and mass disillusionment with political parties and elections. 
Therefore, the anti-fracking movement in Bulgaria is a valuable opportunity to study important 
and urgent questions of civic empowerment: How does local reactive protest expand to the arena 
of national politics and relate to controversies at transnational level? How can lay citizens build 
and legitimize knowledge that serves policy-making on par with technocratic expertise? How can 
a movement both correct the shortcomings of liberal democracy and also develop an alternative 
to it? Ultimately, how can bottom-up policy making achieve desired political outcomes? 
Study Purposes  
The dissertation is part of a larger study that aims to explore and describe the initiation, 
development and outcomes of the anti-fracking movement (AFM) in Bulgaria, its major 
constraints, resources and processes, and to provide tentative explanations of its successes. The 
project aims to produce findings that can be used in comparative studies of anti-fracking and 
environmental protests across Europe, North America, and other regions where similar techno-
                                                          
1
 According to Freedom House Nations in Transit 2014 Report. 
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industrial developments have been proposed and opposed. Second, this inquiry aims to describe 
a grounded model of a bottom-up, local-to-national movement development that can help civic 
activists learn from their experience and inform civic action in environmental and other contexts. 
Third, the study will humanize the movement’s participants in the public’s perceptions by letting 
them tell their stories in their own voices. This transparency will hopefully support Bulgaria’s 
democracy and public sphere. Finally, this project will be the first systematic empirical study of 
an instance of grassroots collective action in Bulgaria. It will attempt to generate culturally 
grounded local theories about civic action and social movements. 
General Approach 
The overall investigative approach for the study of the AFM in Bulgaria is case-study 
research. This framework helps explore, describe and understand problems of interest by using a 
case as a phenomenon and illustration of these problems (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2003). However, 
the AFM is more than an instrumental case study (Stake, 1995), i.e. an instance selected to 
illustrate theoretical constructs of interest. It is also an intrinsic case study (Stake, 1995) in which 
the focus is on the case (the movement) itself because of its unique qualities (first empirical 
study of a social movement in Bulgaria, unusual strength of mobilization and success) and the 
two practical purposes of building a grounded model of civic challenge and giving voice to 
participants. As in a case study design, the AFM is examined as a case within a bounded system. 
The timeframe is set from its inception in June 2011 (when the first contract with Chevron was 
announced) until the voting of the final text of the moratorium (June 2012). Some data were 
collected on events before and after this period, but only to illuminate or help the understanding 
of the movement itself. The AFM is also bounded within the context of Bulgarian society, with 
deliberative efforts to understand the influence of context on the movement (Creswell, 2007). 
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Within the case study framework, different research questions are addressed more 
flexibly and pragmatically via different analytical methods. The design decisions for the study 
are shaped by its purposes, conceptual framework, and research questions in an interactive 
design model (Maxwell, 2012). The complexity of the phenomenon and the lack of prior 
research in the cultural context determine a versatile approach with exploratory, descriptive, and 
explanatory research questions (Creswell, 2007), applying various methods of data collection 
and analysis of multiple sources and forms of data, coupled with immersion in the movement’s 
operations. The participation of activists in the navigation of the study was invited and welcomed 
in phases such as the purposeful sampling of interviewees, the member checking of 
interpretations (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), and, as a next step, the discussion and dissemination of 
findings. 
The Three Studies 
This dissertation comprises three studies taking different perspective on the AFM. In 
their combination, the three studies aim to describe and explain how the AFM shaped and was 
shaped by policy-making in its specific context. The first study advances a conceptual 
framework, a policy-making process (PMP) model, for the study of social movements (SMs). 
The study builds on the current accomplishments of SM scholarship (Amenta et al, 2010; 
McCammon et al, 2008) and presents an approach that synthesizes important theories and 
emphasizes issue-focused policy-making. The AFM movement features as a case illustrating the 
application of the proposed PMP model. The model allows for the concise description and 
deeper understanding of a whole SM. The model is also useful in that it may allow cross-case 
comparisons between SMs in other contexts. 
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The second study focuses on the content and process of meaning-making in the AFM. It 
attempts to answer how understandings emerged and developed among activists about the issue, 
the technology, the threat, and the major actors in the conflict, including themselves as a diverse 
group. Collective meaning-making was crucial for the movement’s mobilization, the winning of 
public opinion, and, specifically to the case, for the contentious politics of knowledge around the 
then-obscure technology. The analysis of meaning-making is performed and presented in a novel 
way, reconstructing activist meanings from objects to higher-order systems such as discourses 
and narratives; in addition, meaning-making mechanisms are explored. 
The third study describes and evaluates the inner workings of the AFM through a 
grassroots democracy lens. The AFM mobilized thousands of first-time activists from a fledgling 
civil society and their organization is a topic of interest in itself. Additionally, the study 
examines how democratic forms helped the AFM community mobilize and sustain participation, 
while also developing an alternative political process. The mutual influence and impact of the 
PMP and movement democracy are examined. 
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THE ANTI-FRACKING MOVEMENT IN BULGARIA: 
A POLICY-MAKING PROCESS MODEL 
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This paper presents a theoretical framework for social movement description and analysis 
that emerged from a study of the anti-fracking movement in Bulgaria, 2011-2012. This 
framework, dubbed a policy-making process model of a social movement, proved useful in 
putting together the actions of anti-fracking activists and the context and outcomes of the 
movement. The paper presents the conceptual framework and supports it with examples from the 
anti-fracking movement, in effect structuring a case study around the model. The paper opens 
with short reviews of social movement theory, the policy-making cycle, and their prior 
integrations in the study of social contention.  Next, the policy-making process model of a social 
movement is presented, with discussion of its potential analytical benefits. The paper continues 
with a description of the empirical base for the case study, and then proceeds with the illustration 
of the model within the history of the anti-fracking movement. 
Social Movement Theory 
A social movement is a mass mobilization of citizens for collective actions, partly outside 
institutionalized channels, for the purpose of demanding changes from institutions in policies, 
laws or the institutions themselves (Snow & Soule, 2009). Social movements (SMs) are a form 
of contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001) in the sense that their collective claims 
conflict with someone else’s interests and that governments are either a claimant, an object of 
claims, a party to the claims or monitors of contention (Tarrow, 2001; Tilly, 2004). This policy-
oriented conceptualization will be used as more pertinent to the nature of the anti-fracking 
movement (AFM) in Bulgaria compared to, for example, New Social Movements (NSM) 
theories that emphasize networks that challenge existing power arrangements not so much via 
claims but through a shared conflictual culture and collective identity (Melucci, 1985). 
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 Challengers are outsiders to the polity (Tilly, 1978) meaning that they represent 
constituencies not previously mobilized (Gamson, 1990), speak on behalf of constituencies that 
lack formal representation (Tilly, 1984), or employ unconventional tactics (McAdam, 1999). 
While extrainstitutional tactics are a necessary and defining feature of SMs, all political 
collective action by a movement must be included in its study (Amenta et al, 2010).  
Contemporary SM theory is a successor of several theoretical perspectives focusing on 
different aspects of contentious politics (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996): political 
opportunities theory, focused on the importance of political context factors on SM emergence; 
resource mobilization (McCarthy & Zald, 1977), or more generally SM organization theory 
(Davis et al, 2005) concerned with the forms, structures, and practices within a collective 
challenger; framing processes theory (Benford & Snow, 2000), accounting for processes of 
meaning-making within a movement and around an issue in society; and a focus on grievances 
and threat as impetuses for mobilization (Snow et al, 1998; Johnson & Frickel, 2011). These 
threads or perspectives of research have been integrated into comprehensive approaches to the 
study of SMs such as political mediation (Amenta et al, 2010) and strategic adaptation 
(McCammon et al, 2008). The policy-making process model that is to be elaborated through the 
AFM case is another attempt at a synthesis of SM theories (or foci) that advances the political 
mediation and strategic adaptation approaches into novel directions. 
The Policy-making Process as a Framework for Studying Social Movements 
The Policy-making Process 
A simplified, summary model of the Policy-making Process (PMP) will be described 
based on policy cycle theory (Fischer, Miller, & Sidney, 2007). The model is grounded on a 
problem-orientation assumption of public policy, viz. that policy is a solution response to social 
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issues (Smith & Larimer, 2009). State policies are “authoritative and consistent lines of action 
undertaken by states, backed by laws and the legitimacy of states” that can take diverse forms 
ranging from short-term action to highly institutionalized programs with many laws and 
bureaucratic institutions to support them (Amenta et al, 2002, p. 67). This orientation to policy-
making is admittedly narrow, reducing policy to the administration of occurring (and recurring) 
social issues, and disguising moral dilemmas under institutional rationalities of optimal solutions 
(vs. resolutions) and efficiency (Fischer, 2000; Rittel & Webber, 1973). However, using such a 
policy framework is helpful in the case of a single-issue, reactive and policy-oriented movement 
such as the AFM in Bulgaria. 
The PMP model is presented in Figure 1; it is conceptualized here into seven phases. This 
level of detail is most suitable for the case of the AFM. For example, phases 1 and 2 are treated 
in some analyses as Agenda Setting (Fischer et al, 2007), but in the AFM case under study, 
defining the issue (phase 1) and its forceful introducing as a priority into the political agenda 
(phase 2) should be examined as two distinct processes. The schematic might leave the 
impression of a strict succession of the stages; however, the term “phases” is used purposively to 
underscore that policy-making can move back and forth between phases, and that policy work on 
different phases can be done simultaneously. Short descriptions of each phase follow. 
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Identification 
and definition 
of issues
Choice of 
priorities
Research on 
issues
Formulation
of solutions/
policy 
alternatives
Choice of a 
policy
Policy adoption 
and 
implementation
Policy 
evaluation
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The policy-making process. 
Identification and definition of issues. Social problems are social constructions; what 
social phenomenon becomes an issue, a problem, is the first important question in the PMP 
process (Johnston & Klandermans, 1995; McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996). It is a matter of 
awareness, cognitions, and values. Not only must a phenomenon gain the status of a problem, but 
it should also be framed as a public-sphere issue; something to be addressed by collective effort. 
The framing of issues depends to a great extent on the dominant ideologies in society, as a 
problem is the discrepancy between a desired and an actual state of affairs (Fischer, 2000). 
Choice of priorities. A phenomenon might have been recognized as a social issue, but 
then it must compete for public and political attention and resources with many other social 
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issues. Why is it more important or urgent than other issues? This phase is even more crucial in 
younger democracies like Bulgaria, where regulations and institutions are preoccupied with 
constant reforms, social problems are many, and resources are scarce. A perfect illustration of 
the priority hurdle for an issue is the agenda of Parliament, where the busy pipeline of laws and 
regulations must be interrupted to introduce a new issue. 
Research on issues. The goal of this phase is to collect extensive information and to 
conduct systematic inquiry into the causes, conditions, forms, prevalence, experience, and 
consequences of the issue in focus. Such activities are usually the domain of experts and expert 
knowledge (Fischer, 2000). 
Formulation of solutions/policy alternatives. Research usually produces information 
for the possible solutions of the social issues. Similar to phases 1 and 2, this is a point of 
competition with other issues for resources or between solutions and the interest groups 
promoting them that can win or lose, sometimes for a mere word in the formulation. Also, 
prevailing ideologies about the role of the state and other social actors influence the shaping of 
alternatives. A solution describes new practices, regulations, institutions, markets or agents that 
would address the issue. 
Choice of a policy/solution. The choice can be seen as the final act of policy formulation 
and the first of policy adoption (Fischer et al, 2007). It is conceptualized as a separate phase 
because of the formal and ritualized ways of making the choice, for example through highly 
publicized voting in Parliament or in a referendum. 
Policy adoption and implementation. The next two phases are usually the realm of 
professional bureaucrats or public administrators. The success of a policy depends on the quality 
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of its introduction and implementation, which include diverse and complex activities from 
information dissemination to education and training. 
Policy evaluation. Finally, the policy is evaluated against measures of achieving its 
goals, to wit solving the social issue that begat it. In this crucial phase, learning from policy 
implementation becomes possible, and implications for correction and improvement in the policy 
are made. The policy cycle comes to a closure and starts again as issues arise from the policy 
implementation and its intended and unintended consequences. 
Institutional and Challenger Policy-making Processes 
The adoption of a PMP framework for a social movement is not entirely new, although it 
is indeed rare. Most SM studies of policy change have focused on the final adoption of a policy 
as a dichotomous outcome, which begets criticism (Soule & King, 2006). An early predecessor 
of such models is Schumaker’s (1975) five stages of policy responsiveness to citizen demands:  
access responsiveness, agenda responsiveness, policy responsiveness, output responsiveness, and 
impact responsiveness. Even studies that use a more elaborate PMP framework focus on a 
segment of the process, most often the entry, formulation, and passage of legislation (Amenta et 
al, 2010; Burstein & Linton, 2002; King, Cornwall, & Dahlin, 2005; Soule & King, 2006). 
Amenta and his colleagues also add implementation to the PMP (2010), while Andrews and 
Edwards (2004) use an eclectic model of policy process dimensions (not phases) with agenda 
setting, access to decision-making arenas, achieving favorable policies, monitoring and shaping 
implementation, and shifting the long-term priorities and resources of political institutions. The 
PMP framework was used in the cited studies for various purposes: for distinguishing between 
different political opportunities at different stages, for example claiming that rules become more 
stringent and exclusionary at later stages of legislation and therefore public opinion and protest 
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are more influential at early stages (Amenta et al, 2010; King et al, 2005; Soule & King, 2006); 
or for refining the evaluation of policy outcomes as not just passage of a policy legislation, but 
also agenda setting, introduction, content, etc. (Amenta,  2006; Andrews, 2001; Andrews & 
Edwards, 2004; Burstein & Linton, 2002). 
The first novel feature of the PMP model proposed here is the fuller elaboration of 
policy-making as encompassing all seven phases described above. The second advancement is 
that I propose using a PMP framework to study not just a variable such as outcome or PO, but 
the whole complex of SM concepts as shaped by the phase of the PMP: POs, strategy, tactics and 
organizational forms, framing processes, and political outcomes. This comprehensive approach 
is pertinent to the study of a case of activism such as the AFM in Bulgaria. The most elaborate 
model I found is in Soule and King’s (2006) study of the adoption of the Equal Rights 
Amendment, where they used the stage of legislation as a moderating variable between the 
independent variables SM organization, public opinion, and POs, and two possible outcomes. 
 The biggest conceptual step proposed here is the separation of institutional and challenger 
PMPs. While previous studies examine SM activity and outcomes as SMs participate in the 
institutional policy-making (hence the emphasis on legislation), I attempt to look at a challenger 
PMP happening in parallel and in interaction with the institutional PMP. In other words, instead 
of asking, how activists influence the content of legislation, I would ask: How do activists 
formulate policy alternatives and how do they introduce their formulations in legislation? How 
do they do research on the issue and how does their research compare to expertise summoned by 
institutions? Or, how do they define and interpret the issue, and how is their definition reflected 
in the institutional diagnosis of the problem? Such an approach makes easier the move away 
from a pure legislative process, and the inclusion of traditional SM topics of interests such as 
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framing processes or organization. SM development can be studied with a finer lens and greater 
agency ascribed to the challenger (McCammon et al, 2008). 
Applications and Potential Benefits from the PMP 
I will present here brief suggestions for the use of the challenger PMP framework for 
examining political opportunities, SM strategy and actions, framing processes, and outcomes. 
Political Context 
The term “political opportunity” (PO) was introduced by Eisinger (1973) in order to 
explain why some US cities had riots in the 1960s while others did not. His hypothesis was that 
the openness of the local polity encouraged protest. Tarrow (1994) defined POs as “consistent — 
but not necessarily formal or permanent — dimensions of the political environment that provide 
incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or 
failure” (p. 85). This understanding reflects the need to transcend criticisms of strain theories 
(relating SMs to breakdowns in social structures) and explain why protest is rare while 
discontent is constant and ubiquitous (McAdam, 1999). However, the definition had to be 
expanded as scholars realized that political contexts that facilitate mobilization do not necessarily 
aid political influence (Amenta et al, 2010). The dependent variables can be mobilization, but 
also SM strategy and tactics, organizational forms, and policy outcomes (McAdam, 1996; 
Meyer, 2004; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004). In addition, political context became a more adequate 
term to capture not just facilitative, but also unfavorable conditions that shape a SM (Amenta et 
al, 2010; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Piven & Cloward, 1977). If the early definition of POs can be 
described with the metaphor of the dam (of discontent) where a crack (an opportunity) leads to 
an outpouring, the later concept of political contexts and outcomes is more like a river (the 
movement) shaped by the political landscape. 
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 There are many conceptualizations of POs and a useful summarizing was done by 
McAdam (1996). He reviewed four scholars’ work and summarized four dimensions of POs: 
relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, the stability or instability of 
elite alignments in the polity, the presence or absence of elite allies, and the state’s capacity and 
propensity for repression. McAdam chose to leave out the policy-making capacity of the 
government as a PO. This dimension has been asserted by several scholars (e.g. Kitschelt, 1986; 
Rucht, 1996; Tarrow, 1988).  Policy implementation capacity is the power of authorities to 
implement adopted policies, regardless of internal or external resistance. State capacity is related 
to the degree of centralization of the state apparatus, the government control over market 
participants, the independence of the executive from the judiciary branch (Kitschelt, 1986), the 
penetration of geographical peripheries, the standardization of state practices, and the 
sophistication of the means of policy implementation (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). 
 With the expansion of the PO concept and the introduction of political context emerges 
the question of the boundaries between political and other facilitative contexts. McAdam (1994) 
and Gamson and Meyer (1996) discuss cultural opportunities such as dominant values and 
world-views in society, zeitgeist, class-consciousness and media representation. McCammon, 
Campbell and Granberg (2001) studied gendered opportunity structures as facilitators of policy 
change in favor of women’s rights and found that shifting gender relations indeed influenced the 
attitudes of policy makers. Noonan (1995) described how women were able to openly mobilize 
and protest in the authoritarian context of Pinochet’s Chile because of the framing opportunity 
provided by a motherhood value supported by the conservative government. Finally, economic 
opportunity structures are also important (Wahlstrom & Peterson, 2006), when economic actors 
are either targets or interested parties in a challenge. 
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Within a PMP model, the analysis of the political context should begin with the question 
of where, or at what phase, the issue taken up by a movement stands along the policy-making 
cycle. Furthermore, openness as a dimension of POs can be defined more specifically as the 
openness of the institutional PMP at each phase of the specific issue. This conceptualization is 
consistent with a policy-specific opportunity structure (Tarrow, 1996). Access points to formal 
policy-making can be examined at each phase, as points in a process, instead of as windows in 
institutions (Brockett, 1991). Inclusion or exclusion of citizens from policy-making can be 
formal, or a matter of degree measured by amount of interactions with powerful actors (Andrews 
& Edwards, 2004). Political access opportunities can also be examined via the PMP if we 
analyze the formal rights of citizens to create policies. For example, mechanisms for citizen 
participation are common at issue identification and definition (e.g. public councils or hearings), 
choice of policy (e.g. referenda), and policy implementation (e.g. non-profit service provision) 
phases. Policy adoption and policy implementation capacities feature prominently and separately 
in the PMP model (as an issue-specific capacity). While the former is a more of a legal 
possibility (is the issue within the executive branch’s purview and state’s regulative power), the 
latter is also a matter of actual capacity, which can be weak due to problems like corruption, lack 
of necessary expertise, or a double institutional agenda where the state meets citizens’ demands 
formally, but does not enforce the policy because of other actors’ interests. This aspect of 
implementation capacity is neglected in studies of political contexts of SMs. It is also worth 
noting the expanded possibilities that the analytic inclusion of the phase of research on issues 
provides for the study of exclusivity. Access to policy-making is limited through the use of 
scientific, value-neutral discourse in issue diagnostics (research) and policy development (Brulle, 
2000; Fischer, 2000). Overcoming this hurdle is a major task for mobilized citizens. 
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Strategy and Tactics 
A movement is a challenger to a status quo; the agency of activists should be examined 
through the strategic and tactical choices they make as they perceive and evaluate, act upon, and 
shape their political context (McCammon et al, 2008). Older models of movement capacity focus 
on internal organizational characteristics and resources (McCammon et al, 2008). Newer models 
of political mediation suggest the need for a matching of movement capacity and political 
context (Amenta et al, 2010). Strategic adaptation models (McCammon et al, 2008) move a step 
further by putting the emphasis on the deliberate activities of activists to adapt their strategies 
and tactics to the political environment: by perceiving and interpreting signals from other actors, 
planning and implementing the most effective tactics, observing their effects, and ultimately 
learning from the movement’s experience. The PMP model will attempt to elaborate the political 
mediation and strategic adaptation models with the introduction of the policy-making process as 
a tool of analysis. 
Political mediation addresses the crucial question of how exactly movements influence 
institutions and elected officials to change or adopt policy (Amenta et al, 2010; Andrews, 2001; 
Giugni & Passy, 1998). This posing of the problem is within the debate of state-centered vs. 
society-centered explanations of impact. The political process model reflects the return of the 
state as an autonomous agent in policy-making. Political institutional theory is the current 
elaboration of a state-centered analysis of political decision-making (Amenta, 2005). The theory 
posits the state as an agent with autonomy to define policies and the capacity to carry out 
decisions (Amenta, 2005). States can influence political outcomes directly, as political players, 
and indirectly, as they structure the relationships between other actors and their political 
initiatives. Political mediation models of SM impact (Amenta, Caren, & Olasky, 2005; Amenta 
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et al, 2010) elaborate political institution theory by positing that SMs need the help of mediators, 
institutional political actors such as elected officials and state bureaucrats in order to force the 
desired change in policies (Giugni & Passy, 1998; Amenta et al, 2010). Because these actors 
have various interests and goals, influencing their calculations requires different strategies in 
different political and policy circumstances. Political mediation models are somewhat 
inconsistent across scholars, as some include public opinion as a third party mediator that in turn 
influences powerful political actors (Giugni & Passy, 1998). 
To sort out types of political mediation, the following framework is proposed. A 
distinction is made between levels of mediation (direct participation in policy-making without 
mediators, mediation via political actors, and second-order mediation via fostering societal 
pressure on political mediators), political targets of influence (elected officials or bureaucracies), 
and means (disruption or persuasion). 
First, there is direct policy-making participation, meaning that in certain political systems 
citizens can directly formulate, enact, or implement certain policies. Examples are plebiscites or 
direct democracies like Switzerland (in the case of policy enactment) and policy implementation 
by designated civil society organizations. Second, there is political mediation influence, meaning 
that elected officials or state bureaucracies must be coerced or persuaded to act on a policy. 
According to Burstein (1999), in democracies elected officials have three goals: reelection, 
increasing of their power among other actors, and promotion of their political values and visions 
(which can also be more a matter of appearance of ideological consistency than a genuine care 
about a value). Similarly, bureaucracies are interested in fulfilling their missions and increasing 
their organizational capacity via expansion of jurisdiction, budget, staff, etc. 
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The influencing of policy-making actors can be direct (political mediation) or indirect 
(second-order societal mediation). Thus activists can press elected officials’ prospects for 
reelection directly, by presenting themselves as an important (swing) electoral group; or, 
indirectly, via winning public opinion (Amenta et al, 2005; Giugni & Passy, 1998; Soule & 
King, 2006) that is perceived by officials as relevant to voting preferences. Challengers can also 
offer increased power to political actors within the polity if they are related to allies that can 
enter new coalitions with the targeted policy-maker. The reelection and power recalculations can 
be prompted either via disruption from a direct protest (activists threatening a negative vote of 
their constituency) or societally-mediated protest (embarrassing the officials in the public eye); 
or via persuasion by direct action (showing up in high voter numbers) or societally-mediated 
action (sensitizing the public to an important issue). 
The third goal of elected officials, promotion or consistency with political values 
(Amenta et al, 2005; Burstein, 1999), can be influenced directly, by presenting the movement 
claims in a more conventional lobbying (Andrews, 2001) – in this case the official might be 
considered even an ally; or indirectly, via the societal mediation of disruptive or sensitizing 
protest that presses the target to live up to their stated missions in the eyes of the public. A 
variant of this societal mediation scenario is also a strategy of broader change in social-cultural 
norms (McCammon et al, 2001) that can make a claim more coherent with the political actors’ 
attitudes. Using the target’s political values and visions is especially pertinent to authoritarian 
settings where elections and elite instability are less, if at all, meaningful, but the regime might 
be concerned with its ideological legitimacy (Noonan, 1995; Westby, 2002). State bureaucracies 
can be influenced in similar ways, by either supporting or disrupting their operations and 
threatening or promoting their power (Amenta et al, 2005; Piven & Cloward, 1977). 
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The agency of a social movement is expressed through the choices activists make with 
regard to the strategic goal (the desired policy solution, or prognostic framing), the 
organizational forms of the movement (e.g. Skocpol, 2004, Clemens, 1996) and movement 
democracy (Della Porta, 2009; Polletta, 2002), the ways of acquiring resources, the specific 
actions (or tactics) – marches, petitions, sit-ins, and the framing of the issue with regard to 
particular discursive opportunities. The PMP model, by focusing on phases of policy-making, 
introduces a meso-level between strategy and tactics: the choice of political mediation within 
phases of the PMP. Once a policy goal has been chosen (strategy), choices of direct vs. mediated 
policy influence must be made within each phase. Tactics then serve to bring about the 
realization of the chosen pressure mechanism. 
Within PMP phases, the activities of the SM can be split roughly into three types: work 
on the challenger PMP, i.e. on policy-making; work on transferring that policy-making to the 
more or less impervious institutional PMP (breaking through), and dramaturgical work to 
influence the public (for societal mediation). Analysis of SM strategy should take into account 
where the issue stands on the institutional PMP at the start of mobilization, as it is easier for a 
challenger to enter an already started institutional PMP, but on the other hand, missing work on 
previous phases means that the policy is already shaped to certain extent by the institutions. 
Grievance theories and diagnostic framing might suggest that the first phase of the PMP starts 
from the bottom up, but this is not always the case – sometimes state experts identify and define 
the issue (Castro & Mouro, 2011). The choice of actions can be analyzed against the formal and 
informal openness of the institutional at different phases – variations in openness across stages 
shapes the choice of mediation. Examining SM work across stages and through different 
mediation paths allows for a study of SM flexibility as condition for success (Andrews, 2001; 
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Andrews & Edwards, 2005; Della Porta & Diani, 2009). In terms of this flexibility, the PMP 
model suggests that later phases are not more difficult to influence by protest (as suggested by 
Amenta et al, 2010 and Soule & King, 2006); instead, different phases require different type of 
challenger PMP work and different types of breaking-through work depending on the mediation 
circumstances of each phase. 
 To summarize, while McCammon and colleagues’ model of strategic adaptation (2008) 
examines the stages of observation – interpretation – planning – action – observation of reaction 
and how activists learn from that experiential cycle, the PMP model uses the policy-making 
cycle to “test” for the strategic adaptation of the movement. Are activists aware of the different 
phases of the process, their different goals, opportunities, mechanisms of political mediation? 
Learning is again experiential, but the PMP model conveys even more the complexity of 
adaptation. Even if actions are successful at one phase, the experience may not be directly 
applicable to the next. 
 The institutional/challenger PMP distinction raises another intriguing conceptual and 
practical question for a social movement: How do the two processes interact at the points of 
interface in each phase? On whose terms are these points negotiated? Should the movement “fit” 
with the institutional PMP to influence it (Skocpol, 2004) and how does this fitting affect the 
challenger’s identity and forms of organizing? Can we examine a conflict or collaboration of 
different institutional logics (DiMaggio, 1997), bureaucratic and informal, or rationalities 
(Fischer, 2000), technical and cultural in each phase? Such a nuanced approach avoids a 
simplistic assumption that later policy-making phases need to involve more formalization; the 
control or evaluation of implementation, for example, can be performed by tools like 
crowdsourcing or local knowledge collection. 
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Framing Processes 
Theories of meaning-making within SMs (Benford & Snow, 2000) also fit well with the 
challenger PMP model. Very roughly, diagnostic framing is pertinent to the phase of issue 
definition, prognostic framing to policy formulation, and motivational framing to break-through 
strategizing or actions. Beyond these parallels, framing can be studied within each phase: its 
main objects, meaning-making mechanisms, discourses and storylines. Frame alignment can be 
examined in two directions – toward political and toward social mediation. For example, the 
diagnostic framing of the issue can be studied within the challenger PMP and as frame alignment 
with the institutional and the social frames around the issue, with coherence or discrepancies 
among the two framing tasks examined as well. 
 With the concept of the challenger PMP, extrainstitutional action acquires additional 
meaning. A SM can present an extrainstitutional, alternative way of policy-making. This 
alternative in turn can provide an additional mechanism for policy influence, apart from 
mediation: competitive comparison. A comparison between institutional PMP and challenger 
PMP can put pressure on institutions, especially if the public is witness to a better (more efficient 
or just) alternative PMP. In this sense, a primary framing task of a challenger is to demonstrate 
its legitimacy to develop policies in each of the phases - legitimacy in the eyes of institutions or 
the public, depending on strategy. The legitimizing task seems to be easier in some phases (like 
issue identification by the affected) than others (research). One important way of legitimizing the 
challenger PMP is by showing its adherence to democratic values and practices. Similarly, a 
political-system critique for undemocratic practices or corruption can delegitimize the 
institutional PMP. 
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Political Outcomes 
Outcomes within the PMP model can at the simplest level be classified as degree of 
achieved access at different phases, and as substantive influencing of the institutional PMP by 
the challenger PMP. Degrees of achieved informal access should be juxtaposed to the initial state 
of exclusion at the particular phase. For example, access might be expressed in officials talking 
about the problem, meeting with activists, working on legislation, etc. The opposite direction of 
influence might be evaluated as well – to what extent the challenger PMP adopts rules, forms 
and practices from the institutional PMP. Substantive impact can be assessed at each stage 
according to its task – the adoption of the SM’s definition of the problem into the institutional 
PMP diagnostics, the use of citizen-generated knowledge, the degree of adoption of the 
challenger’s policy formulations, etc. 
The Anti-fracking Movement in Bulgaria as Empirical Base of Theory Development 
Data Collection 
Interviews. 
Sampling. Current and former activists were interviewed as key informants and the 
transcribed interviews were the main source of information about the AFM. Interviewees were 
sampled purposefully for a maximum variation in experiences (Miles & Huberman, 1994) based 
on my observations of online anti-fracking groups and recommendations from prior 
interviewees. Participants vary in important characteristics such as membership in local and 
national groups, current and former, first-time and experienced activists, engaged in leadership 
and rank-and-file work. As data collection unfolded I added interviewees whose perspective was 
recognized as unique or dissident. The participants were reached through participant referrals 
and the local Facebook groups of the movement. Access to participants and rapport were 
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facilitated by my peripheral engagement with the AFM. All invited activists agreed to 
participate. A total of twenty-four activists from seven local groups (cities) were interviewed 
from March 2012 through August 2013. 
Interview protocol. Semi-structured interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 2012) were planned. 
The interview schedule (Appendix 1) contained questions about personal experiences and insider 
observations regarding recruitment in the AFM, local group functioning, between-group 
relationships, national-level strategy and actions, perceptions of the political context and other 
actors. In the course of the interviews, more general questions opened these topics and the 
respondents’ subsequent answers were probed further for elaboration or clarification. 
Interview process. The interviews were conducted in locations preferred by the 
interviewees, most often natural settings in the cities where participants joined local groups; 
seven interviews were conducted via internet conferencing. Interview length ranged between one 
and three hours, with an average length of one hundred minutes. Three activists were interviewed 
twice because the initial analyses suggested that some topics in their accounts were worth 
pursuing further. Some interviews were followed up with questions via email for clarifications. 
In qualitative research, data collection and analysis are not completely separated: initial coding 
and memo-writing as well as emergent findings can reveal needs for additional data collection 
(Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 2007). 
 All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed by the author. The texts of the 
conversations were sent to each participant for reactions or corrections. Each participant signed 
an informed consent form. All research data were stored in password protected archives. Audio 
recordings are confidential.  Pseudonyms chosen by respondents can be used for reporting and 
writing up of findings. Interview data collection was approved by Vanderbilt University’s 
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Institutional Review Board. 
Movement texts, documents, and images. Textual and visual data were collected in the 
course of movement actions and retrospectively, mostly from Facebook-based archives and a 
few from the media. Facebook was the main mobilizing and organizing platform for the AFM. It 
was the main space for internal communication, file exchange, data collection and banking, and 
decision-making. It was also a symbolically important organizing milieu as it enabled 
“spontaneous” coordination of loosely connected activists. I had access to the groups as a 
member after establishing rapport with local groups and the national organizing group. 
In total, 38 public statements and positions from the AFM, 7 leaflets, 22 minutes from 
national and local group meetings, 200 Facebook discussions and hundreds of photos were 
collected. An attempt was made to collect all public statements and most of the documents 
produced in the movement. Facebook discussions were selected with a judgment of their 
relevance to the research questions and the richness of information and perspectives contained.  
Other sources. Additional information was available from publications in local and 
national media and from direct observations of protest events. Media sources were useful to 
verify events, opinions and statements of government officials, experts and opponents of the 
AFM. Direct observation of protests provided contextual knowledge for the analysis of textual 
data, helped understanding the relationship between the movement’s meanings and practices. 
Data Analysis 
The accumulated qualitative data were analyzed in two cycles (Saldana, 2009): the first 
for summarizing and labeling meanings, the second for building categories and links between 
them. MaxQDA, a software application for qualitative analysis, was used for coding and sorting 
the data. I coded the entire interview transcripts using a combination of coding methods. With 
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structural coding (Saldana, 2009) I coded segments pertaining to topics of inquiry stemming 
from my conceptual framework. During the process of coding I also maintained openness to 
emerging theoretical directions, performing initial (open) coding (Charmaz, 2006). This 
approach allowed the extraction of important ideas within and outside the topics initially 
formulated. 
 In a second stage of coding I coded within and across segments, reflected on the data and 
wrote analytical memos (Charmaz, 2006). I also came back to several interviewees to 
supplement more data to questions that emerged as important and/or unclear. Subcategories were 
formulated to the initial structurally coded topical segments. Open-coded segments were 
analyzed with the constant comparative method (Corbin & Strauss, 2007) to create more general 
categories, which in turn were compared and expanded with newly-coded statements. Links 
between codes and categories were drawn based on the analysis and the conceptual framework.  
The trustworthiness of the findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) was addressed carefully 
given my position as participant researcher. I made efforts to ensure credibility by triangulation 
of sources and methods of data collection. Divergent perspectives were sought – for example, 
from people who left the movement or who engaged in conflict with movement leaders. The 
richness and diversity of perspectives present in the interviews suggests that experiences and 
meanings in the AFM were captured quite comprehensively. I also secured member checking 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985) by soliciting comments on my interpretations from one very reflective 
interviewee. Finally, I believe that being a cultural insider helped me understand contextually-
anchored meanings of participants. 
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The purpose of this paper is to elaborate new concepts and extensions of existing theory. 
The description of the AFM is an illustration of the use of the PMP model for social movements. 
A history of the AFM, including the actions of all major actors, was compiled (see Table 1). 
Table 1.  
History of the Anti-fracking Movement in Bulgaria. 
Date/Period Event 
06-16-2011 The Bulgarian Council of Ministers grants a license for natural gas prospecting 
and exploration to a Bulgarian subsidiary of Chevron. The Minister of Economy 
and Energy, T. Traykov, announces the decision to the public on the next day. 
07-02-2011 The City Council of Novi Pazar, a town in the geographic center of the licensed 
area, passes a 15-1 resolution to appeal the decision. The meeting is attended by 
several experts and Members of Parliament. Throughout the month of July, the 
first local and Facebook anti-fracking groups begin to organize. 
08-02-2011 First protests against Chevron’s license in Sofia (the capital of Bulgaria) and Novi 
Pazar. Between thirty and fifty people participate in each place. 
On the next day, the opposition’s candidate in the coming presidential election 
announces he would initiate a referendum on fracking. 
August 2011 A total of five protests are held in Sofia, all in front of the Ministry of Economy 
and Energy. Attendance is limited to about fifty participants. An impromptu 
confrontational meeting is held with the Minister of Economy and Energy 
Resources at his request after one of the protests. The Facebook groups expand 
exponentially (9000 members in the main group by August 10). First expert 
opinions from Bulgarian environmentalists are submitted (against fracking). 
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09-01-2011 First nation-wide protest staged in Sofia, Varna, Dobrich, Plovdiv, Stara Zagora, 
and other smaller towns. Around a hundred people attend the march in Sofia. A 
declaration is submitted to the Council of Ministers with three main demands: a 
moratorium on the use of the fracking technology; a rescission of the licenses 
granted to companies and a canceling of current open calls; passage of a 
permanent bill outlawing the use of fracking in Bulgaria. 
09-08-2011 Activists attend a soccer exhibition game pitting Bulgarian politicians, led by the 
Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, against foreign diplomats in Bulgaria. The 
activists disrupt the game with banners against fracking. Visibly angry, the 
Premier promises the activists a personal meeting. 
09-14-2011 The meeting is held in the Council of Ministers between activists on one side and 
the Prime Minister, the Minister of Economy, and the Minister of Environment on 
the other. Activists present the issue to the Premier, emphasizing the risks for the 
water, food, and health in the targeted region. The Premier orders a halt on the 
signing of the contract with Chevron, a full disclosure of the contracts to the 
activists, and detailed reports on the technology and its application in the world 
from the two ministers. These reports were never revealed (if prepared at all). 
Several days later (on September 18) activists disrupt an inauguration ceremony 
of a new soccer field in Dobrich led by the Premier himself. Agitated by the 
protest, he makes a highly publicized threat that if activists continue to “pester” 
him, he might sign the contract with Chevron “just to spite” them. 
September – 
December 
A series of protests are staged in Bulgaria, now attended by hundreds of people. 
One nation-wide protest is staged each month. Multiple smaller protests are 
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2011 organized by local groups. 
The local groups are organized in Facebook groups, with one open national group 
of over 50,000 members and one closed national organizing group. A database is 
created with studies and publications on fracking and its effects on human health 
and local communities. 
The Ministers of Economy and Environment continue to accuse activists of being 
ignorant about the technology and/or being paid by foreign interests. Experts and 
lobbyists for fracking start to organize and issue statements. 
11-26-2011 After another nation-wide protest, on a square in Sofia, the Civic Initiative for a 
Ban on Exploration and Extraction of Shale Gas is founded by 81 activists. A 
national petition is started, per a law that allows citizens to directly propose 
legislation with 50,000 signatures collected within three months. The petition 
would collect 52,500 signatures and would be publicly filed in Parliament on 
February 24, 2012. It would be unlawfully neglected by the Parliament. Activists 
would use the signatures drive to educate citizens about the threats from fracking 
and invite them to an upcoming nation-wide mega-protest on January 14 2012. 
01-13-2012 After the period of disregard to the activists’ demands and actions, the Chair of 
the Parliament (from the ruling party) invites the protesters to a private meeting 
and announces that “there is a political decision” to support the ban on fracking. 
Meanwhile, opposition parties propose their own versions of a ban. 
01-14-2012 The biggest protest against fracking takes place in 12 cities in Bulgaria. Estimates 
of participants vary between 8,000 and 14,000. In the next few days, the 
Economy Committee in the Parliament discusses in open meetings the terms of 
32 
 
the ban on fracking. After some failed attempts to insert loopholes in the text of 
the ban, followed by threats from activists, a strict version of the ban is approved. 
01-18-2012 The moratorium on fracking is voted in Parliament, with 166 to 9 votes in favor. 
The contract with Chevron is rescinded. 
02-05-2012 The United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, visits Bulgaria to discuss 
with the Bulgarian government issues of “energy security” and the political 
situation in the Middle East. The visit is presented in the media as a lobbying 
effort for shale gas. Four days later, Richard Morningstar, “Special Envoy of the 
United States Secretary of State for Eurasian Energy” also visits Bulgaria and 
conducts a series of high-profile meetings in the government. No public 
statements are issued. In the following months, the US Ambassador to Bulgaria 
will appear multiple times in the media to advocate for shale gas as a path to 
energy independence for Bulgaria. 
February – 
June 2012 
The issue of fracking and the moratorium are raised again in the media by energy 
experts, pro-fracking politicians, and the US ambassador. The moratorium is 
sharply criticized as too restrictive for all gas extraction in Bulgaria. 
On April 4, a “Committee for the Collection, Analysis, and Discussion of Good 
Practices and Legislative Solutions with Regard to the Regulation of Activities of 
Exploration and Extraction of Underground Resources with Observance of 
Environmental Protection” is established in the Bulgarian Parliament. The 
Committee, made up of thirteen members of Parliament, ostensibly aims to 
improve the moratorium. It holds open sessions with experts and activists, but 
disregards the 700 pages of studies and reports submitted by the Civic Initiative. 
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The movement expands its demands by including a ban on coal gasification and 
demands for a more just regulation of natural resources extraction. Work with 
experts is intensified and contacts with the international movement become more 
frequent. Attempts are made to collaborate with Romanian anti-fracking activists 
as exploration licenses are granted to Chevron in Romania. 
06-14-2012 The Parliament votes for the proposal of the Committee (and effectively upholds 
the ban) after several days of hectic negotiations. Instrumental for the acceptance 
of the activists’ texts is the exponential rise of a new wave of environmental 
protests – this time for the protection of the forests in Bulgaria. 
Post June 
2012 
The movement gradually subsides as the issue drops out of the public agenda. 
There are occasional events organized by lobbyists, for example conferences or 
visits to the United States. The government keeps an ambivalent position, but 
does not attempt to reopen the debate. No law is passed. Activists, more often 
individually than as a group, engage in institutional actions such as demanding 
information and signaling suspicious drilling operations. Contacts with European 
activists are intensified as the issue enters the European Union’s agenda. Smaller-
scale protests are staged to support Romanian activists against fracking. Attempts 
to start a regular media newsletter on fracking fail. The Facebook groups remain, 
but become almost inactive. 
Many activists from the movement take part in the planning and founding of a 
broader Civic Initiative (along with other smaller protest groups) aimed at 
“system change” through direct civic participation. The Initiative ultimately fails 
due to internal contradictions and conflicts. 
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Phases of the AFM’s Policy-making Process 
The history of the anti-fracking movement can be interpreted through the use of the PMP 
model of social movements. It is important to note in the beginning that none of the participants 
(in discussions or interviews) used a policy-cycle model when they described the movement or 
during the actual strategizing activities. However, participants who were involved in the core 
organizing group, especially those who thought about the strategy of the movement, were clearly 
aware of the phased nature of policy-making. For example, they evaluated how difficult it was to 
insert the issue on the policy agenda compared to other contemporary issues like the Forestry 
Law, where the policy had already been advanced to the policy formulation phase. In addition, 
many activists were acutely aware of the post-adoption phases of the issue, where the weak 
policy capacity of the state determined very different movement strategies. 
Identification and Definition of the Fracking Issue 
Fracking had to be problematized in the public debate by the movement; the challenger 
had to start from phase one. There was no publicity for the prior negotiations with Chevron, and 
no institutional process of including local citizens in a discussion of the advisability of a gas 
industry in the region. The Bulgarian Minister of Economy and Energy Resources framed the 
announcement of the contract in entirely glowing terms of energy independence from Russian 
gas and economic benefits. In the Bulgarian regulations at the time there was no distinction 
between conventional and shale gas, so the issue might not have been discovered for some time 
without this announcement. 
These characteristics of the issue-specific political context shaped the reactions of the 
activists. The unknown technology was framed in catastrophic terms, most often through 
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metaphors such as Chernobyl, a symbol of destructive runaway technology, a harm inflicted by a 
foreign power, and a government cover-up; through vivid images such as burning water; and 
through cultural rationality (Fischer, 2000) – understanding the technology through its 
association with the company and its poor environmental record and with its country of origin, 
known among many activists for recklessness and exploitation. Within this catastrophizing 
discourse on risks, activists tended to frame themselves as victims, people that were “worried” – 
a narrative taken up by the media as well. In addition, the secrecy and exclusion of the Cabinet’s 
decision also presented activists with the opportunity to frame the problem as one of democracy; 
injustice was done because those who would be affected were not involved in the decision. 
Activists took the position of active citizens. The democracy-oriented frame was salient in this 
phase of the PMP in interactions with institutions and the media, as it gave activists legitimacy to 
demand inclusion in the definition of the issue. 
While public definitions of the issue involved the threat to human health, the water, soils, 
and food in the region in an environmental health discourse (Brulle, 2000), within the AFM a 
more nature-oriented sensitivity was discussed: many activists were preservation 
environmentalists; other reported strong spiritual connections to the nature in the threatened 
region and a vocation to protect it for future generations. However, these identities and their 
corresponding nature-centered environmental discourses were purposively kept in the back 
region, as a form of motivation framing. Finally, another discourse that emerged early on within 
the movement was that of patriotism and the protection of Bulgaria from foreign “pillagers”. 
This framing was partly an instrumental one, to engage the discourse of independence opened by 
the Minister. It also reflected the strong culturally-specific connection between nature and the 
meaning of motherland in Bulgaria. The framing of activists as protectors of national interests 
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served a mobilization function but also a more strategic function to legitimize the protests and 
delegitimize the (energy) independence claims by the government. 
 The strategy at this early phase was more spontaneous than planned, but it had a few 
main elements. First, and most important in activists’ accounts, was “the information campaign”: 
activists spread “the truth” to “people like them” to counteract the secrecy and lies of the 
government. Dissemination of information happened mainly in face-to-face interactions in the 
streets, where human contact would persuade bystanders and counteract “the media curtain” on 
the issue. Government officials, including the Prime Minister, were also targeted by letters and 
complaints, mostly with the intention to inform about the risks from fracking. Protests were 
improvised (with activists most often still being strangers to each other) to press officials to 
listen to activists. The inclusive and pluralistic defining of the issue, with health, environmental, 
civic, patriotic, and even leftist explanations, was associated with a mass mobilization of first-
time activists who considered themselves equal and self-driven. Common perceptions and 
experiences of freedom from coercive organizing structures and of solidarity sowed what would 
become a grassroots democracy within the movement. 
The definition of the problem by the challenging movement was not accepted into the 
institutional PMP: the issue was never discussed on a formal forum with the government – 
protesters were shunned and even ridiculed by officials and the exchanges of claims were made 
through media channels. 
Choice of a Priority 
 The activists faced the challenge of putting the issue on the agenda of a busy Parliament 
that did not recognize the threat at all – i.e. to influence the choice of priorities of the state and 
society at the time. Some favorable contextual factors were in play, such as the upcoming 
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Presidential elections and the intense struggle between ruling and opposition parties in 
Parliament. The most often stated opportunity in my interviews though was the personality of the 
Prime Minister Boyko Borissov – ego-driven, publicity-conscious, and “populist” in the eyes of 
activists. The media was used to focusing on his personal decisions and was certain to cover 
personalized confrontations with him. 
The strategy of the AFM was to attract attention and create embarrassment for the 
government through protests marches and rallies. The lucky strike for direct pressure on 
Borissov occurred at two personal confrontations where he could be embarrassed in front of 
important publics – the soccer game and the inauguration ceremony (see Table 1). At the game 
he was forced to notice the issue. The Premier also had to be persuaded in the severity of the 
threat from fracking and offered a familiar and desired role. At the meeting in the Council of 
Ministers, activists emphasized the threats to human health, water and food. They presented 
themselves as victims, and the Premier was left to play the role of the hero (activists underscored 
his future legacy in history). Not less important for the jump in media interest was his angry 
reaction in Dobrich, which reaffirmed the issue as a focus of public interest. 
The movement also attempted to use an institutionalized channel for putting a priority on 
the policy agenda – the national petition was started, with over 50,000 signature collected in 
three months. By law, the Parliament had to take formal action on the petition and consider it. 
This never happened; instead, the main achievement of the petition was in issue definition and in 
its prioritization for the public: it provided activists with thousands of personal, often touching 
conversation with bystanders, where they could frame the issue and persuade about its urgency. 
These personal interactions and trust-building were the most significant disruption of the 
institutional approach of issue framing, where power sells or imposes a definition on the public. 
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Several months of protest action in many cities also shaped a movement democracy 
where activists experienced an alternative way of doing “real” or “true” politics, where they 
enacted alternative ways of organizing – informal, leaderless, and “natural.” Strong feelings of 
personal freedom, agency, and self-fulfillment color my interviews. These experiences and 
consciousness facilitated mobilization and gave legitimacy to participation. 
The framing of the issue for the tasks of this phase was expansive. The threats from 
fracking were related to the whole region, and eventually to Bulgaria. The scale of concern was 
expanded symbolically by framing the area as “the Granary of Bulgaria”, thus turning the issue 
into a national problem. This expansion corresponded well to the self-framing of activists as 
citizens, meaning protectors of the common good, and patriots, meaning protectors of the 
national interest. 
The AFM was quite successful in de facto bringing the issue to a high priority in the 
public debate. Activists gained direct access to a primary decision-maker (the Premier); his 
assignment to the two ministers to submit reports was a symbolic acceptance of the need to 
redefine the issue (after its original definition by the minister). Parties in the Parliament and 
presidential candidates also took up the issue; in Parliament, several parties started drafting bills. 
The importance of this phase (and why it is a separated from the previous one) is demonstrated 
by the comparison of the AFM with the contemporary Forestry Law protests. In the latter, the 
issue was already being voted in Parliament; it was recognized as a priority. It was much easier 
and faster for activists to stage a huge protest at the exact time of the voting in order to enter the 
institutional PMP at the stage of policy alternatives formulation. In contrast, the anti-fracking 
movement had to push through all prior phases in a parallel process without getting access to 
policy-making. 
39 
 
Research on the Issue 
 Research on fracking and its effects was an especially important activity given the 
complexity of a novel technology operating in the complex system of the environment (Johnson 
& Frickel, 2011). Research by activists started from the very beginning of the protests, but it 
intensified and became systematic when the problem was accepted as legitimate. After 
November 2011 pro-fracking experts consolidated and started their media campaign. The 
movement turned to a politics of counterexpertise (Fischer, 2000) after the moratorium was 
passed in January 2012, when under industry and American pressure the ruling party created the 
Parliamentary “Committee to Allow Fracking,” as the activists joked. The Committee was an 
embodiment of technological rationality looking for solutions to an issue (Fischer, 2000). 
Ostensibly it represented an opening of the institutional PMP as protesters were invited to its 
meetings and to submit evidence against fracking. Additional opportunities were the easy access 
to US experience and reports on fracking effects and, very importantly, the lack of established 
experts in Bulgaria on this novel technology. 
 The AFM’s main activity during this phase was the collecting and systemizing of 
information related to fracking. Using the internet and social media, participants were able, by 
crowdsourcing research, to collect, evaluate and systematize over 700 documents on the risks of 
fracking, mostly from the United States, included peer-reviewed published studies. The 
organization of the collection allowed for wide participation and the education of hundreds of 
activists in the process. In this line of work, two conferences were organized with experts with 
negative stances toward fracking. In addition to the research on technology, activists also 
investigated the activities of gas companies locally and examined the structure and bylaws of the 
agencies that were tasked to regulate gas extraction. In the latter investigation activists 
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established workable and sometimes trusting relationships with bureaucrats, using both 
accountability pressure and appeals to their professionalism. 
As with the outcome of the national petition, the institutional PMP did not recognize the 
research of activists as such. The Parliament did not include their evidence in the work of the 
Committee despite the promises made, but featured the industry’s fracking-friendly statements 
on the Committee’s website from May 2012. Despite the demands of activists, the government 
also never organized a public expert forum on fracking. Yet the research phase produced other 
accomplishments. It brought a new focus on technology instead of Chevron or the US; such 
focus countered the claims of opponents that activists were driven by pro-Russian interests. The 
AFM leveled the ground by delegitimizing pro-fracking experts as not experts (because of the 
novelty of fracking) or as guns for hire. The technology-focused research allowed activists to 
show themselves as knowledgeable experts themselves in public debates. 
Gradually, the expert work by the AFM transcended institutional expertise and technical 
rationality (Fischer, 2000). First, activists purposively sought an expansive definition of the 
issue, where not just geologists, but also chemists, ecologists, underground water specialists, 
physicians, and many other experts should provide perspectives on the effects of fracking. 
Second, they turned attention to the application of the technology and its side effects in the 
specific context (Fischer, 2000). They relied on local knowledge, pointing to the specific 
circumstances in the licensed region that prohibited a generalized assessment of risk. Ultimately, 
activists strived to show the divergence of expert opinions and perspectives and to reframe the 
experts’ role from determining the solution (solving the problem) to consulting on a policy 
decision made democratically. 
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 Intermediate outcomes of this phase can be summarized into several points. First, there 
was an impressive and workable body of knowledge accumulated within the movement and not 
less importantly, distributed among hundreds of activists by virtue of the process of its creation. 
This was a considerable democratic achievement given the exclusivity that expert debate brings 
to policy-making (Beck, 1992; Fischer, 2000). Second, there was a continuing process of 
educating the public and the politicians fed by the research. And finally, the research phase 
demonstrated the split between technical and political rationality in making the policy. The 
expert debate, with the institution’s disregard of the AFM’s arguments, revealed its purpose as a 
veil for political decision-making (Fischer, 2000). 
Formulation of Solutions/Policy Alternatives 
Through its diverse tactics and persistent work in the prior phases, the anti-fracking 
movement managed to bring the issue into the institutional PMP and participate in its 
deliberation, thus creating a favorable political context for their cause. Representatives of the 
movement were invited to participate in the drafting of the moratorium text (policy formulation) 
and later in its amendments in the spring of 2012. Favorable aspects of the political context were 
also the high visibility of the issue in the press and the public sphere, and also the activity of 
several parliamentary parties who started proposing their own drafts of a moratorium, thus 
putting pressure on the ruling party to participate in the formulation of a policy. 
 The AFM engaged in three main activities during this phase. First, there was internal 
discussion of the intricacies of concrete legal texts and terms that could be included in the 
moratorium. Building on the phase of research, participants were capable of fostering an 
inclusive deliberation within the closed national group. Second, and more problematic, the 
movement participated in the institutional PMP, accepting some of its rules, expectations and 
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corrupting logic. The AFM had to elect representatives who would work directly with the 
Parliament and other institutions and would engage in behind-closed-doors negotiations and take 
urgent decisions without consultation with other activists. The splitting of a “working core” from 
the mass of protesters was exemplified in a case when one Member of Parliament proposed a 
moratorium draft on behalf of his party to activists in the fifty-thousand-member group. He was 
scathingly criticized by the activists there; at the same time, he was secretly contacted by the 
leading negotiator from the AFM to discuss his draft (which eventually became the moratorium). 
The institutional logic dictated less democratic, pluralist and gradual formulation of strategies 
and solutions, which introduced tension and conflict within the movement. The movement was 
strong on the previous phases in its spontaneity, authenticity, pluralism and interpersonal 
contacts and trust. Now, some activists, especially from groups outside Sofia, felt that the 
movement’s position omitted important information and input from local groups and that 
representatives to the institutions (entirely from the capital) overused the power they were 
delegated with in the negotiations. 
 The third important activity of the AFM was to continue protests in the streets in order to 
keep the issue visible and press politicians to act. The protests were organized autonomously by 
local groups and kept the spirit of equality, spontaneity and solidarity in the movement. Thus a 
division of labor between the negotiating core of activists and the mass movement emerged. The 
former complied with institutional logic and built on the experience of environmental groups 
with issue campaigns; the latter was a prefigurative grassroots alternative to politics as usual 
(Yates, 2014). The division reflected the split between the official, rational and expert-based 
formulation of solutions and the political and power brokering among parties and economic 
interests. 
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With regard to the framing of the issue at this point, the most important development was 
the emergence of a modified understanding of the risks. The research on the issue revealed the 
lack of capacity and reliability of the government to regulate and monitor the technology. To the 
threats from the technology per se were added the risks of its application. These conclusions 
were a more reflective (Beck, 1992) iteration of the initial, culturally grounded distrust to 
authority. The important implication for the policy solutions was in the demand for a total ban on 
fracking. Only with it could the safety of the environment and human health be guaranteed; 
regulated fracking would mean no control at all, as the administration was seen as too 
incompetent to monitor the industry and too closed (corrupt) to allow people to play watchdogs. 
At this phase a very visible new storyline emerged within the movement about the problem, its 
sources and solutions. The government was no longer considered a misguided actor whose eyes 
must be opened in order to turn him into a savior. Instead, the government was the source of the 
problem and activists wanted to circumvent, subvert, and supplant it. 
The policy formulation phase was a success for the movement in that it achieved direct, 
albeit not entirely formal and recognized access to the making of the moratorium. The first text 
of the moratorium was almost entirely according to the demands of the movement; even a crucial 
mistake they made in one term made it into the text. Less optimistically, the phase was 
characterized by an important acceptance of an institutional, undemocratic logic of action that 
would create problems for the movement.  
Choice of policy 
 The success of an issue-oriented movement is usually judged by the passing of the policy 
demanded by the activists. In this regard the anti-fracking movement was considered highly 
successful by the media, politicians and experts. T
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fulfilled: the technology was banned, the license to Chevron was rescinded. However, the more 
impactful and far-reaching demand – a new law regulating the extraction of natural resources 
was not even considered by the Parliament; the demand was also lost in the media coverage. 
 A symbolic victory at this phase was also the admittance and legitimation of political 
decision-making by the politicians themselves. Just before both votes – in January and June 
2012, the leaders of the ruling party stated to activists that “this is a political decision.” In other 
words, a solution was now admitted as a resolution; despite the highly complex character of the 
technology per se, often used as a pretext to leave the decision to experts, the institutions 
admitted to the politicized nature of the issue and to a political (i.e. more inclusive) decision-
making. 
Policy Implementation and Evaluation 
Activists were well aware of the significance of these the two post-decision phases. The 
lack of policy implementation capacity uncovered by activists dictated their demands and 
strategy. Nonetheless, the two phases were quite problematic for the anti-fracking movement. 
The history of the movement (Table 1) shows various attempts of activists to again duplicate 
PMP phases that the institutions were unable to perform. Among these efforts were submissions 
of tips and complaints, legal demands for information, appeals of licenses in court, and visits and 
observations at drilling sites. However, the AFM was unable to formulate a grassroots alternative 
to the expert-driven and bureaucratized procedures of policy implementation and evaluation. Part 
of the reason was of course the inability to police and sanction. Other explanations are rooted in 
the inability (and aversion) of the movement to create professional organizations. Such formal 
structures were dismissed as contrary to the spontaneous and horizontal character of the 
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movement. As the immediate threat was removed, action-reaction mobilization no longer 
worked. Activists moved forward to other causes or back into their private lives. 
Discussion 
The PMP model for social movements was applied to the anti-fracking movement in 
Bulgaria in order to highlight the logic of its development, the challenges and accomplishments 
in its attempt to shape a new policy. Political mediation in the fracking issue was phase-specific: 
the movement attempted to act directly on the institutional PMP when formal rules allowed it; 
political figures and bureaucrats were targeted directly; and often indirect pressure was fostered 
by mass protests and a popular education and awareness campaign. A pattern is discernible 
where activists first attempted to use institutional channels for direct participation (e.g. the 
petition), but the unresponsiveness of the institutions turned their action to more disruptive and 
indirect actions. Perhaps ironically, the disruptive and mass movement tactics helped the 
movement foster solidarity and grassroots democracy within; the acceptance into the institutional 
PMP begat conflicts between two ways of policy-making: formal, representative, and non-
transparent vs. spontaneous, participatory and “authentic.” Another remarkable observation is 
that the movement took the de facto useless tools of institutional participation and turned them 
into instruments for other uses, more disruptive and societally-oriented. Thus the petition was 
used to disseminate information and mobilize bystanders for the biggest protest on January 14. 
Finally, the AFM put indirect pressure on politicians by presenting an alternative process of 
making politics – more participatory and focused on the common good. 
Strategic adaptation can also be seen from a fresh perspective within the PMP model. 
There was certain learning by trial and error within phases when activists attempted different 
tactics depending on phase-specific openings and exclusions. There was also adaptation across 
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phases, for example when research influenced the strategy of the movement with regard to 
demands, with the increased attention to technology application, or the shift to a more critical 
perception of the government. These processes of adaptation were not as reflective as the 
concept implies (McCammon et al, 2008): some adaptation decisions were a choice of the 
familiar, which in this case were street protests. An important limitation to strategic adaptation 
activities was the lack of clear structure and leadership in the AFM. The analysis of the 
movement also sensitizes the observer to the issue of adaptation vs. confrontation of the political 
context. The institutional and challenger PMPs presented different and contrary logic of 
operation. The movement often attempted to forcibly impose its logic on the institutions, and 
sometimes succeeded, as evident from the admissions of “a political decision” by members of 
parliament. And in a very important moment the AFM adapted pragmatically to the non-
transparent process of policy formulation. This dichotomy corresponds to the pragmatism-values 
dilemma in movement democracy and will be discussed in paper 3. 
Conclusion 
The case study and the findings from it have certain limitations. The perspective of the 
political actors and targets of the AFM is missing, which weakens the analysis of actions, 
reactions, intentions and influences in the PM cycle. The analysis can also be strengthened by 
comparisons across cases of social movements (Stake, 1995), where variations in important 
themes and elements of the PMP can clarify the concepts and their usefulness, and advance 
stronger inferences for causal relationships (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The analysis here, for the 
sake of manageability, also simplifies the movement in treating it as a single entity. Instead, it 
can be examined in more detail as an arena of politics itself. The diversity within the AFM is 
better represented in Studies 2 and 3. 
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The study’s conclusions span several directions. The PMP model for social movements 
was presented through the experiences of the anti-fracking movement in Bulgaria. The PMP 
model builds on prior policy-oriented SM research and adds several directions of analysis. The 
model allows for a closer, more discriminate look at established concepts such as political 
opportunities, movement organization, and framing processes; these can be examined across 
PMP phases. Social movements by definition act at least partly outside institutional channels. By 
introducing the PMP model, we can focus more specifically on points of access and points of 
exclusion of citizens from the institutional PMP. This conceptualization is consistent with a 
policy-specific opportunity structure – the anti-fracking movement had to act in a political 
environment specific to the issue at stake. In practical terms, we can focus on where exactly 
extra-institutional pressure on policy making is needed – these are the phases that are closed to 
direct and meaningful citizen participation. 
We go a step further by exploring not just actions at specific phases of the institutional 
PMP, but also by treating the actions of the movement as a challenger PMP. The anti-fracking 
movement carried out within itself a full-fledged PMP – from issue identification to choice of a 
policy. For a challenger’s PMP, a crucial issue is the starting point: where does the issue stand on 
the institutional PP? Is there already an on-going policy formation on the issue? In the case of the 
anti-fracking movement, the activists had to create a whole policy-specific PMP from scratch 
because of the total novelty of the problem and the lack of prior action on the level of 
government. 
This challenger PMP, while driven by activists within the movement, also had to interact 
with the institutional PMP. These points of interface were contentious in that two different logics 
of forming policy met, in conflict or conformity. These interactions had important consequences 
48 
 
for the movement democracy within the AFM. However, despite the power differential, the 
institutional logic sometimes also submitted to the protest logic. Also, political instruments 
provided by the institutions turned into tools with different purposes and sometimes unexpected 
effects when used within the protest logic. These observations add important nuances to the 
established dichotomies of institutional and extra-institutional means that define social 
movements. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Protocol 
 Introduce yourself and the study again. Solicit reactions or questions before starting. Inform the 
interviewee that the interview is expected to last up to two hours, but they can stop at any time.  
Thank for the participation. 
1. How did you join the action against fracking? 
o When? How did you learn about the problem and the movement? 
o How did you get information about the problem? 
o How did you decide to get involved? 
o What previous experience with civic action – individual or collective – had you 
had? How did it matter? 
• What did you do in the local group/movement? What was your role? 
o What skills and qualities of yours you think are most valuable in the action? 
o What kind of relationships do you have with other participants? How well do 
you know them? 
o How does your work in the group go with your professional and private life? 
How much time does it take? 
o How do you speak about the movement to your friends? How do they react? 
Have some of them joined the movement with you? 
o What did you experience while you participated in the movement? Positive and 
negative? 
o What drives you to go on? 
• Was there any change, a development in your engagement, in your functions and role? 
• Why do you think the problem with fracking occurred in Bulgaria? 
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o How did you see the possibility to influence the political decision? 
o How did your participation affect your attitudes to politics, to democracy? 
o How do you explain the paradox that Bulgarian citizens are allegedly passive, 
but so many people marched out to protest? 
2. (Local group) How does your group function? 
o How was your group created? 
o What previous structures or relationships were built upon? 
o Describe to me the activities in your local anti-fracking group. 
o What are the main functions and activities on the group? 
o What actions did the group take? 
o What is most important for the group to work well? 
o How do you plan and make decisions? 
o What leadership emerged and how did it contribute to the group? 
o What kind of relationships developed among participants? (Personal or work-
only? Do you meet other participants outside the work against fracking?) 
• What kinds of people participate in the group? 
o How do you attract new participants? 
• What are your group’s most important resources? Your strengths? 
o What were your most successful activities? What did you do well? 
o What was the greatest shortage that you felt? 
o What were the main difficulties and the weaker sides of your organization? 
Conflicts? 
o How did you overcome them? 
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• How did your group develop in time? What changed in it? 
o How did the group become stronger? 
o What was the most critical moment for your group? What was its significance? 
• How did you interact with the national movement against fracking? 
o How did the national-level effort start? 
o How did you coordinate actions? How did you communicate? 
o How were responsibilities distributed between local groups and the national 
organization? 
o How were you connected with other local groups? 
o How did you learn from each other? 
3. (National level participant) What is the movement against fracking? 
• How did it start? How did it get organized? 
o What existing structures (organizations) or networks were built upon? 
• What is the structure of the movement? What elements and functions there are in the 
movement? How are they performed? 
o How did you plan activities and took decisions? 
o What leaders emerged and how were they helpful? 
o What kinds of relationships developed between participants? 
o What kinds of people take part in the movement? 
o How did the movement attract new participants? 
• What are the most important resources of the movement? Its strengths? How were 
they put to use? 
o What were your most successful activities? What did you do well? 
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o What were the most important qualities and skills of participants? 
o What were the most important shortages you felt? 
o What were the main difficulties and weaknesses of the organization? Conflicts? 
o How were these difficulties and weaknesses overcome? 
• How did the movement develop in time? What phases did it go through? 
o What was the most critical moment? What was its significance? 
• How did the national movement relate to local community groups? 
o How were responsibilities distributed between local groups and the national 
organization? 
o How did you communicate and coordinate actions? 
o How did you exchange experience? 
4. How did the movement succeed in influencing the decision on the ban? 
• How did you see the possibility of influencing the decision of the government? What 
was the path by which you planned to have an effect? (Related to the question about 
why the problem occurred.) 
o How were the demands of the protests formulated? 
o What was your idea of success? What were the goals and how were they set? 
o What kinds of actions did you undertake and why? What forms of protest? 
When, where and how were the protests staged? 
• What factors in the larger society do you think had a bearing upon the problem and 
the protests? 
o What factors helped the movement? 
o What factors hindered the movement? 
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o What opportunities were present in the political situation? How did you use 
them? 
o Who were the allies and the enemies of the movement? What was their 
influence? 
• What strategies were applied given the resources and the political opportunities? 
o What strategies were used to avoid the negative factors? 
• How did the interaction with public institutions and the government happen? What 
were their reactions? 
o What powers had the two sides (the movement and the institutions)? 
o Why do you think the government yield to the demands of the citizens? What is 
the explanation for the effectiveness of the protests? 
o To what extent were the goals accomplished? 
o What are the outcomes from the movement? 
• What remains after this effort? What will happen next? How do you see any 
sustainability of civic action? 
5. How was the issue of fracking discussed and debated in public space and the media?  
o How did the public debate unfold? 
o Who were the participants in the debate? 
o How do you explain the position of your opponents? 
o What were the main versions that explained the issue? What were the 
explanations about the motivations of the two sides? 
o What was the role of the media? 
o How did the explanations change during the campaign against fracking? 
61 
 
o How was the public opinion won? 
6. What do you think is unique or specific about the Bulgarian movement compared to the 
other movements against fracking in the world? 
What are you interested to know about the movement? What else should I ask? And 
whom? 
 
Ask if it is OK to contact the participant for clarifying some of the answers. Thank again for the 
participation and provide contacts for further communication. 
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MEANING-MAKING IN THE ANTI-FRACKING MOVEMENT IN BULGARIA 
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Introduction 
The processes and outputs of meaning-making are crucial for the direction, scale, and 
sustainability of a movement’s impact (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996). Framing is 
instrumental in recognizing and explaining a problem, in formulating a politically viable solution 
and the strategy to achieve it. Moreover, through meaning-making and signifying work activists 
accomplish internal and environmentally-directed tasks: attract new recruits, sustain 
commitment, acquire resources, generate media coverage, garner the support of bystander 
publics, and demobilize and constrain the options of opponents (Benford & Snow, 2000; 
McAdam, 1996). The purpose of this study is to explore and describe meaning-making in the 
AFM in Bulgaria: how activists developed understandings of a novel technology and its complex 
interactions with nature, of the main actors and workings of the policy conflict, and furthermore, 
how this knowledge helped movement mobilization, organization, and action. 
Theoretical Framework 
Frames and Framing 
Framing analysis (Snow & Benford, 1988) is probably the most preferred approach to the 
study of meaning-making in social contention. Snow and Benford borrow the term “frame” from 
Goffman (1974) meaning “schemata of interpretation” that enable individuals "to locate, 
perceive, identify, and label" events and objects in their world (p. 21). Snow and Benford 
transform this individual-level concept into collective action frames (CAFs), which are “action-
oriented sets of beliefs and meanings” (Benford & Snow, 2000) for interpreting the world in 
ways that are “intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander 
support, and to demobilize antagonists (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198).” Again borrowing from 
Goffman, collective action frames are posited to create meaning in three ways: they punctuate or 
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amplify, i.e. make certain occurrences or features more important while leaving others “out of 
frame” (Snow, 2004); they attribute causality for the amplified phenomena; and they articulate 
links among the amplified phenomena and other occurrences, experiences, and meanings. 
 Collective action frames are both inputs and outputs of framing processes – interactions 
for negotiating meaning within the SM, and between the SM and adherents, opponents, targets, 
and the public. Snow and his colleagues (1988) make a workable typology of framing processes 
based on their task, borrowing from Wilson’s (1973) three functions of ideology. First, 
diagnostic framing is meaning-making work on problem identification and explanation. It 
involves focusing attention to a social occurrence, interpreting it as unjust and human-made and 
not natural (Gamson, 1995), identifying victims, causes and culpable agents. Second, prognostic 
framing involves the articulation of a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem and the 
strategies for achieving it. Third, motivation framing provides a rationale for engaging and 
persevering in collective action aimed at solving the problem. Benford and Snow (2000) list 
severity, urgency, efficacy, and propriety as “vocabularies of motive” for action. Gamson (1992) 
elaborates on “elements of framing” – injustice, agency, and identity – that map onto this (but 
not only) framing process. A cognitive and affective aspect of injustice makes people aware and 
willing to take action. Agency – or collective efficacy and sense of power compared to 
opponents – is necessary for people to engage in struggle. Identity is a self-definition in an 
adversarial way, contrasting “We” vs. “Them.” 
 Collective action frames are strategically deployed by SMOs for the objectives of a 
movement, in a process called frame alignment (Benford and Snow, 2000). Frame alignment 
involves linking the meanings (frames) constructed by the movement to meanings (frames) of 
recipients like supporters, bystanders, the state or opponents. The success of frame alignment 
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depends on the resonance of the frame deployed by the movement (Benford and Snow, 2000). 
Resonance (defined parsimoniously as effectiveness or mobilizing potency) depends on the 
credence and salience of the proffered frame. Credibility in turn is a function of frame 
consistency, empirical credibility, and credibility of the articulators. Relative salience depends on 
the frame’s centrality in the lives of recipients, its experiential commensurability, and narrative 
fidelity (cultural resonance).  
 Finally, one important concept in frame analysis is master frames (Snow & Benford, 
1992). These are frames that are “quite broad in terms of scope, functioning as a kind of master 
algorithm that colors and constrains the orientations and activities of other movements (Benford 
& Snow, 2000, p. 618).” These frames are usually conceived by successful movements in the 
onsets of protest cycles (Snow & Benford, 1992) and are then adopted or strategically used by 
other movements. 
Framing in the AFM: A Modified Approach 
Interpretive and strategic framing. The classic framing analysis approach described in 
the previous section was modified to address some weaknesses – both general, critiqued by 
scholars in the past, and specific with regard to this study. First of all, the concept of a CAF 
obscures important qualities of meaning-making within a movement. CAFs are often tapped 
from movement statements or materials (Johnston, 2002) where a movement’s depictions of a 
problem, solution, and call to action are presented to a public the movement attempts to 
persuade. However, an important distinction is necessary between framing within a movement 
and framing for the public. Benford and Snow (2000) define “discursive” and “strategic” 
processes of framing: the former being frame amplification and articulation within the 
movement, the latter being frame alignment: “deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed efforts to 
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deploy frames for a specific purpose (p. 624).” 
 This distinction between discursive and strategic meaning construction is not often 
implemented analytically to the full extent of its implications for practical and conceptual 
reasons. Very briefly, a movement’s CAF or philosophy is more easily accessible from public 
texts (e.g. Gerhards & Rucht, 1992); when a frame is used as a variable, scholars turn to publicly 
available sources or use a single item to sort organizations into predefined categories (e.g. 
Andrews & Edwards, 2005). On a conceptual level, Snow and Benford and their colleagues 
borrowed from two frameworks that were focused more on interpretation than strategy: 
Goffman’s concept of frame (1974) and Wilson’s of ideology (1973). From these two they 
coined “collective action frames,” a concept that makes two leaps away from interpretation – to 
the collective level and toward action (strategy). The collective level of analysis necessitates a 
focus on the frames that movements deploy on behalf of all activists and SMOs. This insertion of 
an action emphasis is problematic in that it directs attention toward how SMOs “inspire and 
legitimate activities” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614) to external recipients of meanings and 
away from meaning-making within the movement. The study of meaning construction can be 
conducted in its own right if strategic tasks of meaning-making are analytically separated from 
interpretive processes. 
 Such a distinction, and a focus on what I will call interpretive processes within a 
movement, brings two benefits. First, instead of a CAF, we can explore the diversity and 
interweaving of within-movement meanings, frames and ideologies (Gillan, 2008; Oliver & 
Johnston, 2000). Meaning-making in movements is most often an object of contention, of “frame 
disputes (Benford, 1993).” The solidified, logical message contained in a CAF as a public 
statement (e.g. Gerhards & Rucht, 1992) does not “exist” in a movement. Instead, a “network of 
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messages” (Franzosi, 1998) is suspended in a movement discourse with interacting and 
competing claims and visions. In the anti-fracking movement, as focused on a complex issue, a 
plurality of diverse explanations and activist identities merged into a collective policy challenge. 
The second benefit from distinguishing between interpretive and strategic (or persuasive) 
framing is that we can discern differences (sometimes contradictions) between the two. For 
example, battered women developed an understanding of themselves as empowered survivors 
within a feminist community but had to present their cases within a victimhood frame in the 
courtroom to gain legitimacy (Polletta & Chen, 2012). In an enlightening study of collective 
resistance to incinerators, Kubal (1998) describes the differences in political claims between 
discussions among activists (“back region”) and those with the wider public (“front region”). 
Such differences between “back” and “front” are understandable when we think about the 
movement as strategically adapting to “discursive opportunity structures” (Koopmans & 
Statham, 1999): salient, even hegemonic, beliefs, values, ideologies in the larger culture or 
discursive field (Steinberg, 1999), often institutionalized in laws, sometimes occurring 
temporarily from political or economic events (Ferree, 2003; McCammon et al, 2007). 
Ideologies and identities. Meaning-making within a movement can be studied more 
rigorously if we also use finer lenses when we distinguish between frames on the one hand, and 
ideologies and identity on the other. Ideologies are systems of meaning that contain “assertions 
and theories about the nature of social life with values and norms relevant to promoting or 
resisting social change” (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, p. 44). Compared to frames, ideologies are 
much more articulated, organized and coherent (Swidler, 1986); they are related to theories of 
society beyond the particular contested issue; and they are more stable and profound, so 
socialization, education and critical reflection, not alignment or “marketing” are the processes of 
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meaning construction and diffusion (Oliver & Johnston, 2000; Rochon, 1998). Movements can 
be driven by a coherent ideology, pragmatic imperatives with no ideology at all, or some middle 
course (Westby, 2002). Sometimes movements strategically use the dominant ideology as their 
frame in order to discourage repression against them (Westby, 2002) or to legitimize demands 
against the authoritarian state (Noonan, 1995). 
Another cluster of SM meanings is collective identity. Hunt, Benford, and Snow (1994) 
treat identity as the framing of an actor in a social contention. Identity is therefore a set of 
imputations about actors relevant to the movement: the protagonist, the antagonist, and the 
audience. Similar to ideology though, identity should be studied as a much more elaborated 
system of meanings within a movement. Collective identity is “the shared definition of a group 
that derives from members’ common interests, experiences, and solidarity (Taylor & Whittier, 
1992, p. 105).” Sometimes shared attributes are “given” (Gamson, 1991), determined by 
structural positions or power institutions, but most of the time scholars are interested in emerging 
activist identities that are shaped in the challenging of political and cultural dominance. 
Collective identity is more fluid than ideology – it is mostly shaped in the interaction among 
activists and between activists and outsiders, including opponents and dominant institutions. 
In the influential framework of Taylor and Whittier (1992), collective identity has three 
elements: boundaries, consciousness, and negotiation. Boundaries are the structures that establish 
and signify differences between the collectivity and other groups. Boundaries highlight self-
affirming and positive in-group characteristics in contrast to dominant values and structures. 
Consciousness is a concept close to ideology: it is the interpretive frameworks emerging from the 
struggle of the group to assert its interests. It involves attributions of issues to systemic rather 
than individual failings and also a sense of agency. Negotiation involves symbols and practices 
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that the group uses to resist and change systems of domination and cultural codes, in protest and 
everyday life. 
This study distinguishes between frames, ideologies, and identities and explores to what 
extent meanings and interpretive framing within the AFM were influenced by or developed into 
ideologies and identities. It also acknowledges the varying levels of elaboration of these meaning 
constructions, drawing from scholars who use intermediate concepts such as orientational frames 
(Gillan, 2008), discourses (Brulle, 1996), philosophies (Andrews & Edwards, 2005), and non-
comprehensive collective identities (Saunders, 2008), i.e. groups that come together for strategic 
reasons but do not develop the full system of definitions and elements. 
Discourses and narratives. Another important concept used in this study is discourse as 
distinctive from ideology and master frames. Master frames are higher-order meaning 
constructions by which a movement can take advantage of previous movements’ successes 
(Snow & Benford, 1992), for example framing their challenge as a struggle for “rights” or 
signaling “feminism” to potential supporters. Steinberg (1999) opposes a treatment of frames as 
resources for a movement because very often a master frame is used both by opponents and 
activists; it is not “owned” or “controlled” by the movement.  
Steinberg (1999) and other scholars prefer to use the term “discourse” to signify how a 
worldview is shared in the public sphere where contention occurs. Drawing on Dryzek (2005), 
Hajer (1995), and Steinberg (1999), a discourse is a specific ensemble of vocabularies, rules of 
language use, concepts and categorizations, recognized entities and agents, and key tropes 
(rhetorical devices such as metaphors and metonymies) that are “produced, reproduced, and 
transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and 
social realities (Hajer, 1995, p. 44).” Certain discourses, for example economic or natural-
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science discourses, are established by powerholders by virtue of “institutional control and social 
standing” (Steinberg, 1999) as the commonsensical and legitimate ways of viewing certain social 
issues. A discourse is thus not a resource of a movement, but it can nonetheless challenge claims 
by powerholders because a discourse is multivocal (Steinberg, 1999): key words and tropes (e.g. 
“rights”) have multiple meanings given their contextual use.  
With the multiple discourses around an issue and the multivocality of discourses, 
coherence is not an essential discourse feature (Hajer, 1995). How do framing processes then 
produce claims that serve interpretive and strategic purposes? Narratives play a crucial role in 
creating coherent knowledge about an issue. Narratives have been studied in framing research as 
forms of expressing a frame (Lakoff, 2006; Polletta, 1998). In contrast, frames are often 
presented as cause-effect propositions from public movement statements. Polkinghorne (1998) 
discusses the difference between this logico-scientific understanding and narrative 
comprehending. Within the former, “explanation is understood to occur when an event can be 
identified as an instance of an established law or pattern of relationship among categories (p. 21; 
Gerhards and Rucht’s study [1992] is an oft-cited example of such frames).” Narratives, on the 
other hand, explain events and actions by putting them in a plot, by showing their contributions 
to a whole; they are considered the ordinary way of knowing for lay people (Polkinghorne, 
1998). Key elements of narratives are goals, motives and agents (Polkinghorne, 1998); agents 
have roles such as heroes, villains, victims, helpers (Lakoff, 2006; Polletta, 1998); key words and 
metaphors explain motives or relationships (Hajer, 1995; Polletta, 1998). Some plotlines are 
culturally established and easily accessible (Lakoff, 2006; Polkinghorne, 1988). For Hajer 
(1995), story-lines are crucial for “discursive closure”: the achievement of a common 
understanding of a specific phenomenon by actors with diverse discourses. Story-lines combine 
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elements from different discourses and put the involved actors in positions acceptable by them.  
Meaning-making mechanisms. The focus on interpretive processes and the content of 
movement frames requires also a finer method for studying the mechanisms of meaning. 
Framing analysis is focused more on resonance, or how a movement’s claim relates to the 
knowledge of a target public. Explanation is making something unknown known by connecting it 
to existing knowledge (Moscovici, 1984; 2000). Within a movement, in processes of 
interpretation, the focus is on the relation of the new issues, events, and actors (e.g. fracking) to 
the existing knowledge of activists. Social representations theory (Hoijer, 2011; Wagner et al, 
1999) has developed tools for examining such connections; it elaborates mechanisms of 
interpretation, which correspond to cultural cognition (schemata) and linguistics theory 
(DiMaggio, 1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). Analogies connect an unknown object to a known 
one and the two are subsumed under a more general category (DiMaggio, 1997). Metaphors 
draw a connection between two objects based on some similarity (Hoijer, 2011; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 2003). Metonymy is similar to metaphor in involving the substitution of one thing for 
another but with metonymy the relationship between the two things has a status of common 
sense (Polletta, 2006). A connection can also be oppositional, or anchored in antinomies (Hoijer, 
2011): a phenomenon understood in opposition to something known (cf. oppositional identity in 
Gamson [1992]). Objectification (Hoijer, 2011) makes the unknown familiar by transforming it 
to something concrete from our experience; it is especially important for the grasping of complex 
and abstract issues. Powerful images fall into this category (Gamson & Lasch, 1983). Finally, 
Steinberg (1999) emphasizes the dialogical nature of discourse and meaning-making: activists 
take “cues” from texts, opponents and other discourse participants to connect novel to familiar 
ideas. The activists’ texts in this study were examined with sensitivity to such mechanisms. 
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Place and nature in framing. Two objects within the fracking issue in Bulgaria were 
important for the interpretive processes within the movement and were thus included in the 
analysis: the threatened place (region) and nature. I have discussed the importance of notions of 
place and nature for local environmental grassroots activism elsewhere (Mihaylov & Perkins, 
2015). Place-framing analysis is an application of framing theory from social movements, 
focused on “the material and symbolic dimensions of place as a basis for collective, identity-
based activism (Larsen, 2008, p. 174).” Fragility and uniqueness are commonly ascribed as 
characteristics of the natural environment (Burley et al, 2007). These features often create a 
sense of local ownership, a moral obligation to protect, to act on behalf of voiceless nature 
(Martin, 2003; McLachlan, 2009). Then, nature is also a complex system, and even more 
complex is its relationship with human systems (Fischer, 2000; Johnson & Frickel, 2011). 
Furthermore, environmental disruption is produced by the use of complex technologies, resulting 
in varying levels of threat complexity (Johnson & Frickel, 2011). Consequently, experts are 
summoned by proponents of development to testify about the innocuousness of technological 
intervention. Activists are in a quandary where their claims are pitted against expert knowledge 
and notions of certainty (Fischer, 2000; Rootes, 2007; 2013). Interpretation of technology and its 
fit with nature becomes an important task of activism (McLachlan, 2009).  
The study of meaning-making in environmentalism has elaborated types of 
environmental discourses (Brulle, 1996; 2000; see Dryzek, 2005 for an alternative typology). 
They contain beliefs and prescriptions about the relationship between humans and nature, the 
ontology of nature, and the place of nature-human relations in other systems (economic, social). 
Examples most relevant to this study are discourses of preservation, conservation, environmental 
health, and deep ecology (Brulle, 1996; 2000; Carmichael et al, 2012). 
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Research Topics and Questions 
This paper presents an exploratory study of the interpretive, back-region framing in the 
anti-fracking movement in Bulgaria. The analytic strategy was to start from partial, object related 
meanings, to map a network of meanings and the mechanisms that produced them and see how 
they aggregated to higher-order meaning constructions such as discourses and narratives. This is 
a different strategy from the more frequent analysis of collective, coherent and logical frames 
and framing tasks in public documents. The major research questions guiding the analysis were: 
What objects and agents were seen as important around the issue of fracking? How were 
they and their relationships interpreted? How did activists make sense of fracking and connect 
the new technology to their existing knowledge? How did activists interpret the link between 
nature and fracking? To what extent meanings and interpretive framing within the AFM were 
influenced by or developed into larger meaning system such as ideologies and identities? How 
were the partial meanings placed in discourses and narratives? What were the social-cognitive 
and culture-cognitive mechanisms of meaning-making?  How were activists’ meanings shaped 
by the Bulgarian cultural tool kit? How did actions and texts outside the movement influence 
interpretive framing? How did the threatened place (region) and nature feature in the 
understanding of the issue? What were the implications of interpretive meaning-making for the 
actions and strategy of the AFM? 
Methods 
 Qualitative methods of inquiry are especially well-suited for the exploration and 
description of meanings (Creswell, 2007; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Meaning-making processes in 
social movements are usually accessed through interviews with activists and examination of 
movement texts (Johnston, 2002). Then qualitative analysis, supported to some point with 
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continuous data collection, provides the thick descriptions and comprehensive understandings of 
participants’ individual and collective perspectives. 
Data Collection 
Interviews. Semi-structured interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 2012) with current and former 
activists were conducted to access and explore information about their own and collective 
meaning-making processes. Sampling, process and instrumentation are described in detail in 
Study One. Several questions inquired directly about interpretations in the AFM: about the 
sources of the problem, about the desired solutions, and about the public debate around fracking. 
Movement texts, documents, and images. Textual and visual data were collected in the 
course of movement actions and retrospectively, mostly from Facebook-based archives and a 
few from the media. Facebook groups were semi-private movement spaces where current and 
general issues were discussed with candor and bluntness, facilitating “back region” or 
interpretive communication. These data are also described in Study One. They were treated as 
complementary to the interviews because the public statements were directed to external 
audiences and therefore had elements of strategic framing, while the minutes and discussions did 
not allow additional probing for meanings. 
As part of movement data relevant to meaning-making, an additional 147 off-topic 
messages in activist Facebook groups were collected. Off-topic messages were quite common 
and accepted in the groups. Their usefulness for framing analysis comes from treating them as 
free association tasks similarly to the social representations studies of meanings (Devine-Wright, 
2010; Wagner et al, 1996). A free association task in a survey might read “Write, as quickly as 
you can, any words or phrases that come to mind when you think about…” (Devine-Wright, 
2010). In the case of off-topic messages these were spontaneous (not researcher-tasked), 
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naturalistically-prompted (not instrument-prompted) associations activists made between 
fracking (actors, technology, impacts) and other issues. Associations or analogies between new 
and unfamiliar phenomena and known concepts are a basic way of adding new to existing 
knowledge (DiMaggio, 1997; Hoijer, 2011). To use an example from the AFM, an off-topic 
posting about an upcoming protest against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) suggests that the poster considers the issues of fracking and TTIP connected, and 
probably generalized under a “people vs. corporations” master conflict. 
 Facebook off-topic messages were collected in a one-month period within the four local 
groups with highest activity (21.03.2012 - 21.04.2012). Off-topic messages were defined as 
those that were not about hydraulic fracturing or shale gas; not about Chevron or other 
companies that were granted licenses; not about movement actions or events. A total of 147 off-
topic messages by 65 posters were collected. Off-topic messages are a complementary source 
because they are inferior with regard to deeper and clearer exploration of meanings. 
Other sources. Publications in local and national media and direct observations of 
protest events supplied additional information. Media sources were useful to verify opinions and 
statements of government officials, experts and opponents of the AFM. The public debate on 
fracking shapes back region framing as it presents new information or counter-framing (“cues”), 
creates the need to interpret positions and motives in the conflict. Direct observation of protests 
provided contextual knowledge for the analysis of textual data, helped understanding the 
relationship between the movement’s meanings and practices. 
Data Analysis 
The collected data were analyzed in two cycles (Saldana, 2009): the first for summarizing 
and labeling meanings, the second for building categories and links between them. MaxQDA, a 
76 
 
software application for qualitative analysis, was used for coding and sorting the data. In the first 
coding cycle, structural codes (Saldana, 2009) were assigned to segments pertaining to topics of 
inquiry stemming from my conceptual framework: understandings of main actors, the problem, 
the threat, the conflict, solutions, and the social order. Simultaneously, initial (open) coding 
(Charmaz, 2006) allowed the extraction of important ideas within and outside the topics initially 
formulated, for example, “spontaneity,” “truth,” and “naturalness.” One important finding was 
that interviewees often used oppositional meanings and definitions. I used versus coding 
(identifying in binary terms entities in direct conflict with each other) to capture these (Saldana, 
2009; Wolcott, 2003; cf. “indigenous contrasts” in Emerson et al, 1995). 
In a second stage of coding I coded within and across segments, reflected on the data and 
wrote analytical memos (Charmaz, 2006). Open-coded segments were analyzed with the 
constant comparative method (Corbin & Strauss, 2007; Miles & Huberman, 1994) to create more 
general categories, which in turn were compared and expanded with newly-coded statements. 
More details on the approach to analysis and the ensuring of trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985) are presented in Study One. The emerging categories were applied to Facebook off-topic 
messages to verify and enrich the meanings extracted from the interviews. 
Given that the first interviews were conducted seven months, and the last ones two years 
after the beginning of the protests in Bulgaria, the understandings and explanations of my 
participants were solidified and elaborate. The interviews provided a good retrospective view at 
the activists’ explanatory frameworks. The contemporary processes of emergence of the 
meanings were partly accessible through public statements and internal Facebook discussions. 
Findings 
Meaning-making in the movement is presented in this section following the logic 
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advanced in the theoretical framework: from partial, object-related meanings, to tentative links 
among them, to aggregations of higher-order meaning constructions. Table 1 summarizes the 
interpretive framing of important objects and actors. The discussion section is a synthesis of the 
identities, ideologies, discourses and storylines in the movement. 
Table 1. 
Interpretive Framing of the Main Objects and Actors in the Anti-fracking Movement. 
Object/actor Imputations Key ideas Meaning-making 
mechanisms 
Implications 
Activists “A new generation” 
Victims 
Environmentalists 
Patriots 
Citizens 
Spontaneity 
Truth 
 
Common good 
 
Oppositions 
Labels 
Links to nature 
Legitimacy 
Mobilization 
Informality 
“Positive” 
protests 
Fortifying myths 
Technology Harmful 
Catastrophic 
Incontrollable 
Irreversible 
Incongruent 
 
 
Incongruity 
Truth 
Images 
Chernobyl 
metaphor 
Local knowledge 
Cultural rationality 
Lateral 
Literal 
Reflexive 
Protests for show 
of problem 
Mobilization 
Expert debate 
Political pressure 
Experts Paid off experts Autonomy Distrust to Research 
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No experts 
Paid experts 
We are experts 
Citizen experts 
Openness authority 
Lateral discourse 
Literal 
Reflexive 
Politics of 
knowledge 
Establish 
controversy 
Nature Resource 
Healthy 
environment 
Value in itself 
Victim, voiceless 
Omnipotent force 
Natural 
Incongruity 
(with money) 
Common good 
Different scales 
Bulgaria 
Place experiences 
Mobilization 
Legitimacy 
Fortifying myths 
Company, 
Money, 
Capitalism 
Exploitative 
Robbing 
Speculative, fake 
Corrupting 
Source of evil 
Incongruity 
(with life and 
nature) 
Secrecy 
Company history 
USA 
Post-socialism 
 
Mobilization 
Inclusivity 
No coalitions 
with business 
Fortifying myths 
Government Formal and 
personal 
Corrupt 
Incompetent 
Traitorous 
Oppressive 
Absurdity 
Political 
 
Resolution 
capability 
Secrecy 
Interactions 
Interpellation 
Opposition 
Moratorium 
solution strategy 
Mobilization 
Protests for show 
of force 
 
Activists 
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Key ideas: spontaneity and truth. Two words were used frequently in the stories of 
participants, and especially in their descriptions of actions and reasoning: spontaneity and truth. 
The word “spontaneity” appears in 16 of 24 interviews; more than 60 times in total and many 
more times is implied with similar expressions. In one of its very first self-descriptions in a 
leaflet, the movement is described as “a spontaneously arisen above-party citizen alliance in 
defense of Bulgarian nature.” The importance of spontaneity in activism narratives has a striking 
parallel with Polletta’s study of 1960 sit-ins in the United States (1998) where it was “the 
repeated word” in activists’ stories. 
First, “spontaneity” meant that activists were independent, self-activated, and self-driven. 
In most interviews, activists recounted how they first learned about and informed themselves 
about fracking, then decided to do something about it, then found other people like them. This 
narrative was contrasted to “organized” action, associated with party or special interests 
involvement. The story also fit well the experiences of the many first-time activists in the 
movement who “were absolute strangers to each other, meaning nothing was arranged.” The 
association of organization with self-interest is as commonsensical as a metonymy in the 
Bulgarian media and public sphere, so spontaneity had both interpretive and strategic importance. 
Also, the notion strongly influenced the main movement strategy, information dissemination, as 
activists saw bystanders as only needing “the truth” to spontaneously join the protests. 
Second, spontaneity also stood for reactive, passionate, emotion-driven action. The 
emotional reaction to the threat of fracking was important for the agency of first-time activists 
who had to overcome lack of experience and self-restraining notions of powerlessness. 
Spontaneity as emotional intensity and authenticity was also very important in how activists 
explained the winning of people for the cause in face-to-face conversations where “people see 
80 
 
that we are sincere, they cannot fail to sense it…. this energy flowing from us infected more and 
more people.” Finally, this intensity of reaction was seen as leverage in negotiations with the 
government where spontaneity meant that no bargaining was possible: no one was in control of 
the spontaneous crowds and nothing but the fulfilling of demands could stop the protests. 
Spontaneity was also used as a descriptor for the informal, unstructured way actions 
happened within the movement, with lack of planning, leaders, written rules: “organization is 
created every day,” work is planned “today for tomorrow, even today for today.” “Strategy is 
always born spontaneously, never drawn and written…. All was being born on the spot…. 
Strategy is born on the street; it is not a backroom strategy. And that’s what’s true about it.” 
Finally, “spontaneity” was used to describe the “natural” ways of organizing without an 
organization. “Whoever had ideas shared them with the rest and we discussed them collectively, 
then took decisions whether to go after them. Everything happened totally spontaneously and 
without controversies.” Spontaneity stands to explain how first-time activists, who are also “very 
different” from each other, can come together and coordinate their efforts without using 
symbolically discredited practices of organization. But in this function, spontaneity 
simultaneously explains and fails to explain action (Polletta, 1998). “Simply spontaneously” is 
often where argumentation of individual or group reasons and actions stops. Spontaneity 
explained and justified how strategy was charted, how decisions were made, how leaders 
emerged, and how power between Sofia and other groups was distributed. Thus the movement 
was really experienced as an alternative to a flawed and corrupt political system, whose ills were 
subsumed under the “organization” metonymy; in contrast, in the anti-fracking movement things 
happened not in a contrived, master-minded way, but “naturally.” For some activists, spontaneity 
as naturalness became a sign for a larger, “world historical force” (Polletta, 1998), that helped the 
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movement succeed, a fortifying myth (Voss, 1996) that no matter what the odds, the tribulations 
and the defeats, they would prevail in the end. “Things happen spontaneously”, one activist said; 
“I don’t think that any one of us, even the group as a whole, controls the processes. Things 
simply happen miraculously, some things happen at the right moment that help our cause, 
confirm our ideas and demands.” 
“Truth” was another very important word in the narratives of activists. It appears 
approximately 80 times in interviews and also in many Facebook discussions. Truth, as in “living 
in truth,” was a key value in dissident movements in Eastern European socialist countries 
(Goldfarb, 2007) and the dissident meanings had parallels in the anti-fracking movement. 
First of all, truth was seen as the main movement’s weapon in the conflict with the 
government. The latter’s actions, in collusion with the media, were characterized as secrecy, lies, 
or “populism.” Many of these non-truths concerned what Arendt (1973, cited in Goldfarb, 2007) 
dubbed “factual truth” – the government trying to cover up or deny facts (such as incidents from 
fracking or incidences of protests) and thus to distort and control the “philosophical truth,” the 
interpretation of facts in the public debate. Partly as a reaction to the modus operandi of this 
undemocratic government, truth was the movement’s banner. Practically its strategy involved 
mass information dissemination, “information on all levels”, “informing rather than protesting.” 
More than a reactive strategy, truth was also a pivotal notion in the interpretive frame of 
power, protest, and society. Interviewees saw power in Bulgaria as based on deception and 
secrecy, on “ignorance and unawareness where you don’t know what’s happening, when 
someone acts upon you behind you.” The role of the movement was seen as shattering the 
illusion of consent and the claim of the “populist government” that “it cares for the people.” The 
anti-fracking activists saw themselves as instrumental in spreading the truth to others, “letting the 
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people see,” “educating, informing, waking the people up.” The government’s reaction to truth 
“coming out in the open” then is that “things are not going well for them – it becomes too clear 
and intelligible for the common citizen outside.” In this regard one environmentalist with 
experience prior to 1989 drew a direct parallel between the two undemocratic regimes – the 
totalitarian and the authoritarian-populist. Truth also contributed to the sense of agency and 
righteousness of the activists. They believed that they were making possible “the informed choice 
of the people” where the truth would help them “reach an insight” about how the government 
“takes decisions for them”; this realization would “set the people free”, restore “human dignity.” 
Speaking truth to people and power became a moral imperative (“Only with truth we will win”) 
and a fortifying myth: “truth ought to prevail…. it is human energy bound in one direction.” 
Symbolic demographics and boundaries. The activists often described themselves as a 
group, ascribing and interpreting certain qualities, profiles and boundaries of participation. First 
of all, there was a quite common idea that the anti-fracking protests were the expression of “a 
new generation,” “awake and young,” “twenty to forty-something.” This new generation was 
“free from fears of repression,” “with new expectations, emancipated,” “free from the thirst for 
money, ego,” “not dug into survival,” “free traveling, informed,” “interested,” “educated,” 
“fresh.” Most of the generational descriptions focused not on individual biographical availability 
(McAdam, 1986), but on more general contextual trends of post-material and emancipatory 
values. Many activists talked about people “waking up,” “growing spiritually” in a society that 
“needs time to mature”; some activists compared the AFM to the Occupy movement. Such 
consciousness also contributed to a fortifying myth of an unstoppable process. 
Another widely spread notion was that the movement was a collectivity of “wild 
individualists,” people who are “all very different from each other,” “individualities,” “persons.” 
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Frequently in discussions activists appealed to others to “subdue” and “win over” their “egos”; 
the texts create a sense of constant internal strife between “ego” and “unification.” These self-
descriptions fit well with the rationalizations of a non-hierarchical, informal, leaderless and 
spontaneous organization. The anti-fracking movement consisted of “many ones, not one with 
many zeroes”; it provided space where “no one is dependent on anyone,” “everyone felt he was 
in charge of his actions,” “and did only what he agreed about.” The AFM seems to share a new 
social movement pathos (Buechler, 1995). 
Boundary work, or the definition of us versus not-us, inclusion and exclusion, is also a 
very important meaning-making activity, and an element of identity formation (Taylor & 
Whittier, 1992). A very early observation from the interviews was that activists did not draw a 
firm line with “the people,” the general public they were trying to inform and educate. Activists 
saw their activities as spreading the “truth” so that other people would “spontaneously” join the 
movement, just like they had. In this sense, activists identified themselves with those they were 
persuading. This notion of a soft boundary was also supported by the experiences of multiple 
face-to-face contacts with people on the streets and in internet during the information campaign. 
Activists took pride in this authentic and egalitarian practice and contrasted it to the distorted 
media communication. The notion of a lack of boundary with “the people” both justified the 
strategy of persuasion and gave activists legitimacy in their own eyes of being “the people.” 
Boundaries did exist, and revealed themselves sometimes in conflicts. There were closed 
organizational groups on Facebook; sometimes activists prefaced their posts with warnings not to 
leak the information outside. People were excluded from the movement and were retrospectively 
framed as ego-motivated and dominating, having a hidden political agenda, or being too non-
conventional in their ideas. Such explanations obviously correspond to the self-descriptions of 
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activists as altruistic, apolitical, and balancing between emotion and reason (to be presented 
next). People who did not join the movement despite being invited (relatives, colleagues, passers-
by) were characterized as apathetic, self-focused consumers, or money-driven. Finally, there were 
groups that were not approached at all despite some activists’ suggestions to the contrary – these 
were mainly businesses and business associations. Activists had very strong notions of the 
incongruity between money and their idealistic cause. 
Protest identities. Throughout the protests several self-descriptions rich in meaning were 
sustained and shared within the movement. These were not different groups with their own 
identities, although there were pre-existing groups in the movement like environmentalists, 
communists and nationalist party members; these were rather shared and enduring identities that 
came forth at different times depending on the need for and context of use.  
Victims. “Victims” was the least explicitly used identity in the movement; it was a sort of 
baseline: the starting position of participants when they first realized (most often on their own) 
the looming threats. This is germane to NIMBY battles, which “all begin with the frustrated rage 
and fear of people who perceive themselves as victims and who see their quality of life 
threatened (Piller 1991, 12, cited in Fischer, 2000).” The victim identity was readily picked up by 
the media when they reported how people were “worried,” “fearful,” “surprised” by the prospects 
of fracking operations. Such notions were present in Facebook discussions, especially in the early 
days when the focus was on the harmful effects. An important meeting with the Prime Minister 
where activists “introduced him for the first time” to the technology also contained strong 
victimhood elements and accomplished a promise “those citizens worried by the technology to be 
kept informed about where things stand, notified if something happens, invited for discussions.” 
At this point there were voices in the groups to leave the rest to the institutions now that the 
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Premier knows about the risks. However, the victim identity was quickly rejected by most 
activists. While it provided some media attention, public sympathy and a mobilizing sense of 
urgency, it also played right into a media metanarrative of a self-reforming, threat-and-
reassurance media-political system (Gamson, 1995), and a risk communication discourse where 
experts elucidate a complex technology to a fearful public to alleviate anxiety fed by ignorance 
(Beck, 1992; Fischer, 2000). One activist from Varna wrote in a discussion:  
I did not like the media report. People are not worried and scared, they do not want to be 
calmed and comforted, they are AGAINST, they reject this technology. There is a big 
difference!!! The way they say it sounds like “We are worried, please give us reassurance 
that everything will be alright, calm us down and we will give you green light to drill.” 
Yes – but no! I personally don’t want no comforting and reassuring from Chevron, I want 
Chevron OUT of Bulgaria and, to be honest, out of every other place in this world.  
The main reason for this quick shift from victims to agents, from “they did not tell us” to 
“they did not ask us” was the utter distrust toward the government to act effectively on the 
demands for a fracking ban. The activists quickly drafted concrete policy demands that would 
prevent the use of the technology and demanded to participate in their discussion in Parliament. 
The political issue switched from secrecy to exclusion; the activists needed not only 
transparency, but legitimacy to participate in the policy-making process beyond problem 
definition and prioritization. 
Bulgarians. This was a very frequent self-description among activists, with the variations 
of “patriots” and, rarely, “nationalists.” There were some rank-and-file activists who were 
members of or voters for nationalist parties (I interviewed one); but the term was used widely to 
convey meanings, not membership. The use of the word had some surprising peculiarities. First, 
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“Bulgarians” was often used as an appellation, a derivative of the country (“people who really 
love Bulgaria”) without hints for characterizations or qualities germane to the ethnicity. This 
appellative use was common when activists rallied for unity, as in “[we have a] national cause, 
above-partisan, above-religious, above-ideological, above everything else, when people are 
unified, because they fight for Bulgaria.” Another appellative use was when “Bulgarians” 
signified the largest collective unit concerned with the issue, which “naturally” led to unity: “we 
fight for the same thing… live in the same country, breathe the same air, have the same nature – 
we are the same people.” The appellative use served also to instill a sense of legitimacy, because 
“we are the people”: “Borissov should apologize not to us but to those 7-8 million Bulgarians.” 
The other use of “Bulgarians” was as a characterizing word, entailing qualities or 
explanations. Surprisingly, the majority of meanings here were negative or oppositional. Many 
times “we Bulgarians” were self-characterized as “divided,” “splinters,” “conflicting,” 
“nihilistic,” “gullible,” “egoistic,” “distrustful,” “cowardly,” “too patient,” “meek” and “vain.”  
There were far less common notions of Bulgarians as special people that could “ignite the world” 
or, looking back in history, “strong personalities who defied all odds.… heroes.” One quite 
common positive characterization was “the attachment of Bulgarians to nature, to the mountains 
and the protection of nature”; Bulgarians meant “children of this land.” This link was logical 
given the strong association of Bulgaria with nature. These expressive elements of identity co-
existed with very strong oppositional ones (Gamson, 1992). “Bulgarians” was first a role of 
protectors against external enemies. Bulgaria as a victim of foreign powers is a strong cultural 
narrative, and it was replayed in the AFM. Activists talked about “the natural Bulgarian feelings 
against plunderers,” the need to be “a nationalist, otherwise you get smashed in the world of 
today”; posters and slogans used the “invader-defender” narrative (e.g. Figure 1 in Appendix 1). 
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The other contrast in the definition of Bulgarians was made with the government or pro-fracking 
experts, seen as “traitorous,” “puppets of the US,” “ready to sell their land.” And lastly, the 
prominence of oppositional meanings was also a reaction to libels and insinuations coming from 
opponents that the protests were a “foreign PR campaign,” and activists were “Russian agents.” 
In this framing battle both sides strove to present themselves as protectors of the national interest. 
To summarize, the often-invoked “Bulgarian” identity as an appellation served to 
mobilize and unite, and to legitimize the protests as a majority cause. As a characterization it was 
a complex notion, with expressive meanings that were negative (essentialist) or positive (nature-
referenced) for explaining social reality; and with strong oppositional meanings serving to 
mobilize and legitimize the movement. 
Nature-protectors. One identity in the movement was strongly related to nature, and I 
chose this particular word because it was very often used by activists but also because a more 
typical term such as “environmentalists” was contested. An observer of the movement would 
quickly hear the statement “we are not environmentalists2, we are nature-protectors/citizens.” 
“Environmentalist” was a label actively and vehemently rejected by activists, especially in 
responses to media reporting. There were ecologists in the movement – this was the strongest 
pre-existing and organized group. However, most activists perceived the label as a libel. First and 
foremost, “ecologists” were seen as a narrow group having a narrow focus, and even a private 
interest. In contrast, the protection of nature as a public good (air, water, food, a national asset) 
was a broad and legitimating stance, and an activity the government had abdicated from. Also, 
ecologists were organized in non-profits, very often as professionals, and that was suspect in the 
media but also in the spontaneity-driven narratives of the movement. Finally, there was also a 
                                                          
2
 To be more precise, there is no direct translation of “environmentalist” in Bulgarian. Closest in meaning is the 
term “ecologist”.  
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perceived libel that ecologists are “ecotalibans, ecoterrorists,” “hippies,” irrational protesters. In 
contrast, the technology discourse in the movement (see below) created a self-confidence and 
legitimacy that activists were more competent than institutions and even experts. 
The nature-related identity was also probably the most expressive one, i.e. it existed 
before and could exist without issues and adversaries. Many of my interviewees were “nature-
lovers”: they talked about their lifestyles in close relationships with nature, about 
mountaineering, hiking, path-finding, organic agriculture, clean-ups, tree-planting, etc. In my 
analysis of off-topic Facebook messages, the nature-related self-definitions were the only ones 
where expressive and oppositional posts were balanced in numbers. 
Citizens. Movement activists often called themselves “citizens.” “Citizens” was used as a 
preferred identity, coming rhetorically after a “but,” such as in “not as experts, but citizens.” 
“Citizens” was preferred over “organizations,” “experts,” “politicians,” “parties,” and 
“professionals.” The word conveyed several important meanings and fine balances in how 
activists saw and presented themselves. First of all, a citizen is a person who goes out “to say – 
this is what I think; do not do this because you infringe on my interests, my life”; a citizen must 
“have a position; no matter right or wrong.” Citizens “defend their rights”, refuse to be “sheep-
hearted,” “slaves, serfs, docile, bending heads meekly.” Activists saw the government as “not 
hearing their voice,” “not representing them,” and the role of citizens as “putting pressure” on the 
government in order to “participate in decisions” and “control what they are doing.” 
The notion of “citizen” was also often used to express “apolitical” or “above political.” 
When analyzed closer this link revealed several important meanings. Most significantly, a citizen 
defends “the common good” (in contrast to politics, which is about representing private and 
corporate interests). Citizens “unite around causes, for the community, the garden, the park.” The 
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activists’ cause was to “defend no other interests but Bulgaria’s,” their ultimate goal was to make 
the government “work for the common interest, the small man.” In other words, the raising of 
one’s voice was “not for their sake, but the whole society.” Another meaning of apolitical was 
non-party: “a party group strives for power, while the citizen group strives to control power.” 
Such claims were very common because activists wanted to dispel accusations that their protest 
was “political,” aimed at toppling the government, with which they negotiated. “Citizens: 
working, child-rearing, studying” was also used to signify “amateur” in the sense that activists 
were not professionally engaged and invested in the issue, therefore not paid to have a position. 
The notion of citizens was used to accomplish some fine balances in the public 
presentation and internal reasoning of activists. First, “citizens” was a desired position between 
“the passive” and the politician. It allowed activists to participate in policy-making without being 
politicians and without being represented by them. Later on, activists, in interviews or internal 
discussions, reflected that they were engaged in “politics per excellence…. politics about 
environmental protection, politics about civil rights, politics about the future, the present, for 
normal existence.” They also qualified this as “real politics, unseen in Bulgaria in the past…. 
because real politics is about the good of society.” Another important balance of “citizens” was 
that it conveyed reason and passion within the political system. Activists wanted to have voice 
and were aware of the links between issues; but they were also concerned not to be seen as 
“perpetual protesters” or “clowns” who, “not knowing what they want”, raise hell on “a 
hotchpotch of causes.” A “citizen” was both “crazy”, i.e. implacable in their spontaneity, and 
reasonable in negotiations. Finally, the “citizen” position was one of an “informed, educated” 
person who did not need to rely on politicians or experts and at the same time an amateur, not a 
paid professional. These balances served to legitimize the participation of activists in policy-
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making while delegitimizing other actors such as the government and paid experts. 
The Technology 
The technology of fracking features prominently in the framing activities of the 
movement. The main demand and claim of the movement was that the technology should be 
banned because it is dangerous. Other statements and propositions followed from that: why it 
should be banned; why it is being promoted; what kind of actors oppose and support it. 
This focus on technology is not surprising. The AFM is, in one aspect, an instance of an 
environmental protest against the actual and latent effects of uncontrolled technoindustrial 
development in a risk society (Beck, 1992; Fischer, 2000). Moreover, a complex technology 
intervening in a complex nature system produces high levels of complexity of causes and effects. 
In a typical risk-society quandary (Beck, 1992) the movement faced the task of understanding 
and explaining probabilities of potential and initially invisible harms, and of identifying few 
among many possible causes and culpable agents. The activists engaged in an intricate politics of 
knowledge (Fischer, 2000), presented in this and the next section. 
 The technology of fracking was framed as harmful, catastrophic in damages and scale, 
certain to harm, uncontrollable, and incongruous with the contexts of its application. These were 
the “whats” of framing. The “hows” – the activities of interpretation – can be grouped in three 
different technodiscourses throughout the course of the movement: lateral, literal, and reflexive. 
This distinction is inspired by Beck’s discussion of technology and reflexive modernity (1992). 
Lateral discourse. The lateral discourse on fracking used ideas and experiences from 
other spheres (lateral links) to establish and explain the dangers of the technology. Hence it was 
a discourse abundant with social representations: metaphors, images, analogies, and antinomies. 
The name of the national Facebook group was a prime example: “We are against the Bulgarian 
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Chernobyl – the extraction of shale gas.” The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant meltdown is 
still remembered with deep trauma in Bulgaria and blamed for the incidence of cancer and 
congenital diseases. The choice of this master metaphor for shale gas extraction frames fracking 
as the ultimate technogenic disaster: technology gone out of control; irreversible and often 
invisible harm on a mass scale; and a government attempt at a cover-up. 
The potential harms from fracking were discussed at length within the movement. They 
included poisoned waters and soils, polluted air, elevated local levels of noise, deteriorated local 
infrastructure, earthquakes, diseases of animals, plants and people, higher levels of greenhouse 
gases, and as ultimate effects, depopulation and desertification of the region. The logo of the 
movement (Figure 2) became a picture of a tap with running fire instead of water (a powerful 
image from the 2010 documentary Gasland by Josh Fox). This incongruity between fracking 
(and its effects) and the “normal” or “natural” ways things happen became a major topic in the 
interpreting and presenting of fracking. 
Incongruity as an attribute of fracking is a much stronger form of oppositionality or 
antinomy. Oppositionality is typical for environmentalism in the risk society (Beck, 1992). 
Contrasting of states with and without fracking was widely used in the AFM interpretations, but 
it is important to note not just the antinomy, but the absurd incongruity through which activists 
understood and conveyed the harms of fracking. Incongruity transcends discourses of the 
movement at different levels. With regard to technology, incongruity was underscored with 
regard to health, life, and place. One succinct example of incongruity was the often-used 
oxymoron “barbaric technology” and bynames like “Vandal technology” and “human-hating 
technology”. On a protest poster, an activist wrote “Here is a cocktail: water + 750 chemicals. 
Cheers!” A culturally-grounded example was a vivid image: a famous painting by a Bulgarian 
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artist where female wheat harvesters in traditional costumes donned gas masks (Figure 3). 
Similarly, a loaf of bread was pictured as pierced with gas drills (Figure 4).  
The fracking technology was also grasped as incongruent with regard to place. The 
research literature on place attachment suggests that local residents oppose new (industrial) 
development the stronger they are affectively attached to the place and the more incongruent the 
change is with their meaning of the place (Devine-Wright, 2010). Activists who resided in the 
threatened region shared vivid stories of how they saw fracking would destroy their everyday 
experience of place and place identity. 
 The dramatic presentation of the harms from fracking was obviously focused on its (side) 
effects – the main focus of resistance to technoindustrial development in the risk society (Beck, 
1992). As the harmful effects were still only potential, a lateral discourse on the technology 
seemed an adequate cognitive and persuasive approach. Indeed, the dramatic metaphors and 
images were abundant in the early phases of the movement and in its public communication. 
 The technology’s harmfulness was grasped through one other lateral mechanism – what 
Fischer (2000) dubs “cultural rationality”: evaluating technopolitical decisions on the basis of 
prior experience, peer groups, the history of actors and the social context. According to Fischer 
(2000), “reliance on cultural rationality is especially strong when there is reason to believe in the 
possibility of deception or manipulation” (p. 137) and “in a society where the level of trust is 
low” (p. 138) – both of these characterize the Bulgarian case. The anti-fracking activists in 
Bulgaria initially focused on Chevron and its poor environmental record. Furthermore, the US 
government and what was perceived as American way of resource extraction – reckless and 
exploitative – was used as evidence for harm. One of the protest posters (Figure 5) featured a 
grinning cowboy drilling poison in Bulgarian soil. Finally, the non-transparent legal process by 
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which the Bulgarian government auctioned licenses for fracking was a powerful cue within the 
movement and evidence for external audiences about the nefariousness of shale gas extraction. 
These interpretive mechanisms of cultural rationality demonstrate higher-order links between 
meanings – one object or actor is framed within its association with other actors and objects. 
Literal discourse. The lateral discourse on fracking alone was not satisfactory to many 
activists whom I interviewed. One environmentalist distinguished between Gasland’s 
contributions in explaining “the concrete technology” versus its “populist elements” (the vivid 
images); he had also felt uneasy about the Chernobyl metaphor which had “sounded too far 
removed,” but then became confident when further research revealed that used fracking water 
was literally radioactive because of elements carried back from underground layers. Many 
interviewees juxtaposed their initial shock from the images of fracking’s side effects to the 
meticulous search for “information” that the emotion prompted. Therefore, а significant amount 
of the interpretive and persuasive efforts of the movement were invested in a literal discourse of 
technology, to wit, a painstaking research, description and analysis of the technology itself – its 
components, stages, required equipment, and conditions of use. My interviews were frequently 
interspersed with impressive descriptions of the drilling process in fracking, pedantic 
comparisons of types of fracking, myriad details about equipment for drilling and monitoring, 
intricacies of legal and regulatory issues, etc. These were results of an extensive process of 
knowledge creation at individual, collective and then public level. The products were impressive: 
a collectively maintained database with “ten thousand” pages of materials on fracking, a file with 
over 750 documents submitted to the Bulgarian Parliament as evidence for public hearings, at 
least seven public education leaflets, two “informational” websites. 
Activists made self-critical evaluations of their early understanding, sometimes calling it 
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“populist” or “disinformation”; they seem to have internalized the technocratic understanding 
that metaphorical or cultural knowing is inferior to technical discourse. The crowdsourcing of 
information was organized with rules that scientific and “journalist” articles should be filed 
separately and that publications without proper citations “would not be considered for addition to 
the folders.” There were several important reasons – strategic or interpretive – for the shift from 
the lateral to literal discourse on technology. The most obvious reason was dialogical (Steinberg, 
1999): the opponents in the public debate, including the Minister of Energy Resources, framed 
the protests as “hysteria” of ignorant groups. This explanation was fully in line with a modern 
technocratic narrative where resistance to technoindustrial progress is a problem of information, 
and if it persists after expert explanations, then the public is hopelessly irrational (Beck, 1992). 
The activists took this “cue” from their opponents and worked to disprove it.  
At an interpretive level, the lateral understanding and presentation of fracking was 
congruent with the activists’ strong commitment to “truth.” “The campaign of information” 
launched by the movement was often compared to and defined as a counter to the secrecy and 
distortions of opponents: companies’ secrecy of operations, government’s secrecy of contracts, 
political parties’ “populism”, and media’s  “curtain” and “censorship” over the issue. 
Also of importance, after three months of protests the contention entered a new phase – 
the activists were accepted by the Prime Minister and he announced that more information on the 
risks of fracking should be collected before proceeding with the Chevron contract. Three 
opposition parties proposed variants of restrictive regulation on fracking. And almost right after 
the protests won a moratorium in January 2012, a parliamentary committee to investigate 
possibilities for safe gas extraction was created, perceived by activists as “the committee to allow 
fracking.” In other words, the issue was already firmly past the phase of prioritizing; it was time 
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for research and the formulation of concrete solutions, including specific regulatory texts. The 
movement took full part in these processes, not entrusting the work to experts or politicians. The 
focus on the technology and the very process that creates harms was unavoidable. 
Furthermore, as one activist put it, “in our activity and search for the core problem /…/ 
we got to the technology – it is the problem.” With research and reflection activists realized that 
fracking can be used for extraction of other resources than shale gas, which, although a sticking 
term in the beginning, was not workable when it came to prevention of the harms from the 
technical process. Similarly, the activists realized that Chevron, although an easier enemy with 
its environmental record, should not be the main target because it did not matter who used the 
technology. Lastly in this line of explanation, the movement also underscored a focus on 
technology vs. focus on government. Time and again, in interviews and public communication, 
in heated Facebook discussions, activists stated that they were against the technology and not 
against the government. Again, there were both interpretive and strategic grounds for this 
framing. The activists had engaged directly with the Cabinet and demanded the rescinding of the 
license and a general ban. Strategically, activists had to provide an opportunity for their main 
target of influence to roll back a decision while saving face. On an interpretive level, the activists 
were highly skeptical of the Bulgarian political system and toppling a particular political party 
from power was not seen as a solution. Lastly, in the dialogical and cultural context, the 
movement wanted to disprove the knee-jerk blames that they were being used (or even directed) 
by political opponents of the government, and the focus on technology provided this opportunity. 
While the lateral discourse helped imagine and grasp the severity of fracking’s effects on 
water, soils, air, food, and people, the literal discourse served to elaborate what attributes of the 
technology would bring about the effects and how. A catastrophizing framing (Kubal, 1998), 
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common to environmental protests in “a catastrophic society” (Beck, 1992) of technoindustrial 
development generating enormous risks, persuades audiences and mobilizes activists. 
The first catastrophizing characteristic of fracking was that it would create expansive 
risks: the damages would not be contained and local, but would instead affect larger and larger 
groups and areas. Early on activists realized that the licensed region covers a deep underground 
aquifer, Malm Valange, stretching under the whole Dobrogea area, including its Romanian part. 
Fracking would poison the water in this entire “underground lake” and damage the whole region 
beyond the national border. Another discovery was that the Chevron contract was just the first of 
more than twenty covering one-third of the Bulgarian territory. This “full picture and dreadful 
information” expanded dramatically the scope of fracking risks and effects, from local to 
regional to national and even transnational level. Finally, the expansive understanding of risks 
included an interpretation of the symbolic meaning of place (Manzo & Devine-Wright, 2013). 
The threatened region has a great significance in Bulgarian history as a grain producer – “the 
Granary of Bulgaria” – that feeds the nation and contributes to Bulgaria’s fame for agriculture. 
“This is our most precious – our granary, Dobrogea.” One of the prominent accusations was 
“You are selling Golden Dobrogea”; one of the public slogans: “If you eat bread, this concerns 
you.” Using strong cultural codes, activists framed the threatened region as a national treasure, 
and thus made the issue a national one. 
Other important attributes ascribed by activists were that the harms were irreversible, 
inevitable, and often invisible. Irreversibility was substantiated by the claim that the underground 
aquifer cannot be cleaned when poisonous fluids from fracking are released. Another argument 
was that the radioactive produced water cannot be purified in Bulgarian water-cleaning plants. 
One of the ways activists made sense of the irreversibility and also showed it in protests was by 
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bringing along their children as victims and actors. Inevitability of harms was an important 
attribute because technocratic discourse is about probabilities and levels of acceptance (Beck, 
1992). Activists claimed that pollution was not a matter of if, but when, because given the 
extensive drilling and big number of rigs involved in fracking, it was inevitable that a drill would 
leak and poison the aquifer. Finally, the radioactivity of fracking water – staying and migrating 
underground or flowing back to be put in reservoirs – was a stern concern for activists. The 
history of the Chernobyl disaster when children were exposed to invisible risks was intolerable. 
The literal discourse on technology had its limitations as a tool for protesters, because if 
the focus of debate is entirely on the technology per se, a moment must come when experts can 
substantiate a safe use of an improved technology in some ideal conditions, while explaining 
away failures with idiosyncrasies of local application (Beck, 1992). Such denouement is 
inevitable within technoscientific reasoning that emphasizes abstract, universally applicable 
knowledge and leaves side effects as – side. It also requires “componential thinking” (Fischer, 
2000) where technological processes are a narrow focus leaving out contexts of application. 
Reflexive discourse. Beck calls for a “reflexive modernity” discourse (1992) to supplant 
the previous one. In a reflexive discourse on technology, side effects are part of the technology 
and should be debated and considered in advance of application. This in turn means that local 
application context and local knowledge are a key component of the reflexive technodebate. In 
addition, holistic and multidisciplinary knowledge instead of specialization is needed to asses all 
possible effects. Causality is assumed as diffused and evaluated not only with regard to 
technology, but to social, political, and other contextual agents and factors.  
In the Bulgarian anti-fracking movement there were indeed activists who, within the 
lateral discourse, admitted in discussions or interviews that “the goal is to not allow (fracking) 
98 
 
until some safe technology is invented.” The course of the lateral debate and the research on 
fracking though made it clear to activists that a focus on technology was insufficient to grasp and 
prevent the risks from fracking. Consider the following revelation from an activist: 
What we found was – we [Bulgaria] did not have absolutely no legal or regulatory base 
that puts some limits, that monitors or does whatever anything in non-conventional fuels, 
or any resource extraction field, absolutely none. There were some decrees from 1956, 
untouched, some safety regulations…. And then you discover that you have the same 
three people in the [Ministry of Environment] who receive documents, issue licenses, go 
out to monitor in the field. They don’t have nothing, no equipment, no tools, no any other 
means to measure anything. They go to the site and rely entirely on the data supplied by 
the exploiting company, their logs….The more you get into the details, the more 
knowledge you acquire, the bigger and bigger gaps you establish in control, in the legal 
base, in technical execution. The gaps are so big, so staggering, that the human mind 
refuses to accept them, such madness, you know, a normal person cannot accept (laughs).  
Thus, in what I call a reflexive discourse on technology, activists moved the focus from 
technology and process to the context of its application. The shift was a result of research but 
also of extensive use of local knowledge (Fischer, 2000). Activists from the threatened region 
talked with farmers and rural residents; took photos of existing oil rigs; attempted to meet the 
managers of rig operators; monitored transport vehicles. As a result, important contextual factors 
were brought into the discourse. Local knowledge and research on the regulatory environment 
made clear that political, regulatory, social and economic factors made the “safe” use of fracking 
impossible in Bulgaria. “Uncontrollable” as a key attribute of the technology changed its 
meaning from inherent (as in “undeveloped technology”) to contextual (impossible to control 
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application), from the lateral to the reflexive discourse. 
Experts 
The experts participating in the fracking conflict were prominent actors in the storylines 
of the AFM. There were different discourses on experts and expertise in the course of the 
movement, roughly comparable to the lateral, literal, and reflexive discourses on technology. The 
lateral discourse was characterized with understanding of experts based on the perceived 
associations they had with other important actors. Above all, there was a widespread distrust 
toward experts, quite typical for contemporary environmental conflict (Fischer, 2000). Experts 
were seen as “lying and spinning,” “a means to calm down people with their faith in experts, 
[because] experts know their job.” They were also distrusted because professional expertise was 
perceived as institutionalized, even in the non-profit sector, while activists valued spontaneous, 
egalitarian, and bottom-up participation. As one interviewed environmental expert recounted, 
authority from expertise even within the movement was rejected as imposed in contrast to the 
“natural” emergence of leaders through participation in action. 
The opponent experts were almost unanimously considered corrupt, “paid for” and bought 
off; some activists called them “lobbyists rather than specialists.” Patriotic- and nationalist-
minded activists also despised them as “traitors” and “Janissaries” (a very strong word in 
Bulgaria). These explanations were also used in the public exchanges to paint pro-fracking 
experts as untrustworthy. While such accusations against experts are common in technological 
debates (Beck, 1992), the claims of the Bulgarian activists were also buttressed when three of the 
pro-fracking experts were revealed as former socialist secret service collaborators (i.e. 
unprincipled guns for hire), and the leading pro-fracking geologist as a former consultant for 
Texaco, now part of Chevron. In addition, for both movement- and counter-movement experts, 
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activists rejected an authoritative role where experts “tell what should be done.” On the contrary, 
in the beginning of the protests there were many voices who called for local and national 
referenda in order to bypass expert decision-making. 
A literal discourse on experts and expertise concurred with the focus on technology. 
When activists started researching the issue they quickly realized that “there are no experts” on 
fracking in Bulgaria: “no specialists, no geologists, no scientists, no engineers who are 
comprehensively familiar with the technology and who can give an expert opinion.” This is 
literally correct: in issues arising from novel technological developments laypeople, activists and 
experts must educate themselves and collectively craft decisions (Callon, 2005 [cited in Eyal, 
2010]). The anti-fracking activists underscored the lack of expertise and attributed it mostly to the 
peripheral status of Bulgarian science. Attempts were made to contact American geologists and 
engineers to up the ante in the literal debate. Activists also earnestly embarked on becoming 
experts themselves. Their self-confidence was boosted by exchanges with governmental 
institutions where activists educated and influenced officials. One of the professional 
environmentalists I interviewed noted that activists “started believing themselves too much.” 
In the very first months of the protests the activists engaged also in a reflexive discourse 
on experts and expertise. Anti-fracking activists called for expanding of the expertise in the 
debate on fracking – not just geologists and petroleum engineers, but also soil experts, 
seismologists, chemists, physicians, hydrologists, environmentalists, even economists. Narrow 
specialists’ opinions “must be considered last, because they are in a conflict of interests,” as one 
internal discussion concluded; not because they were “paid off” or “not experts”, but because 
they have most to gain professionally from fracking; because of their structural position in the 
development and implementation of the risk-producing technology (Beck, 1992). 
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The expansion of the debate on fracking allowed the activists to engage in the game of 
counterexpertise (Fischer, 2000): on a complex and multifaceted issue citizens (lobbyists, 
governments) can pick experts whose position is concurrent with their own, thus becoming more 
dependent on science but less dependent on particular studies (Fischer, 2000). Activists 
demanded persistently to see “our experts” on parliamentary committees, meetings and debates. 
An expert pool was created and expanded in the course of the movement; there was an 
unsuccessful attempt to create a permanent expert council to the movement. A different role was 
assigned to experts in this expanded discourse. Rather than shields for political decisions or 
deciders for the public, experts were relegated the function of consulting, “supplying 
information” and educating of citizens in the public debate. In this Deweyan prescriptive view 
(1927, cited in Fischer [2000]), activists demanded that fracking “should not start until 
information is available and people can make the decision.” Activists saw their own role as 
experts-informers for the public and policy-makers, deemed key to their success the ability “to 
explain processes in a lay manner, not specialist-like” and contrasted it to “the heavy, outlandish 
terminology” of professional experts. Anti-fracking activists went a step further and attempted to 
be facilitators of “the public debate” on fracking. While lamenting the unwillingness of the 
government and media to set up “a true” public debate, activists organized and put online at least 
two public education (“official”) conferences, and three public talks by experts. 
A very interesting understanding of trustworthiness and validity of expert opinion can be 
discerned among activists on the basis of their gradually more receptive attitude to expert 
activists. In one story of an anti-fracking environmentalist, in the beginning the activists expected 
him to participate “as a citizen,” as equal and not an expert. Then, through intensive interpersonal 
communication and “personal engagement,” “trust and respect” supplanted the blanket distrust of 
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authority. A new nuanced understanding of expert autonomy within the movement became 
crucial to judging whether an expert was trustworthy or not. The distinction was along the 
dichotomy professional-citizen, or paid-spontaneous expert. Professional experts are not 
autonomous; they only speak when they are paid to (even if not paid off), and only on the narrow 
topic they are paid to speak about. In contrast, “experts with civic engagement” speak 
spontaneously when they see a problem; they speak on the problem as they see it, not just on a 
piece of it that was paid for. Thus their opinion is autonomous and trustworthy. Furthermore, the 
commitment of paid experts to the payer also results in expert opinions being consumed by 
companies or the government, and not “reaching society,” “connecting to the people.” Borrowing 
from Eyal (2006) and Medvetz’s (2012) field of expertise framework, citizen-first experts were 
seen as autonomous and open to the public, to wit public intellectuals, while professional-first 
experts were dependent and publicly disengaged, “technicians” (Eyal, 2006). 
Finally, one important shift with the reflexive debate was the change of the purpose of 
expertise for the movement. Here it was not to prove a definitive harm but “to establish 
controversy, dissension, different interpretations” about the effects of fracking. Activists realized 
that no matter how deep they delve in the technical details of fracking, they cannot write all 
missing regulation policies from the laws and terms to the manuals of rig operators. Therefore 
they wanted to establish controversy, reject the default approval of the new development, and 
then call for the principle of precaution to stop fracking. To summarize, by engaging with 
expertise and managing the positions of experts around the movement, anti-fracking activists 
were able to gain legitimacy for their own participation in an otherwise closed and elitist process 
(Fischer, 2000), reaffirm a “cognitive sovereignty” (Beck, 1992) and define validity of harms and 
victims. In this effort the participants applied three different discourses, relegating changing roles 
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to experts – from rejection to authority to consultancy and education. Similarly, the goals of 
expertise application changed from proof to show of controversy. 
Nature 
Nature was an important topic in the framing of fracking, as all harms from the 
technology were mediated by its effects on nature. Nature was the direct “victim” in the story. 
Nature was an object but sometimes also an actor. An environmental discourses framework 
(Brulle, 1996; 2000) is useful in depicting how activists understood nature, their relationship with 
it, and the consequences of fracking. First, in a resource (or, conservation in Brulle’s terms) 
discourse, nature was perceived as a valuable resource for human activity that should not be 
destroyed or over-exploited. Activists talked about fracking operations as competing with 
Bulgarians’ “material desires for the use of the land.” Fracking was “hindering agriculture and 
tourism, and everything nature-related”; activists “wanted clean nature, so [they] could use it as it 
is, to present it [to tourists] as it is.” Such use should be “sustainable” and “planned,” whereas 
fracking was “quick profit, and after us, the deluge.” 
The confidence that fracking was a wrong use of the natural resources was grounded in 
the common conviction that clean nature was “the most important asset Bulgaria has,” “the only 
one left”; that “the future of Bulgaria is in agriculture and sustainable tourism because these are 
the endowments of the climate, nature, all conditions.” These natural gifts and endowments were 
seen as “basic values that Bulgaria should protect.” From here followed an important argument 
about independence as a counter to the pro-fracking claim that the discovery of gas would secure 
energy independence for the country: “Everything else can be fixed later. Important are food, 
water, independence. Because you can do with or without energy independence – many countries 
are just fine without it; but if you are water- and food-dependent – there is no fixing that.” 
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The second prominent discourse within the movement was environmental health (Brulle, 
2000), based on seeing nature as the environment for human life and health, with an emphasis on 
clean air, water, and food.  As one activist put it, “when it comes to the existence of the people 
and to resources like bread and …. not having [clean] water to drink, this was perceived as 
genocide against people, not just an imaginary harm to nature.” The focus of this discourse is on 
human health as a function of the natural environment, with humans as part of and dependent on 
nature. This theme was already elaborated in the discussion of the effects of the technology.  
There were two other discernible discourses within the movement that were based on the 
valuing of nature “as it is”, its pristineness and primacy over direct human benefit. In what can be 
categorized as preservation discourse (Brulle, 2000), activists talked about their lifestyle “in 
accordance with” and “close to” nature, “their home”, “out of the city.” My analysis suggests that 
this environmental philosophy is closely related to the nature-protector activist identity. In this 
discourse nature was a non-conditional value and activists put their “love of nature” in the center 
of their concern and their lives. Nature was a source of joy, recreation, healing and inspiration for 
harmonious life. Finally, the deep connection to nature for a few activists had a more radical, 
even mystical aspect which suggests a discourse of deep ecology (Brulle, 2000). Within this 
discourse, humans are not privileged beings; nature is a being itself. Some activists talked about 
humans and animals being “one family”; there was also a theme about the “assault on Mother 
Earth” who “calls us to defend her.” One leading activist was expelled because he publicly stated 
that the Earth is a living organism. This event was an example of the firm line between internal 
and external framing with regard to the significance of nature. In the public debate activists 
stressed a resource- and health-oriented discourse on nature; privately and among themselves 
more radical themes were shared as well. In Facebook off-topic postings nature as a value in 
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itself was about twice more frequent than nature as a means for human well-being. Such 
observations concur with Kubal’s analysis of incinerator protests (1998). 
From these discourses and from the discourses of technology we can also discern different 
levels or scales at which nature was defined: physical place, local environment, region, nature in 
general and Bulgaria. These scales, as was shown in the technology discussion, stage different 
levels of fracking’s (harmful) effects, and different levels of incongruity of these effects with the 
“natural” or “given” state of things. Thus, fracking operations were incongruent with people’s 
sense of place; fracking chemicals and residues were incongruent with life in the local 
environment. To add to these levels, within the resource discourse activists described the 
incongruity of fracking and gas extraction with the regional and national economies and 
livelihood. Fracking was “suitable for a desert like Texas”; it would turn Dobrogea, “the Granary 
of Bulgaria” into a “moon valley,” “industrial site”; it was an “abruptly imposed model from 
outside, a model that has nothing to do with the endowments of the country.” 
Ultimately, the scaling up and the valuing of nature in itself bridges environmental frames 
to patriotic and civic discourses. In a patriotic framing, “here everything starts with nature,” it is 
“our trump card,” “the most important asset Bulgaria has,” “the only one left,” therefore “it is 
national treasury and we must defend it3”; fracking “surpassed all similar attempts to loot and 
destroy our country.” Moreover, nature is considered a defining feature of Bulgaria, with 
reverence of nature having deep cultural roots (Krastanova, 2012). Activists attributed to this 
reverence part of their success. Finally, the defense of nature and Bulgaria’s natural resources 
were also widely perceived within the movement as a defense of the common good against 
private interests and thus nature connected to the activists’ citizen identity. 
                                                          
3
 And indeed, Bulgaria is the European country with the highest percentage of its territory in EU’s Natura 2000 
protected areas. 
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Throughout these environmental discourses, and especially in the preservation and deep 
ecology ones, nature often loomed as an actor, not just an object in the story. One quite common 
role was that of a victim who must be saved by the heroes-activists (Lakoff, 2006). Some 
activists felt a responsibility to fight for “the most defenseless” and to hear “the call of the land to 
protect her.” Such understandings and claims about nature are important for activists’ motivation 
and legitimacy because they support that a movement “expresses the common good and the vote 
of those who themselves have neither vote nor voice (Beck, 1992, p. 31; a poster on Figure 6 
exemplified this idea).” Apart from the role of victim for some activists nature was also an 
elemental force that retaliated against human atrocity. Such understanding, although uncommon, 
functioned as a fortifying myth. 
The Company, Money, Capitalism 
While the technology was widely perceived as the main source of harm and targeted 
publicly as the main problem, “the villain” (Lakoff, 2006) in the story was the company, the oil 
and gas corporation. The company was the actor and its driving force – money – was seen as the 
source of the problem. The understanding of the villain in the movement evolved in an expansive 
way, from a specific company to corporations more generally and to higher-order forces like 
money and capitalism in the end. 
When the Bulgarian government first announced that it will sign a contract with Chevron, 
that company became one of the main objects of interpretive and strategic framing of the 
environmental resistance. The company was targeted as the main actor, as the agent that must be 
pushed away. Chevron’s infamous history was evidence for the damages to be inflicted on 
Bulgaria. At the early stages the history of Chevron was a lateral way of interpreting the 
unknown technology and also an argument against the government’s claims that it had attracted 
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“a world company,” “a big investor.” Chevron was also very early associated with the United 
States as an actor that had its own interests in the issue. Such association was only affirmed when 
high profile US diplomats, including the then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, promoted 
fracking in Bulgaria as a means for “energy independence.” This association helped frame 
fracking as a case of stereotypical American “cowboy” recklessness. Additionally, it bridged to 
more overarching nationalist frames. For many activists fracking was another way of promoting 
American domination: “punch their land, poison their water, make them dependent.” 
The focus of framing turned quite early from Chevron to all gas companies operating in 
Bulgaria. There were two other companies that were already drilling to explore for gas and 
several at the verge of signing contracts with the government. This information was uncovered as 
activists researched the issue: while Chevron was a cue from the government to which the 
movement reacted, the generalization was a result of their own actions. However, another reason 
for the switch was the counterframing of fracking supporters who accused activists of being 
Russian puppets. At this time the discourse also shifted to the technology as the main problem, 
regardless of the company using it. The change also modified the nationalistic framing of the 
issue – the US was generalized to “foreign companies,” robbing and bleeding Bulgaria of its 
resources. In this narrative, Bulgaria was a victim of foreign capital and a traitorous government; 
poverty and misery in Bulgaria were due to the drain of its resources. This reasoning eventually 
led many activists to organize against the resource concession laws in Bulgaria. 
Yet there was another level of generalization, or a larger system seen in the discussions 
and interviews, concentrated in the fuzzy notion of “money.” On the one hand, “money” was a 
higher level of organization of the corporate forces; on the other, it was the common denominator 
for all companies: their motive for action. First, money was a less ideological (thus less 
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elaborated) shorthand for the forces and logic of capitalism in the world, “some cartels, 
monopolies, oligarchs and all that scum.” Activists took the fracking issue as an example of 
stocks speculation and manipulation. Some activists’ research had unveiled that companies that 
were to drill in Bulgaria had nothing but a central office and promises to would-be investors. The 
banks and stock exchanges were also put into this picture of “a bubble and dupery” for ordinary 
people. “Money” was thus a shorthand for speculative capital seeking profits in the world, a 
system where “not who does the work [wins], but those who spin money in ways the others can’t 
fathom.” This understanding also provided a fortifying myth: “This is a pyramid, therefore it will 
crumble sooner or later.” Catastrophic news about the world financial system was indeed very 
common in off-topic Facebook communication. A more structured anti-capitalist discourse (let 
alone ideology) did not materialize in the movement. The Communist group, booted early from 
the movement, was considered by the environmentalists as having a narrow perspective: “They 
fight against this only because they are against corporations and big capital; they do not take the 
comprehensive view, the pollution of water, etc.” The shunning of an anti-capitalist ideology is 
most likely due also to its polarizing potential in a post-Communist country. The notion of 
“money” as an actor allowed for an inclusive systemic villain for different activist groups. 
The other way “money” functioned as an explanatory concept was in the sense of a 
powerful motivator for actors in the conflict. For many activists it sufficed to state that “it’s about 
money,” “it’s the bottom-line” to define the driving force of the problem. “Money” was 
perceived as the natural motive for companies; it was though quite often disapprovingly ascribed 
to other actors. Within this discourse, activists condemned the Bulgarian government as corrupt 
and governments in the world generally as “working for those who can pay.” Activists also saw 
the media and the opponent experts as “bought off” and interpreted the unsupportive behavior of 
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other actors (e.g. big landowners) as a consequence of money for silence. And ultimately, a lot of 
interviewees lamented a general penchant among “people” to “seek financial gain, to satisfy 
mercantile or consumer needs,” “thirst for money”, in an “artificial value system.” Such 
perspective provided another overarching explanation focused on the individual – “thirst for 
money and the ego are the things that kill.” The understanding of money as a driving force 
produced one more crucial incongruity in the movement’s framing – that between money and 
nature (and hence life). Activists were both angry and sneering when they described the idea of 
sacrificing nature for profit. As one activist exclaimed, “You can’t be such an idiot to say, well, 
we will destroy Bulgaria’s nature but we will make some money.… Where are you going to live 
then, our children, we – where are we going to live?” Another one said, “You simply realize that 
these are just papers with no value. The real value is the natural resource – the pure water, air, 
soils – they sustain life on Earth…. A sane person, not brainwashed by this Western 
commercialism, sees these things.” (Cf. Figure 7). Such juxtapositions of the two values served to 
mobilize participants as righteous and “normal” and reject the claims of opponents as absurd. 
The incongruity of money with nature had another effect in the almost unanimous 
aversion of activists to potential collaboration with companies from agriculture or tourism that 
had a lot to lose from fracking. Activists rejected the notion that the cause had any gain motive. 
Additionally, a full-fledged economic discourse where gains and losses from fracking could be 
evaluated and weighed was shunned and purposely rejected. The economic claims of fracking 
supporters were countered when brought up, but such debates usually ended with statements like 
“the health and life of Bulgarian citizens and our environment have no price; no matter what 
contingent gains we compared them with, we know where the balance will tip.”4 
                                                          
4
 Movement press-conference from 09.29.2011, Sofia. 
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The Government 
The government was the main target of the anti-fracking movement’s persuasive actions. 
If the technology was the problem and the company was the “villain”, the government was seen 
and targeted as the actor to resolve the issue. This most important role begat complex and 
changing interpretations and strategic actions about the government’s motives, capabilities, and 
ways of action. Activists were able to discriminate among the many elements and persons, their 
motives and responsibilities, within the governmental institutions. This “resolution capability” 
came as a result of the extensive research and interaction with the institutions that had some 
connection with the issue. The activists learned to navigate among political parties, parliamentary 
committees, ministers, ministry and agency experts, local authorities and the police. The 
protesters learned to appreciate and work cooperatively with “the level of person in institution,” 
“people who are competent, do their jobs well, want to help.” Activists also developed nuanced 
theories about the motivations of different governmental units or actors, their sometimes 
conflicting interests, their dependencies. This ability to discriminate was crucial for the success of 
the movement which needed to simultaneously confront and work with the government. In 
contrast, in the Facebook off-topic postings, the highest number of attributions for the 
government were very general, negative and under a mobilizing theme of “there is no 
government like this,” expressing the absurdity of government actions. 
 Another complex understanding of the government was that it was both a very formal and 
a highly personalized force. The interviews and discussions abound with descriptions of 
procedures and legalistic details of “a heavy state machine that once set in motion, moves and 
mauls.” The strategy of the movement with its emphasis on mass protests and demand for 
moratorium was based on the understanding of the difficulties of introducing new laws in the 
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policy-making process. The activists also attempted to fully use the formal rules of institutional 
functioning, to make institutions live up to their own rulebooks (Alinsky, 1972) when seeking 
information, demanding the use of administrative powers and control, going through official 
channels of citizen participation in policy-making, and the use of policy-related expertise. 
However, activists also realized that these formal routines were often a way of “throwing dust in 
our eyes,” of offering formal solutions that keep the problem alive in reality. 
 A matching plane of action was that of personalized conflict with three representatives of 
the government: the Minister of Economy and Energy, the Minister of the Environment, and 
Prime Minister Boyko Borissov. The two ministers were seen as story “villains” because of their 
personal responsibility for promoting fracking and “misleading” the Prime Minister. They were 
targeted by many slogans and posters of the movement. This focus was partly drawn by 
interpellation (Althusser, 1970): the two ministers took active and provocative stances, calling 
activists “hysterical,” tools of “a foreign PR campaign” and “a group of five people.” Borissov, 
on the other hand, was a key target in the movement’s strategy, because of the widely held belief 
that in Bulgaria “whatever the Premier says, happens.” Activists described the personal attributes 
and traits of Borissov as crucial for the success of their campaign: a person with a big ego who 
“cannot stand public criticism,” an “impressionable” “populist”, “a vacillating ruler” who “bends 
under pressure”5. Activists attracted the attention of the Premier by disrupting a football game 
where he “played” with foreign journalists. In an ensuing personal meeting with him and the two 
ministers, they extracted a promise from him to examine the issue from all sides because “he did 
not want to remain in history as the poisoner of Dobrogea.” This and other highly visual, 
dramatic and personalized confrontations drew media attention (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007) and 
                                                          
5
 Very similar judgments were made by the US Ambassador to Bulgaria John Beyrle (2005-2008) in secret 
diplomatic cables published by Wikileaks. 
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started a cycle of actions and counteractions that eventually served the movement in making the 
Prime Minister commit personally to the issue. The public story where Borissov was misled by 
the two ministers was convenient for both sides as it afforded the ability to conflict without 
obviating negotiation. As a general tendency, an initial partly naïve benefit of the doubt to the 
government changed with deepening distrust as the movement got to know its opponents. 
 The widely held perceptions about the government among activists were that it was 
corrupt, incompetent, or traitorous. Such attributes roughly fit the money, technological, and 
nationalistic discourses, respectively. As was shown in the discussion of money as a driving 
force, the actions of institutions and elected officials were often explained by corruption and 
financial interest. Activists resented the politicians and officials who were “for sale” and who 
served “the highest bidder,” while some of them also directly promoted their own business 
interests. The government was also revealed in the course of research and interactions with 
agencies and policy makers to be inadequate and incompetent, sometimes “totally amateurish,” 
“not thinking” and “semi-literate.” Activists, with certain pride, recalled key episodes where they 
taught government agencies and politicians about European Union directives and fracking terms 
and processes. In the later stages of the campaign activists were certain that the institutions were 
simply and utterly unable to regulate and control a technoindustrial process even if they wanted 
to. Finally, for some activists the harshest verdict on the government was that it was “traitorous,” 
dependent and beholden by foreign interests. This narrative was fed, on the one hand, by the open 
promotion of fracking by US officials, but also by a deep cultural narrative about the traitors, 
“Janissaries” among us who sell us to an external enemy (the Ottoman Empire, Germany, Russia, 
etc.) The two levers that made the government move according to activists were money and fear 
for their power and control. “We cannot buy them, therefore we can only scare them,” as one 
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activist quipped. “A government will not topple itself for money; there is a boundary, a threshold 
beyond which their calculation of risk fails.” The protest strategy was thus to create “excess 
debate, excess tension” for the government where their “instinct for survival” would kick in. The 
reaction of the government to the protests was seen as constrained by that same logic of fear and 
money – and thus futile. A few activists recounted instances when they or other people were 
threatened by authorities (via surveillance, employer pressure, tax audits). Those interviewees did 
not give in to the inconveniences, sometimes underscoring their identification with “a new 
generation” that was brought up to demand and not to fear from power. Furthermore, activists 
saw their protests as even more startling and frightening from the government’s perspective 
because of how opposite and incongruent their motivations were: 
No government in Bulgaria has confronted a situation like this. Nobody is behind us, 
nobody is paying us; we stand for no other interests but Bulgaria’s: to keep our land and 
water clean.… My observations, after all these meetings with ministers, MPs, whomever 
– they are used to making everything for money.… And now they are in a precedent – 
there is a new generation that cares not for money, but for its land, its clean nature. 
Another tenet of the way the Bulgarian government worked according to activists was 
secrecy and subterfuge. The secrecy around important events such as the Chevron contract, the 
gas permit auctions, the existing exploration sites and activities, the meetings with company 
representatives, the agenda of the US officials’ visits – it was a powerful cue for the movement 
that the government was not to be trusted. These actions “behind the back of the people” also 
gave a powerful argument for mobilization and for the legitimacy of protest. In line of the view 
of the government as a power-hoarding agent, many activists saw manipulations and lies in the 
government actions – in censorship over the media, in innuendos about activists, in populist 
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appeasing half-measures, in purposely ambiguous terms and legal formulations, in conceding 
regulations that would never be enforced, and many others. After a time, all actions of the 
government were interpreted as stratagems with the aim of “pacifying the public and push 
through fracking in the dark”; as attempts to put things back in the familiar “quiet environment.” 
Discussion 
Back and Front Regions 
The findings and analyses from the study of meaning-making in the anti-fracking 
movement suggest that a focus on interpretive framing processes is fruitful, but also not 
straightforward. Strictly back and front regions can be identified, following Kubal’s lead (1998) 
by examining entirely internal communication such as private interviews with a trusted 
researcher and entirely external ones like public statements. In the anti-fracking movement there 
were discussions in closed groups (which can be deemed entirely interpretive); there were press-
conferences and negotiations in Parliament (entirely strategic). But between these communicative 
arenas the processes of meaning-making transcended boundaries and meanings were products of 
interaction and blurring of back and front regions. As was demonstrated in the previous sections, 
the anti-fracking movement was in perpetual dialogical interaction (Sternberg, 1999) with the 
discursive environment, taking cues from opponents, assigning roles for self-proclaimed 
antagonists, disproving or reframing labels, rejecting or internalizing discourses. Additionally, 
the boundaries of the meaning-making community were blurred by the activists’ understandings 
and ways of interacting. Activists considered themselves “the people”; their own role was not to 
frame messages to the public, but to “reveal the truth” to “people like them.” Interactions with 
what is usually “the public” happened in face-to-face contacts in streets and public spaces where 
the other could “sense the energy” and “the authenticity” of the movement. Facebook groups of 
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up to fifty thousand members facilitated a communication both interpretive and public. 
Interpretation and understanding of an issue should take into account the symbolic and practical 
openness of the interpreting (activist) community. Studying a movement as a producer of frames 
it then attempts to align with external audiences offers a limited perspective. 
Higher-order Meanings: Ideologies and Identities in the AFM 
The objects of interpretive framing were connected in higher-order frameworks. 
Ideologies and identities in the movement, to the extents of their elaboration, were discussed in 
the object sections and will be summarized here. The application of well-known ideologies was 
absent in the meaning-making of the AFM. The thinking about “the system” was ambivalent. On 
the one hand, activists consciously focused on the issue at hand and rejected “revolutionary” or 
“nihilistic” challenges like the Communist one. There were both strategic (the direct policy-
making negotiations) and cultural (the post-socialist sentiments) reasons for the “apolitical” focus 
on the issue. But at one point the activists realized in full the systemic issues of power in Bulgaria 
and discussed more freely (although in closed circles) the political nature of their struggle. This 
shift was associated with more ideological production, since ideology includes theories of society 
beyond an issue. The theories that emerged though were pivoted on the fuzzy (and inclusive) 
concept of “money” as an agent and a motive for the workings of power in the world; sometimes 
“money” provided individualistic explanations in relation to greed or vanity. Occasionally the 
money-based explanations turned into conspiracy theories. 
The analyses of interviews and discussions suggest that there were no solidified identities 
in the AFM. First of all, there were two pre-existing activist groups in the movement: 
environmentalists and Communists, the latter expulsed quite early. Identity is often defined as a 
group-level, not a movement-level phenomenon (Saunders, 2008), and the absence of groups 
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explains to some extent the absence of identities as Taylor and Whittier (1992) define them. The 
nature-protector (quasi-)identity was perhaps most comprehensive, connecting to everyday 
practices and lifestyles. This self-definition though was partly subdued in the public debate where 
more partial or narrow interests were considered a liability. The “Bulgarian” identity, at first 
glance “a given” (Gamson, 1991) and universal, was fraught with ambiguities; it served well to 
unify but less clearly to suggest means or give explanations of actions. “Citizens” was an 
emergent identity, a process as well as product of meaning-making (Melucci, 1995; Saunders, 
2008). It was a very important meaning framework that served mobilization, explanation, and 
persuasion goals. It did not develop into a solidified and sustainable identity due to, first, its 
openness: it was opposed to the government, but open to “the people”; and second, its definition 
within the political conflict, with no prescriptions about everyday life. Non-comprehensive 
identities and the lack of elaborate ideologies in the AFM served well to boost solidarity among 
activists by blurring differences, focusing on common interests (Saunders, 2008), and remaining 
open to newcomers. Additionally, the lack of ideologies helped the movement adapt strategically 
to the political environment and its populist logic. Unfortunately, the “citizen” identity was 
unable to extend activism to other issues and to more systemic challenges despite a strong effort 
in 2013. More exclusive, ideological identities are also more durable (Taylor, 1989). 
Higher-order Meanings: Discourses and Storylines 
Several discourses can be recognized in the fracking debate; these were ensembles of 
meanings and meaning-making activities, each with its own vocabulary and logic, allowing 
activists and opponents to understand and still contest each other’s claims (Hajer, 1995; 
Steinberg, 1999). As shared languages in use, these discourses were part of interpretive framing, 
but were not “owned” by the movement, and had very different lives in it. On one extreme, the 
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economic discourse on fracking was mostly rejected by the AFM. Activists did have to publicly 
answer questions or react to claims about profitability and economic benefits, the touted roles of 
investors or value of development, but ultimately economic arguments were brushed away as 
irrelevant, with a switch to the values of things that “have no price”; in internal discussions the 
economic arguments were at best ridiculed, most often absent at all. The logic of profitability and 
monetization of goods or damages was seen as incongruent with life (and nature). Interestingly, 
activists did talk about efficient natural resources use but (perhaps inadvertently) framed these 
arguments in a nature-protection key, with tourism and agriculture seen as “natural” and nature-
based (traditional and sustainable) activities versus the incongruent gas extraction. 
The technological discourse had a different status. At first, it seemed that there would be 
no common ground for a public debate as activists and opponents clashed around the 
multivocality of risks: interpreted as “truth” vs. “hysteria.” Later the activists accepted the 
technological discourse on its own terms and engaged in debates about probabilities, the abstract 
technoprocess, evidence, expertise and expert roles. Activists attempted to capture that discourse 
by accumulating and presenting expert knowledge and delegitimizing the expertise of the 
opponents. At a later (reflexive) stage multivocality was again prominent, with activists 
proposing new meanings of knowledge and controllability. 
An environmental discourse was common within the movement but sparingly used in the 
public debate. In interviews and discussions activists talked about the inherent value of nature, 
Earth-scale effects, the needs of future generations, the equal importance of different forms life; 
in public dialogues nature was mostly a means (a resource, a condition for health), an object in 
economic or risk discourses. For example, environmentalists argued one time about the 
contributions of fracking to carbon emissions (a prominent environmental topic), but this point 
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was virtually absent in the unfolding public debate. The avoidance of an environmental discourse 
was most likely motivated by its perceived narrowness. 
One discourse that both sides engaged in fiercely was the patriot discourse. Under this 
name I subsume the use of concepts such as national interest, of roles and categorizations such as 
defenders, traitors, and external enemies, metaphors of robbery and victimhood, etc. The key 
value of “independence” was contested in its multivocality – with supporters of fracking stressing 
“energy independence” while activists countering with “food and water independence.” Both 
sides publicly put themselves in the role of defenders of the country’s interests while depicting 
the other as paid or unwitting tools of foreign interests. The anti-fracking movement boosted the 
credibility of their claim by shifting the focus away from Chevron to the technology. They also 
constantly underscored their own independence and commitment to a national cause. 
Finally, the AFM actively used a democracy discourse to its own advantage. They 
stressed their identity as citizens first, the importance of consent, their protest as a right, and the 
role of the government as accountable to them. Activists had to counter, within this discourse, a 
populist interpretation of democracy where the Premier “listens to the people” and the precarious 
multivocality of “political,” which in Bulgaria commonsensically means “power-motivated.” 
To sum up, the analysis of discourses in the AFM demonstrates that indeed, as Steinberg 
pointed out (1999), discourses are used but not owned by a movement. Discourses have different 
fortunes: rejected and delegitimized as irrelevant (incongruous) to the issue; accepted and 
usurped; used internally but subdued in public; contested without closure by virtue of the 
multivocality of key notions and values. In the “battleground discourses” the AFM strove to 
demonstrate the greater importance and relevance of its interpretations and/or its greater 
legitimacy compared to the opponents’. 
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The discussion of higher-order meanings will be closed with the highlighting of two 
storylines. Certain discourses contain storylines with typical roles assigned in them (e.g. robbers, 
defenders, traitors). However, there are storylines that combine elements of different discourses 
and put diverse actors in acceptable roles (Hajer, 1995). The first such storyline used by the AFM 
was “Technology is the problem.” In this narrative the main danger was the technology, wielded 
by greedy corporations; activists were concerned victims; the government was a misguided (by 
the corporations) ruler who must be turned into a savior. The story was acceptable by the 
government, with which the activists negotiated; the Premier was used to his role as a savior in 
his populist style. While the storyline was mostly strategic, in the early days of the movement I 
registered discussions where activists explained the situation in such terms. In the course of the 
protest and with increasing awareness among activists, a much more radical storyline emerged: 
“We are the true government.” In this narrative the government was seen as the main problem, 
and money was the villain. But more importantly, activists saw themselves as usurping the role of 
the government in aspects cutting across discourses. The government was traitorous, the activists 
were patriots; it was incompetent, they were experts; it was corrupt, they were pure; it was 
undemocratic, they were “the people” and “the citizens.” The government was totally illegitimate 
to serve the common good, the people, Bulgaria; activists made “true politics.” This radical 
understanding shaped into concrete demands for a radically participatory democracy in 2013 
when the cabinet resigned amid general protests and it seemed that the political system was open 
for pressure from below. The narrative remained mostly internal, but at two times the technology 
storyline revealed its nature as a spectacle. Just before votes in Parliament when the ruling party 
appeared unyielding, activists and deputies would clash and talk about the political undertows of 
the protests. The activists threatened to turn their protesting from technology to the government. 
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As a discursive sign of victory, the ruling party would eventually yield to demands with the 
explanation that they “took a political decision.” 
Conclusion 
 The descriptions and inferences about meaning-making in the AFM should be considered 
with some limitations. First, the perspectives of participants without online presence are 
underrepresented as data collection from discussions as collective meaning-making events was 
conducted in Facebook groups. All interviewees were also digitally connected to the AFM. The 
study would have benefitted from more personal immersion of the investigator through 
participant observation, whereby the links between meanings, practices and artifacts of the AFM 
would have been discerned and explored. Finally, the single case study allows for descriptions of 
meanings and their consequences; variations among cases within the AFM, such as activists or 
groups, facilitate explanations of internal processes (Miles & Huberman, 1994), while larger 
movement-level explanations should be sought with cross-movement comparisons. 
As a strength of this investigation, multiple sources and forms of text and image were 
tapped, from public to semi-public to closed movement groups. Both retrospective and 
contemporary texts were collected. A novelty was introduced by the use of off-topic Facebook 
messages. The study of meaning-making in the anti-fracking movement in Bulgaria also adds to 
the scholarship on social movements in several ways. The study differentiated between strategic 
and interpretive framing, focusing on the latter and comparing the two to arrive at more 
illuminating conclusions. The diversity, and sometimes controversy, of meaning-making within 
the movement was captured and shown as productive for movement-wide meanings. Discursive 
opportunity structures and dialogical cues from opponents were also included in the description 
of framing processes. Meanings were examined and described at multiple levels, from the 
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framing of key objects and actors to higher-order meaning ensembles like ideologies, identities, 
discourses and storylines. Meaning-making mechanisms were studied in their own right as well. 
The approach treats meanings in a way that is more comprehensive and discriminative 
than applying the general concept of frames. The analytical approach facilitated the use and 
synthesis of less frequent frameworks of studying meaning. It allowed for insights into how 
meanings were created, elaborated and applied to actions. A richer description than the oft-used 
diagnostic-prognostic-motivational framing was accomplished. The approach also stayed closer 
to the analytical logic of qualitative methods and thus lent more credibility to the conclusions and 
also opportunities to readers to arrive at their own (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  
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Appendix 1: Images in Meaning-making in the Anti-fracking Movement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A protest poster against Chevron. The message is a reference to a famous phrase 
ascribed to a Bulgarian ruler who repelled a Byzantine invasion into Bulgaria. 
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Figure 2: The anti-fracking movement’s logo: burning water. The text reads, “No to shale gas.” 
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Figure 3. A movement poster. Female harvesters with gas masks: an example of incongruity. 
The text reads, “Save Bulgaria! Say no to shale gas!!!” 
Original painting by Vladimir Dimitrov, 1935. 
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Figure 4: A movement poster. A bread fractured by a drill: an example of incongruity. The text 
reads, “Golden Dobrogea?” 
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Figure 5. A protest poster. Stereotypical American recklessness. The text reads, “Shale gas 
extraction – Vandal technology, unsuitable for densely populated regions. If you eat bread, this 
concerns you. Get informed at www.shalegas-bg.eu”. 
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Figure 6. A movement leaflet. Lending a voice to the voiceless. The text reads, “Your voice can 
solve the problem. Inform yourself. Speak your mind. Share with a friend. LEND YOUR VOICE 
TO THE ENVIRONMENT”.  
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Figure 7. A protest poster. Incongruity of money and drinking water. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
DEMOCRACY IN THE ANTI-FRACKING MOVEMENT IN BULGARIA 
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Introduction: Democracy and Social Movements 
Democracy in social movements (SMs) is an increasingly important theme within social 
movements and also a topic for SM research (Della Porta, 2009). SMs are seen as carriers of 
alternative visions and practices of democracy in times of crisis of legitimacy for the political 
system (Bohman, 2000). SMs present a challenge to the latter in two ways. First, they are a mode 
of political activism that disproves or compensates for the decrease in conventional political 
participation (e.g. voting), thereby promoting democratic citizen participation, “doing 
democracy” (Moyer et al, 2001) in otherwise closed and unresponsive polity. Perhaps more 
importantly, SMs present an alternative to current democratic institutions by being arenas and 
laboratories for rediscovered and novel practices such as deliberation, direct participation, and 
consensus decision-making (Cohen, 1989; Della Porta, 2009; Dryzek, 2000; Offe, 1997). 
 A single-issue movement within a policy-making process framework provides an 
interesting opportunity to study SM democracy. Democracy is usually studied at the level of a 
social movement organization (SMO), where practices of decision-making are routine and more 
straightforward to examine; and where a certain degree of homogeneity of interests and values 
makes practicing democracy easier. For example, Polletta (2002) studied participatory 
democracy in American social movements by examining leading SMOs from different waves of 
activism; Della Porta and her colleagues (2009) studied the global justice movement (opposing 
corporate globalization) at the level of the SMO as well. The Anti-fracking Movement (AFM), as 
a single-issue movement, lends itself to the study of democratic practices because there were no 
clear pre-existing SMOs as participants; the great majority of activists were first-time protesters 
creating and joining new groups and constructing a common identity and very similar 
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understandings and practices of democracy via the extensive use of internet communication 
platforms. 
Theoretical Framework 
Traditional Models of Democracy 
Democracy means “rule by the people”, which shows from the start its contestable 
meaning. Held (2006), in his historical analysis of democracy understood and practiced, 
discusses the ambiguities and controversies of “the meaning of 'political participation', the 
connotation of 'representation', the scope of citizens' capacities to choose freely among political 
alternatives, and the nature of membership in a democratic community (p. x).” 
 It is worth noting that democracy is also a contested value. Philosophers, scholars and 
politicians from Plato to Madison to Hayek (for a history see Held, 2006) have expressed their 
doubts and apprehensions about the rule of the many which might result in displacement of “the 
common good” by the interests of the majority, in oppression of minorities, or simply in short-
sighted, irrational, or ill-informed decisions (Schumpeter, 1950). The discussion of the value of 
democracy is beyond the scope of this text, but my analysis is built on the assumption of the 
desirability of democracy, which was stated as a value by participants in the AFM in Bulgaria. 
Many different models of democracy can be conceptualized; Held described thirteen in 
the development of political thought and practice in history (2006). He groups them in three 
broad types: representative, participatory, and deliberative. 
Participatory or direct democracy is “a system of decision-making about public affairs in 
which citizens are directly involved” (Held, 2006, p. 4). Citizens participate by voting on all 
decisions but also by holding public offices. The republics of Ancient Greece or Renaissance 
Italy were examples of this model, and participatory and “plebiscite” (Schumpeter, 1950) 
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democracy are more contemporary forms. Following Dewey (1927), contemporary advocates 
strive for expanding the scope of direct citizen participation by extending the franchise, the scope 
of the political (e.g. into the workplace, community), the forms and permanence of participation 
– both voting and action. Held calls this tradition in thinking about democracy “developmental”, 
because it is based on the belief that participation in the political is a good by itself, and end to be 
desired. Proponents think of democracy as a necessary element of human development, because 
of the civic virtue, the empowerment and control over one’s life that it entails. 
Representative or liberal democracy is the system of decision-making that uses elected 
officers who represent the interests of citizens within a frame of “rule of law” (Held, 2006). This 
group of models starts from the assumption that an individual is the best judge for his or her own 
development, but not for that of others, so the role of the political system and democracy is to 
protect his or her pursuits and property from the abuses of a powerful state or citizen majority. 
The civic sphere and the free market are allegedly where fair and efficient decisions are made. 
Some more distinguishable contemporary conceptualizations are competitive elitism 
(Schumpeter, 1950), where democracy means free elections of a governing elite and pluralism 
(Dahl, 1956), where state and majority power are circumscribed by institutional and legal checks 
and balances while multiple interest groups and factions vie to promote their interests in policies. 
In this tradition, political participation is a burden for the individual, democracy does not have an 
intrinsic value, but is a means to an end – the desired end being personal liberty. 
The promise of the “ancient” participatory democracy tradition is extended into a 
qualitatively new form – deliberative democracy. This is a new model because for the first time 
the focus shifts on the nature of participation, not just its scope. At the core of the concept of 
democracy is “the consent of the people” (Held, 2006) as a basis for legitimate decisions: all 
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people bound by a decision should participate in making it (Bohman, 2000; O’Flynn, 2006). 
Deliberative democracy addresses the issue of the quality of consent and proposes a new basis 
for the legitimacy of democratic decisions. 
 Existing theories of democracy were criticized by proponents of deliberative democracy 
as emaciated interpretations of democracy and consent of the people. Democracy understood as 
elections, or from a purely procedural perspective, leaves out “the substantive representation” 
(Wedeen, 2008) of citizens in public life, and the nature of their consent and the process of 
creation of political will. Representative and direct theories start from the assumption that people 
have political preferences that need only to be expressed through political forms. Elections are 
aggregations of personal preferences, similar to consumer choice on the market.  In contrast, 
deliberative democracy is about the formation, articulation, and transformation of political 
positions through a profound process of deliberation, of informed debate and reasoning in public 
among citizens (Dryzek 2000). Legitimacy comes not from simple aggregation of preferences, 
but from “reasonable political judgment” (Held, 2006).  
Joshua Cohen (1989) elaborated the characteristics of deliberation in important 
directions. Deliberative democracy in his view is an ongoing and continuous project where 
decisions are open for revision; deliberation is the main source of legitimacy of decisions; 
participants have a commitment to respect each other’s differences and plurality of values and 
goals, as well as each other’s deliberative capacity. Ideal deliberation as a process has several 
crucial qualities. First, it is free in the sense that participants are bound only by the rules and 
results of deliberation, and not by authority or coercive force; and in the sense that they can and 
will act upon the decisions of deliberation as it is sufficient reason to comply. Second, 
deliberation is reasoned in the sense that participants are required to state the reasons for their 
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positions, in support or against proposals, and acceptable reasons are the grounds for making 
decisions. Third, ideal deliberation is equal in two ways: formally equal, meaning its procedural 
rules pertain to all participants in the same way, insuring equal voice for everyone; substantively 
equal in the sense that exogenous distribution of power and resources would not influence 
participant’s equal contribution and voice in deliberation. Finally, ideal deliberation is geared 
toward consensus – finding reasons persuasive to all participants to the extent that they would act 
upon the decision taken. 
Deliberative democracy requires particular attention to communicative mechanisms. 
According to Bohman (2000), among these “dialogue mechanisms” are making explicit what is 
latent in common understandings of participants by exchanging and disputing interpretations of 
common experiences or situations; the discussion of differences in individual and collective 
biographical or historical experiences among participants, revealing the bases of differing 
perspectives, understandings, and values; and the application of a given (shared) norm or 
principle to the particular case at hand, which can articulate commonalities, congruence between 
values and actions, and different ways to realize a respected principle. 
Meaning and Praxis of Democracy in Social Movements 
 Turning to social movements as arenas and alternatives for democracy, scholars do not 
measure degrees of democracy against an ideal-type standard, but describe various models of 
democracy in particular groups and movements (Della Porta, 2009): in constant development, 
stressing different democratic qualities, shaped by different contextual demands and activist 
understandings. 
Meanings of democracy in social movements. 
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Sources of models. The main source of models of SM democracy is the legacy or 
example of other protest movements. SMs can be self-identified as reincarnations or expansions 
of older movements and sometimes they involve influential groups of veteran activists carrying 
over the experience of previous challenges (Reiter, 2009). In some cases, for example the peace 
movement, activist communities encapsulate themselves during times when their issue is out of 
public favor and build alternative institutions that experiment with SM democracy and keep the 
torch lit for a new protest cycle (Polletta, 2002). Social movements also do diffusion work where 
they propagate their models through transnational campaigns and social forums (Della Porta, 
2009). Some movements, like the Zapatistas in Mexico, become important reference groups with 
which other and newer movements identify and try to emulate (Della Porta, 2009). Two other 
important sources will be examined later in more pertinent sections: politics as usual, which 
provides negative examples of what democracy is; and private, non-political relationships that 
activists transplant into SM work (Clemens, 1993). The latter are useful for their familiarity, 
which translates into predictability and quick adoption as ground rules do not need to be 
contested and negotiated. 
Reasons for adopting democracy in social movements. Models of democracy are 
adopted also with specific self-conscious and purposeful rationales. Traditional narratives about 
SM form are that activists choose participatory democracy for ideological reasons, then 
gradually substitute hierarchical structures for instrumental reasons, i.e. to be more efficient in 
the policy arena. This depiction is criticized by Polletta (2002), as neo-institutional approaches to 
organizations demonstrate that hierarchical forms can be adapted for symbolic reasons 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Participatory or deliberative democracy (used as synonyms by 
Polletta) can be also adopted because it fits with the activist identity of the movement’s 
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participants, or boosts the movement’s legitimacy with the public or other political actors 
(Clemens, 1996). 
A very important reason to adopt democratic forms is the imperative to oppose politics-
as-usual. Adversarial framing and oppositional identity (Gamson, 1992) mean that democracy in 
a movement is defined as the opposite to the norms, structures and processes in the 
(disappointing) democratic model practiced in politics. While participation in the policy-making 
processes pressures SMs to comply with the legitimacy rules of the game that favor 
centralization and professionalization, at the same time “strong executive power structures … 
tend to induce a fundamental critique of bureaucratic and hierarchical political forms, which is 
then reflected in the movements’ emphasis on informal and decentralized structures” (Rucht, 
1996, p. 192). 
Informality and horizontal relationships are indeed very common to SMs challenging the 
way politics works (Polletta, 2002). These features are sometimes framed as a preference for 
prefigurative politics over effectiveness (Della Porta, 2009). In the original definition of the term 
(Boggs, 1977) it is “the embodiment, within the ongoing political practice of a movement, of 
those forms of social relations, decision-making, culture, and human experience that are the 
ultimate goal” (p. 100). Prefigurative politics was elaborated by Breines (1989) and Epstein 
(1991) as “building alternatives” (Yates, 2014). A movement builds a community where activists 
experiment with new social relations and alternative institutions. Reasons for adopting 
participatory democracy (or any other practice) in a prefigurative way might be strategic rather 
than escapist (Polletta, 2002): to persuade outsiders in the desirability and viability of new ways, 
to develop activists and their relationships, or to preserve a practice until a more receptive era. 
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Finally, as Polletta (2002) argues cogently, participatory democracy can be adopted for 
strategic reasons because of its benefits. She summarizes them in three groups: solidary, 
innovative and developmental benefits. First, solidarity in a deliberative group is strengthened 
because deliberation leads to shared ownership of the decisions and heightened commitment to 
them. This effect counteracts the usual inability (due to lack of resources) of SM organizations to 
offer selective rewards for participation. Second, deliberative democracy is conducive to 
producing innovative strategies and better decisions for political action by allowing multiple 
points of view and sharing of information on situations of high uncertainty characteristic of 
extra-institutional pressure (Held, 2006). Finally, deliberative democracy develops human 
capabilities in a learning process. It trains skills in citizens of public reasoning, engaging with 
authority, and respectful other-regarding debate. It also fosters a sense of self-efficacy, even to 
the development of new leaders. These effects are particularly important for previously 
marginalized and politically inexperienced activists, including in countries with emerging 
democracy like Bulgaria. 
Contextual demands and models of democracy in social movements. Specific models of 
democracy within SMs are adopted also in response to contextual demands – from the social and 
political environment of a movement. Contextual demands are often framed as a democracy-
efficiency dilemma – Polletta (2002) provides a list of external pressures that seem to make 
deliberation less efficient than hierarchy. Among these, the more important are: the funders’ 
requirements for bureaucratic procedures; the legislative and executive powers’ expectations for 
centralized negotiation, professional expertise, and quick reactions to policy windows; the need 
for unilateral leader action in response to sudden opponent moves; the increasing membership’s 
demand for simpler and faster decision-making procedures; the need to coordinate local actions 
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into a national campaign, etc. Conversely, deliberative democracy is most valuable (its benefits 
maximal) in other contextual conditions. First, the lack of resources, high costs of participation, 
and the unpopularity of a cause make the solidary benefits of deliberative democracy desirable. 
Innovatory benefits are crucial in a highly uncertain context, while groups that are embedded in 
policy-making routines do not need them. Developmental benefits are more important under 
conditions of political or democratic inexperience, as well as when political gains are expected to 
be fragile, so long-term development of activist cadre is a movement goal. 
 Variations in key concepts in social movement democracy. Movements and SMOs with 
different histories, sources of democracy models, contextual demands develop different 
understanding of key democracy components. Thus often differences between movement 
democracy forms are due to the meaning they put in apparently identical norms and practices. 
 Consent of the people, the essential principle of democracy, has many meanings, as Held 
pointed out (2006), and this plurality is transferred to social movements no less. Della Porta 
(2009) discerns two conceptions of consensus in the global justice movement. The plural 
conception emphasizes high-quality dialogue with respect for differences and autonomy of 
participants where final decision is less important than a mutual knowledge of differences and 
agreements. In comparison, a communitarian conception of consensus stresses collective 
agreement that is worked toward in an assembleary tradition and as part of anti-hierarchical 
identity. Polletta (2002) provides an example by comparing community organizing and direct 
action democracies. Within the former, agreement is reached before the meeting of community 
leaders, where the decision is only ratified. For direct action groups this approach is antithetical 
to consensus, which they understand as a process in meetings with elaborate procedures for 
deliberation, including rituals of respect and equality. 
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 Other key democracy concepts that vary across groups are equality, inclusion, legitimacy, 
leadership, and participation. For example, Polletta (2002) underlines the need to allow notions 
of complex equality – where authority is allowed in some sphere of work, but not in others and 
overall, and where training and tutoring gradually transfers the authority to others. Without such 
understanding, equality becomes an obstacle for learning and tutoring in movements. 
Participation, as another example, may involve equality of voting on decisions for all members, 
or equal participation in all movement activities, effectively meaning no division of labor among 
activists. 
Praxis of democracy in social movements. Polletta (2002) defines participatory 
democracy practices in movements as decentralized, non-hierarchical, consensus-based, 
informal, and cooperative. She also emphasized the importance of deliberative talk and 
experimentation. The major meta-task in activists’ work within movements is to ensure 
efficiency and equality. 
Relational bases of social movements. In her history of major US movements (2002), 
Polletta found that the disintegration of trail-blazing SMOs like the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee or the Students for a Democratic Society happened not due to 
irreconcilable conflicts of principle or interests (even between old and new generations of 
activists) but because these communities were no longer capable to resolve interpersonal 
conflicts. Normative discourse is so prevalent in SMs that conflicts of principle seem prominent; 
however, it is changes in norms of interpersonal conduct that render deliberation and 
participation futile means of resolving issues of principle. 
In the movements studied by Polletta (2002), for democracy to work, an underlying 
normative framework of mutual trust, respect, and care was needed. Trust, respect, and care 
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ensure “fair and fast” decision-making in SMOs, i.e. they help address the efficiency and 
equality quandaries of movement democracy. Faster decisions are possible, Polletta argues, 
because mutual respect and care create stable behavioral expectations (predictability), while trust 
helps deal with departures from rules. Fair decisions are reached because inequities in 
deliberative capacity, authority, or speaking time are balanced by interpersonal/intimate equality 
characteristic of positive relationships. 
Where do trust, respect, and care come from? Polletta shows that they are transferred to 
movements at the start from long-term networks of social relationships, from private or semi-
private life. Activists come into contentious politics, but they do not want to emulate 
organizational forms and norms from the political system they challenge. Therefore, they adopt 
familiar non-political relational forms that provide normative and affective bases for 
participatory and deliberative democracy. Examples of such forms are the family, the collegial 
collective, the business partnership, the religious fellowship, the tutelage relationship, or the 
friendship circles. Such relationships also unfold and thrive in particular settings. These can be 
semi-private spaces and interpersonal networks like kitchen-tables (Goldfarb, 2007) or qat 
chews6 (Wedeen, 2008), religious congregations and groups of friends (Polletta, 2002; Speer & 
Hughey, 1995), provided that certain processes of deliberation occur, focused on public issues, 
involving reasoning in public, and entertaining disagreement. Private and semi-private 
relationships and their settings are especially important for groups that do not have prior 
experience with political activism – due to marginalization or overall democratic deficit in 
politics. Thus the relational perspective is very pertinent to emerging democracy societies 
(Goldfarb, 2007) such as Bulgaria. 
                                                          
6
 Traditional gatherings in Yemen where men chew the leaves of an alkaloid plant, qat, while discussing social and 
political issues. 
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 Deliberate practice of democracy: rules, structures, and relationships building. 
Relational bases provide stability, equality and efficiency, but they come with their own limits 
and conflict potentials. In Polletta’s study (2002), for example, activism based on religious 
fellowship was resistant to experimenting with new bases of authority and was powerless when 
dissenters invoked the dictates of conscience. Tutelage purposefully avoided providing clear 
goals, but in times of uncertainty and urgency this bred frustration and conflict. Friendship has 
the darker sides of exclusivity and conformity; informality hinders the establishment of rules 
protecting equality and often results in power to informal cliques (Freeman, 1973). 
New movements possess the advantage of using learning from positive and negative 
experiences and can support the practice of internal democracy via rules, structures, and 
relationship-building activities. Polletta (2002) describes rules allowing expertise and expert 
authority to coexist with equality and protecting minorities in decision-making, for example 
codes for communication during deliberation and complex rules for degree of consensus and for 
temporary authority on certain decisions. Polletta emphasizes rules making complex equality 
explicit and viable as a means of using expertise. Deliberative democracy movements also have 
“structures of cooperation” – group formats that have a dual function – plan and execute actions, 
but also foster new kinds of relationships among participants different from conventional 
political interaction and familiar private relationships. Thus deliberative democracy movements 
purposefully nurture mutual trust, respect, and care among their members. 
What all of these practices must provide for, in Polletta’s view, is deliberation and 
experimentation in a movement. These are the two defining features of movement democracy. 
Deliberation is facilitated by practices of reasoning, argumentation, norms of equality, sincerity 
and respect. Experimentation and innovation are key conditions for movement democracy as it 
151 
 
constantly examines and reflects upon its own working (Bohman, 2000). For Polletta, crucial is 
the generation of new bases for legitimate authority and leadership – alternative to power, 
credentials, and money. Without this experimenting, deliberative democracy cannot offer much 
to challenge the political status quo.  
The Study of Democracy within the AFM 
When applying the theories and concepts of movement democracy to the case of the 
AFM, several themes and topics can be distinguished. The study will examine the understanding 
of democracy within the movement in order to describe it in its own terms. The local meaning of 
key concepts will be clarified: consent, equality, plurality, participation, deliberation, 
authority/leadership and its legitimacy. The sources of democracy meanings will be probed, 
including negative definitions. Reasons for adoption should be explored – (oppositional) identity, 
legitimacy, ideologies, familiarity, strategy (and perception of benefits), and the presence of 
prefigurative politics. The activists’ perceptions of the contextual demands of the political 
environment will also be examined as shaping forces for movement democracy. Then, the 
relational bases and settings for movement practices will be examined – their characteristics, 
norms and affective dimensions. Finally, meanings and will be shown in their embodiment in 
movement practices, key processes, rules, and structures such as decision-making, 
representation, delegation of power to leaders. When evaluating SM democracy, we can compare 
its characteristics against normative models, and also in the terms of the particular movement. 
Methods 
The study of movement democracy was based on accounts of participants containing key 
ideas and perspectives on events, and on records of discussions of movement actions and 
strategy. These texts were analyzed for key topics related to democracy within the AFM. 
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Data Collection 
Interviews. Current and former activists from the AFM were interviewed to both 
understand personal meanings of democracy and its basic elements, and obtain individual 
accounts of the processes and practices of movement democracy. Interviewees were sampled 
purposefully for a maximum variation in experiences (Miles & Huberman, 1994), with most 
important differences being between positions of power vs. supportive ones, Sofia vs. country 
groups, and staunch vs. dissident (including ousted) activists. A total of twenty-four activists 
from seven cities were interviewed from March 2012 through August 2013. The interviews were 
semi-structured (Rubin & Rubin, 2012), with some of the questions referring to democracy 
topics such as decision-making, leadership, participation, and Sofia-country-relationships. For 
more information, see Methods section of Paper 2. 
Movement records and documents. Textual data were collected in the course of 
movement actions and retrospectively, mostly from Facebook-based archives. Facebook was the 
main platform for internal communication, file exchange, data collection and banking, and 
decision-making. Facebook groups were semi-private movement spaces where current and 
general issues were discussed with much candor and bluntness. Two-hundred Facebook 
discussions from the national and local groups were selected with a judgment of their relevance 
to the topic of inquiry. Additional attention was focused on discussions around key decisions, 
conflicts, deliberations on tactics and strategy. The discussions were a primary source of data on 
movement democracy as they contained live deliberations, interactive construction of meanings 
and discursive practices. In addition, twenty-two sets of minutes from national and local group 
meetings were included in data collection to capture the outputs of deliberations. 
Other sources of data were used as well; particularly participant observation of one 
153 
 
protest and observations of video footage provided a small amount of contextual knowledge of 
movement practices. 
Data Analysis 
The qualitative data were analyzed in two cycles (Saldana, 2009): for summarizing and 
labeling meanings, and for building categories and links between them. MaxQDA software was 
used for coding and sorting the data. Both structural coding (Saldana, 2009) based on pre-defined 
theoretical topics and open coding for emerging categories (Charmaz, 2006) was applied. In a 
second stage of coding I coded within and across segments, reflected on the data and wrote 
analytical memos (Charmaz, 2006). Open-coded segments were analyzed with the constant 
comparative method (Corbin & Strauss, 2007) to create more general categories, which in turn 
were compared and expanded with newly-coded statements. More details on the approach to 
analysis and the ensuring of trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) are presented in Paper 2. 
Findings 
“Democracy” in the Movement 
The anti-fracking movement was a cause-driven movement, but as the second study 
demonstrated, a strong citizen identity developed in its course: “people turned out as citizens, for 
democracy and transparency,” “nature coming third for them,” “mad at the powers that be,” 
“fighting for democracy.” The dialectics of the cause (and its pragmatic priorities) and the ideal 
society (and its prefigurative practices) permeated the thinking and debates on how the AFM 
should run itself. Democracy is an ideal for social movements as a strived for state of society 
and/or as a modus operandi of the movement itself, an alternative society (Della Porta, 2009; 
Polletta, 2002). In the anti-fracking movement in Bulgaria, both ideals were present; while this 
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study is focused on democracy within the movement, the narratives of activists about society and 
“the system” reveal understandings of what democracy is for them. 
At first glance there was a surprising paucity of the use of the word “democracy” by 
activists in discussions and interviews; furthermore, sometimes they used it ironically with 
qualifications such as “this ‘democracy’”, “American democracy” (meaning fake), 
“pseudodemocracy” or “democradcia” (a pun in Bulgarian combining the words “democracy” 
and “theft”). Such use of the word demonstrates the activists’ resentment of politics in Bulgaria 
which to them was democratic in name only.  The understanding of “true” democracy or 
democracy within the movement was often constructed in opposition of the political democracy, 
as will be demonstrated below. 
Upon further investigation into the texts, the most wide-spread notion of democracy is in 
the sense of consent of the people affected by a decision, a basic definition of democracy (Held, 
2006). Activists often complained about “the unbelievably impudent intrusion in people’s lives, 
worked out in secret, behind people’s backs” and framed the AFM as a protest that “makes our 
voices heard.” Ruling without consent was generalized beyond the fracking issue, to judgments 
like “communism or democracy [alike], it’s evident that we [the people] are not in charge.” As 
anti-fracking activists identified themselves as “the Bulgarian people,” the flaw of political 
democracy became that “the people have no real power.” A secondary meaning – democracy as a 
rule of the majority – came as a logical consequence. With perceptions and narratives of corrupt, 
incompetent politicians, participants condemned representative democracy as a system where 
“nobody represents us.” In many discussions and interviews activists extolled the virtues of 
“direct democracy” and “a referenda state.” These notions and ideals influenced the ways of the 
movement democracy. 
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“The Civic Society” 
The anti-fracking movement was a means to make the government hear the voice of the 
people; how was the voice of activists heard within the movement? Movement democracy was 
indeed a cherished goal by most activists, but its meanings and limits varied across people and 
times. Perhaps as a reaction to the negative notions of political democracy, activists more often 
talked about “civic society” when they described alternative and prefigurative practices within 
the movement. “Civic society” as a translation of the Bulgarian term reflects a double meaning I 
sensed in its usage. First-time activists tended to use the term in the sense of “a society of 
citizens,” referring to their particular movement, and infusing it with prefigurative notions of a 
better society. Green activists from the non-profit sector were sometimes irked by the notion that 
the AFM was a novel alternative, “the birth of civil society in Bulgaria.” Environmentalists had 
been engaged in “civil society” (in the sense of broadly focused organized, network, informal, 
and even business) activities to preserve nature for years. The difference in meanings played out 
in two different ways the protests were perceived by activists: as a new alternative to government 
vs. as a campaign; a more idealistic vs. a more pragmatic activity. 
The negative examples and experiences of actual democratic politics and government in 
Bulgaria was a major reference point for how activists imagined their civic society should 
function. What was considered right and legitimate democratic process within the movement was 
based on several types of opposition to Bulgarian politics. First, the secrecy of government 
decisions taken “behind people’s backs” was countered with transparency and “glasnost” within 
the movement. “Glasnost” was a norm and expectation for everyone to disclose their actions and 
plans. For example, the group from Sofia posted minutes from their meetings on the national 
Facebook group (a closed group with members from all local groups). Another opposition was 
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between the government’s coercion and the freedom from coercion in the AFM where “there’s 
no boss to tell you what to do.” The formal hierarchy of the institutions was contrasted to the 
informality and meritocracy in the AFM where “everyone finds his place.” The “suppression of 
discussion” and of voice by the government was opposed to the “constructive dialogue” among 
activists. Finally, the corrupted interests of money and profit that drove the government were 
contrasted to the absolute norm of selflessness and dedication to a common cause in the 
movement. In a radical and proudly incompatible opposition to the government and politics as 
usual, activists saw their “true civic society” as transparent, free, informal, dialogical and cause-
driven alternative. Representative democracy was seen as a set of formalities designed to keep 
power away from people. Activists wanted and practiced a participatory and direct alternative. 
The civic society had several important characteristics whose meanings determined what 
was acceptable and right for participants. Perhaps the most important notion was “naturalness.” 
“Naturalness,” “spontaneity,” and “informality” were descriptions and evaluations of how most 
democracy practices in the movement happened. “Naturalness” was used in interviews and 
discussions as the opposite of and the alternative to hierarchy, artificial and arbitrary assignment 
of work, and material or egocentric interests. 
“Formal structures” “repel people and make everything disintegrate,” stated activists; 
“people are scared by bureaucracy, paperwork.” Structures determine “what you should do or 
who to work with” and thus limit personal freedom. Formal rules and positions were seen as 
features of organizations, synonymous with politics, procedural bickering and private interests; 
“when you start making structures things go down the usual way.” There were attempts by single 
activists or pre-existing groups (some coming from professional or party backgrounds) to 
formalize rules for conduct or procedures for decision-making. They were all rejected with 
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descriptors such as “regimentation,” “artificial,” “dictatorial,” “petty,” “like signing off every 
day that you love your wife.” A call for a focus on procedures was deemed distracting from the 
urgency of the cause, as pedantic, even self-serving. “Concrete work being done makes things go 
smoothly. But when you turn to organizational issues – minutes, signing, quorum – it’s a riot.” 
In addition to “naturalness” as opposition to organization as usual, it was also seen as the 
way to transcend the human deficiencies of participants themselves. In this sense “natural” stood 
for “not made up by us” and thus inherently right, universal and legitimate (Douglas, 1986). 
Activists legitimized certain practices and power imbalances in the movement as “natural” when 
they were shaped by factors outside the movement: talents, gender, location. Some activists in 
their interviews preferred “natural leaders” to “officialized” leaders who were voted for because 
the latter would beget constant personal conflicts or become corrupted by power. Even when the 
movement had to vote for a required legal representative of the national petition drive, the vote 
was avoided “naturally” by one of the nominees voluntarily stepping down: “a woman [would 
be] better to stand in front, and she also had longer experience.” “Naturalness” legitimized the 
way leaders and speakers emerged, work was distributed, discussions transpired, decisions were 
made, accountability was performed, people joined or dropped out of the movement. 
Another important notion in the civic society was freedom. It was highly valued and 
appreciated as the mode of action at the individual level. In the AFM “everyone does only what 
he agrees with”; “there is nobody to control or centralize things”; “nobody can impose a 
decision, because nobody is dependent, we are all volunteers.” This freedom from control and 
command was contrasted to the hierarchical and coercive relationships in political or business 
organizations. It was seen as the only possibility for a collective of “wild individualists.” Only 
such freedom produced “self-initiative” and “personal self-control.” In the end “multiple parallel 
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strategies existed” in the movement and this was considered a strength. “Coordination” was used 
instead of “organization.” With the “naturalness” of informal coordination “everyone does what 
his strength is” and “the puzzle fits itself” – two often used expressions that expressed 
meritocracy and legitimacy. 
Lastly, the understanding of the civic society of activists cannot be full without their 
notion and use of “cause.” The focus on a cause made the civic society different from a political 
group that promotes “ideological” goals. The “cause” was also often seen as the only unifying 
power for the “all very different” participants. The appeal to the cause was an ultimate argument 
in discussions, a plea for unity and cohesion during conflicts. Proposed ideas or actions were 
often delegitimized as “diversions from the cause.” Especially suspect were procedural or 
“organizational” questions; they were often interpreted as serving one’s egoistic interests. 
Activists were expected to fall in line, to sacrifice their egos for the cause. Very importantly, 
many decisions and actions were legitimized with their contributions for the cause, their impact, 
and not with their process. Pragmatic legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) was a very common principle 
in judging how things are done in the AFM. 
Appeals to the cause were problematic once processes of disintegration and expiration of 
trust had started in the movement. Very similar to Polletta’s (2002) description of appeals to 
personal conscience in the faith-based peace movement that turned self-serving, on two 
occasions in the AFM leaders threatened to leave the movement “for the sake of the cause” if 
other activists did not agree with them. They justified their ultimatums as situations where a 
contrary decision by the majority would render the leader a liability for the cause. In both cases 
the other activists supported the leaders, not without angry dissident voices. 
Key Characteristics of Democracy in the AFM 
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Power and equality. The first important element of democracy within AFM was the 
question of power distribution and its legitimacy. Authority and equality are crucial issues in 
social movements, a source of both productive action and conflict (Polletta, 2002). One of the 
most evident descriptions of the AFM by activists was that it was a movement “without leaders,” 
“without chiefs,” “horizontal,” “decentralized.” “Leaders – there is really no such thing,” one 
activist affirmed. In the AFM “people don’t have a boss,” there was “nobody on top of those 
below.” This understanding of leadership came from the perceptions of the political and party 
system in Bulgaria where a leader “controls” and “gives orders.” The movement provided an 
alternative for activists who thought of themselves as “a new generation” where “people don’t 
want to sit and stare up at somebody’s mouth.” Another important meaning of this eschewed 
leadership was that it was formal. Formal leadership, even if activists themselves voted for a 
leader, was seen as “regimentation,” as disruptive of the “natural” way people “found their 
place” in the movement. A collective without formal leadership had practical benefits: no leaders 
meant less vulnerability because there would be “no targets for external pressure” and 
“smearing”; no less importantly, activists believed that formal leaders would “make people 
complacent,” relieve them from responsibility to act and to take initiative – a key feature of 
volunteer participation. With these two arguments leaderlessness in local groups was promoted 
by the environmentalist activists from Sofia. Another rationale against formal leadership was that 
it would unleash ego conflicts where people would start opposing collective actions because of 
interpersonal issues with a formal leader. 
Some activists admitted the possibility of informal leaders and elaborated their role in 
ways that understated their power. First, “a true leader” was described as a person who “merely 
expresses the opinion of the people [in the movement],” having “left his personal interest or 
160 
 
opinions aside.” This spokesman function was contrasted to the flawed representation in politics. 
Another key characteristic of a leader came from the reverence for action in the AFM: a leader 
was anyone who was “most active,” “does the most things”; leadership was a burden carried by 
those who “sacrificed themselves before the eyes of the others.” My interviews are peppered 
with personal stories of interpellation, of people who felt that something important had to be 
done and volunteered because no one else would. For example, signing a document addressed to 
an institution or speaking in front of a microphone were seen as uncomfortable activities by most 
participants. Leadership was thus associated with responsibility and not with power or privilege. 
Finally, a leadership function was described with the word “coordinator.” A coordinator was a 
person who would help self-directed volunteers merge their efforts for a concrete action like a 
protest or leaflet passing. She does not give orders; only transmits information. The role was 
seen as natural for a movement based on individual initiative and action. 
The understatement of power – either by rejecting leadership or by relegating it to a non-
privileged status – was easier with regard to simple and straightforward movement activities, 
especially protests. As one rank-and file activist summed up, “the strategy was clear: we are 
against; the tactics were clear too: we jump on the square; there was nothing to discuss.” Early in 
the rise of the AFM and also later in groups outside Sofia, protests were a matter of “who and 
how, not what.” But with the engagement in policy-making and proposing of different strategies 
and solutions, three types of power positions emerged that were more difficult to legitimize. 
Activists who engaged in three activities – strategizing, representing, and policy-making 
– had disproportional power in the sense that they were able to influence the direction and 
outcomes of the movement. First, in a movement where “everybody is free to propose ideas” and 
“multiple parallel strategies exist,” whose ideas become movement actions? The AFM resembled 
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a free market where activist-entrepreneurs would sell their ideas and organize their realization in 
competition with others. Such leaders would propose an initiative, “persuade others the idea 
would be useful,” “run after it,” “become the motor,” “persuade others to help” and sometimes 
“get into arguments” to “defend your ideas… pushy or not.” Some of the milestone actions of the 
AFM – for example, the national petition drive, a legal appeal to the European Commission, a 
letter to all political parties – were executed by small teams led by the idea proponent, sometimes 
unbeknown to other activists. 
Most activists saw this manner of strategizing as legitimate because it was an extension 
of the personal freedom within the movement and it rewarded the most active members. This 
freedom of initiative might have been seen as egalitarian, but the patterns of success of 
movement entrepreneurs revealed the sources of disproportionate power. First, activists from 
Sofia were closer to national institutions and their ideas had much more potential for policy 
impact through direct pressure. And second, people with experience and connections from 
previous social actions, mostly environmentalists, had the networks to quickly summon and 
organize teams to work on an initiative or to “consolidate around an idea” before it was proposed 
for discussion. The initiative of the entrepreneurs had some limits: ideas that were perceived as 
politically tinted (e.g. appealing to a particular political party) or materialistic (e.g. soliciting help 
from businesses) were unacceptable and sometimes lead to internal conflicts. 
The second position of power was that of “faces of the movement,” i.e. representatives or 
speakers. Their role was to speak for the anti-fracking cause to the media, in public debates, 
ultimately for the mass audience. Their influence was in the opportunities to persuade others, to 
make ad hoc decisions about messages, to create an image of the movement for the mass public. 
Activists defined the role in an egalitarian way by understating the powers (the speakers merely 
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expressed the common opinion), by emphasizing the burdens and sacrifices of exposing oneself 
in public, and by declaring that anyone was free to take up the role. Meritocratic explanations 
stated that the speakers were people who had sensitivity to the “main accents within the 
movement” and authenticity to present them, as well as a skill of explaining complex issues in 
simple terms. Thus representatives emerged “naturally” within the collectivity of free activists; 
formal procedures were in fact deliberately avoided. A “natural” determinant for the speaker in 
two groups was gender: she was a woman. A deeper examination of the speakers’ emergence 
shows more factors at play. First of all, this role was most often solicited by external agents, the 
media or the government; and it was the media or the government that legitimized certain 
activists as speakers. For example, a few activists were well-known to the media because they 
had participated in previous protest movements; it was convenient for journalists to go to them 
for opinions. Even more importantly, government figures and the Premier himself invited 
particular activists to meetings and thus picked representatives. This was a very different process 
from the extolled interpellation within the movement. It also meant that activists from Sofia had 
a disproportionate opportunity to speak for the AFM; the proximity to institutions of political 
power granted power to Sofia activists. A milestone event demonstrated the inequality within the 
movement: Sofia activists pressed the Premier to invite them for a meeting by holding banners at 
a football game where he played with foreign diplomats. The meeting was known in advance and 
there was a push from many local groups to elect national representatives from various cities to 
attend. The Sofia group held the communication channel with the Premier’s office and collected 
information on a very popular leader outside Sofia, vetting him as a representative. In the end, 
the Sofia core of activists went to the meeting alone, without prior notice, citing “objective 
factors” such as the lack of time and the regulated access to the government building. In later 
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interviews those activists shared that they mistrusted the local leader as politically-driven and too 
esoteric-minded to represent the movement. This episode created a big rift within the movement, 
with some “democracy-minded” people opting out. While many activists, including some from 
Sofia, vehemently protested this fait accompli with arguments in the spirit of democracy, another 
argument trumped them: the meeting was deemed a success. Voices for movement democracy 
were silenced with what became a very common argument: “it is the cause that matters, not your 
egos,” i.e. results are more important than process.  
The third position of disproportionate power within the movement was held by activists 
who directly participated in the creation of the fracking moratorium (i.e., in policy-making). This 
job involved collecting data, drafting texts, defining technical and legal terms, negotiating the 
proposals with politicians, lobbying and making on-the-fly decisions about compromises on the 
policy. These were diverse activities, but they were accomplished by a small team of about five 
activists. The power of the policy-making role was understated in its own ways. First, the 
negotiators and others alike described the positions mostly as work of a speaker. The main 
negotiator was the only activist voted for within the movement when the group had to select a 
representative for the national petition drive. An important dissident voice told me in his 
interview, “We agreed that she would represent us for the media, they obviously thought she 
should represent us with regard to the drafting of the text.” Policy-making power was not a result 
of misunderstanding or malign intentions though. In my interviews both negotiators and others 
talked about the persuasion of politicians as “telling the truth”; for both (ignorant) politicians and 
the mass public the movement’s main strategy was “the truth only.” In this narrative there was 
not much room for discretion; instead, speakers were familiar with and good at explaining the 
truth about fracking. Furthermore, during meetings with politicians the activists emphasized they 
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had no control over the crowds; everything was spontaneous; no negotiation was possible (cf. 
Polletta, 1998). The activist who led the negotiations described the equal importance of people 
on the streets, “the crazies,” and the “rational core” negotiating inside. 
In instances when the concentration of power was admitted it was legitimized by the high 
priority of results for the cause. “To me the most important is the effect…. sometimes it is not 
even so important how democratic it is, because what’s the point if the result is zero,” stated a 
leading local activist who had otherwise endured much criticism from the negotiating team for 
being “stickler to procedures.” This pragmatic legitimacy was buttressed by a specific 
understanding of accountability within the movement. One of the leading activists from Sofia 
shared in his interview that “one of the most right steps” after the meeting with the Premier was 
that he “sat and wrote down an account of what happened… it was shared by more than a 
thousand people on Facebook… and thus we gave glasnost to the information – what really 
happened inside… This hadn’t happened before… and we did it for all meetings after.” It 
appears that this transparency or “glasnost”, contrasted to decision-making behind closed doors 
typical for the government, was enough for a majority of activists to feel involved in the 
negotiations. 
Upon deeper and more critical examination the power of the policy-making team within 
the movement seems less shared and penetrable. First, as with the other positions of power, being 
in Sofia, “close to the institutions,” provided both the opportunity and the legitimacy (as 
“natural”) to take up the role. Related to that, but more important, policy-making activists had 
prior experience, connections with politicians and connections with activists from prior protests. 
When a Member of Parliament presented a draft for a moratorium in the movement’s Facebook 
group he was “monstrously defamed” by rank and file activists; at the same time, the policy-
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making AFM leader established a private contact with him and made corrections to his draft. In 
her interview the leader talked about the multiple connections she had with politicians (including 
Facebook friendships) established during anti-GMO protests in 2008. She was also well-
established and connected among environmental networks and activists which allowed her to 
recruit an unofficial expert team that eventually drafted texts. This closeness to power, which 
most activists in principle abhorred, was justified as a dedication to the cause: “I talk with 
absolutely everyone, only the goal matters… I don’t care. I go to the ruling party, to the other, to 
the fifth, to the ninety-ninth.” 
In the course of the campaign such positions of power became more entrenched and less 
accountable. After the “working core” team consolidated it became exclusive on the basis of 
efficiency: “Including new people is labor-consuming; we have a working core of people who 
understand each other with a glance…our rules are unwritten… there is a certain teaming up and 
the rest should simply trust what they see and know.” Also pragmatically but even less 
transparently, the “core” developed reasoning more germane to the adversarial powers: “to report 
things from the [negotiations] kitchen is counterproductive… you report to a mass of anonymous 
people… often when I am planning something it is vitally important that information about it 
does not break to the people on the other side, those whom I am going to.” The exclusiveness of 
the negotiating team lead some disgruntled activists to see what had been “merely expressing” 
and “telling the truth” as arbitrary selection from the information, texts and arguments supplied 
by the rank and file; negotiators were a filter, not just a funnel, and their judgments were not 
discussed. Another troubling development happened with the practice of “glasnost” that 
legitimized the negotiating team. Reporting from the negotiations became mediating between 
“the people” or “the crazies” and the policy-making process. The negotiating leader talked about 
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the importance of “explanations and connection”: “people on the street do not have to know the 
technology of negotiations, who participates in them, but they should know the texts they are 
fighting for… it is very labor-consuming to give information to the people outside, they cannot 
understand it and it takes the time of the most important people… [it is worth] only when the text 
concerns them.” The negotiators gradually became a sort of experts, “the thinking model,” 
judging what “the people outside,” “the crazies,” should know and what not. In several important 
discussions on the results of meetings with officials, dissenting or skeptical voices were 
persuaded with arguments of hermetic knowledge such as “the text was sent to experts and 
jurists abroad,” “we have set a mechanism in action, which we will discuss in person and then 
comment on our strategy.” And the insiders also had the power to define success, the basis for 
pragmatic legitimacy in the movement. When the outcomes of negotiations were questioned, 
insiders used witness accounts and cultural rationality to claim success – “the Premier was really 
surprised,” “he looked concerned,” “the lobbyists were sad in the end.” In the beginning there 
was much good will and trust showing in the discussions among activists and the power of the 
“core” was accepted. As time passed more and more activists questioned the exclusivity of 
power in the movement. 
To summarize the findings on power and equality, there were two tendencies in the AFM. 
First, power was understated for the sake of equality by rejecting the existence of controlling and 
commanding leaders; also, leadership was defined as burdensome and interchangable, the taking 
up of the most activity. In the early stages of the movement (and also in local groups) the simple 
nature of protests made such understatement possible. Second, power was legitimized for three 
roles in the movement through pragmatism (the imperative of the cause) and naturalness. 
Powerful positions were seen as a result of everyone informally and freely “finding their place,” 
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“their strengths,” the latter being predetermined by “natural” factors such as location, prior 
experience, or even gender. Freedom, meritocracy, naturalness and pragmatism were an 
alternative to a hierarchical politics. 
Participation and inclusion. Active participation and openness were two important 
characteristics of the AFM. There was a very strong appreciation and valuing of action as the 
substance and expression of participation. Activists expected from each other to go above and 
beyond discussing and to “be the motors of their ideas.” “Everyone gives it all, whatever he can, 
but the important thing is to give.” Facebook, while appreciated as a coordination and 
communication instrument, was dismissed as “a chatter room” when compared to “going in the 
streets.” “People with many ideas” were often suspect as “looking from the sideline”, even as 
“giving orders.” Such perception has a clear link to the meanings of power as control and 
command. Informal leaders, on the other hand, were those who took on most of the work. Action 
was also seen as the most important form of consent: “those who disagree with a decision do not 
participate in its execution; the [executions of] decisions where more people participate are more 
consensual and therefore get realized.” 
 For those who wanted to act, to do something for the cause, the movement was open. The 
boundaries of participation were very porous – at the level of meanings there was no clear line 
between “us” and “them,” as demonstrated in the second paper. In terms of practices, local and 
Facebook groups were freely accessible. When local groups gathered, the walking in and out of 
people, some of them first-time attendees, created great difficulties for decision-making, but was 
nonetheless appreciated as informal and inclusive. New members were seen as joining through 
interpellation, just as local leaders emerged – they saw a need for their action, and they acted. 
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 While participation was preferred over delegation, there were important elements of 
movement work where openness and inclusion were not expected and practiced. There was a 
closed Facebook group, “the national group,” for coordinating and discussing the national 
campaign. I was in the group and my impression was that it was not too impenetrable (with over 
120 members), the main criterion being that the person had shown herself as active and 
interested. Interviewees did not find it contradictory that there was a closed group in a movement 
“of the people” because “anyone can join.” The truly delegated roles, the power positions of 
speakers and policy-makers, were legitimized pragmatically: there were limits (of time, space 
and process) imposed by institutions and some people were most effective at getting results. 
 There were limits to self-initiated action and instances when people were ousted from the 
movement. The comparison between local groups and the Sofia group and the analysis of 
internal conflicts and ostracizing suggests that protest actions were welcome but policy-related 
initiative was suspect. Some members were ousted because of their consistent opposition to the 
judgments of the negotiating “core.” Their exclusion was legitimized with the claims that the 
opposing behavior is “harmful for the cause,” “sowing discord,” “an act of sabotage.” Another 
explanation was that such people were ego-driven or worse, politically-motivated.  These two 
motivations were incompatible with the cause. In any case, exclusion was very often seen as 
“natural” and “a self-removal”: a person did not join the action and gradually dropped out; 
another one’s ego was too strong and he couldn’t accept others to lead; the “politically 
ambitious” and “quarrelsome” lost people’s confidence. Participation in the AFM was open but 
demanding. 
Deliberation, decisions, and consent. Deliberation within a movement impacts the 
quality of group decisions and the degree of their acceptance. Not surprisingly, discussions and 
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decisions in the AFM were made “naturally” and “spontaneously” according to many activists. 
Decisions were taken “by consensus”; voting was avoided whenever possible. In-person 
meetings in local groups were informal: “no procedures, no rules, no roles, no leader.” Two 
understandings of democratic decisions clashed in one local group when a Communist subgroup 
demanded “minutes, voting” while “the independents wanted a discussion of things and the 
acceptance, somehow along the way, of an opinion liked by everyone.” The perception of 
procedures as artificial and illegitimate was very common. The lack of deliberative structure 
produced meetings that went slowly, inefficiently, with many distractions and subtalks splitting 
off the main discussion. In Sofia sometimes the discussion of an important proposal would start 
with a “shouting match” between “two or three people, the rest looking on,” followed by “a 
calmer discussion, and ending with a conclusion of what the best decision would be.” Only one 
local group in Dobrich, after “many fruitless meetings” that turned into “an incredible chatter 
room,” decided to invite an external moderator to facilitate discussion. The results were 
astounding, and the group practiced facilitated deliberation from then on; however, no other 
group was interested in that experience. To the perception of informality as “natural” contributed 
the relational experiences and settings that first-time activists brought into the movement – 
meetings would be held in cafes, parks, pubs as conversations between friends. Some relational 
norms were pointed out by interviewees as crucial for consensus in informal deliberation: “don’t 
get personally offended,” “subdue your ego,” “give reasons and ground your opinions.” 
On Facebook deliberation was similarly unstructured but there was one important rule for 
quicker decisions in the “national group”: when a decision was proposed (almost always by the 
Sofia group), members had a day or two to express opinions; only those who disagreed were 
expected to post; the rest could “like” the proposal and whoever remained silent was considered 
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in favor. In this way decisions were quick but disagreement was quite onerous and difficult for 
more timid voices. 
There was also a difference between deliberations on concrete tasks where “not what, but 
who and how” was discussed (e.g. details of a coming protest action) and on “strategies, more 
general questions.” The former seemed to flow “naturally” and “spontaneously”; some 
interviewees described “switching to concrete tasks” as a tactics in a heated discussion, to 
dissipate conflict on a more general issue. The discussions on strategy, on the other hand, were 
illustrative of the difficulties of unstructured deliberation. Disagreements and contradictions on 
such important topics were not explored deeply; they were avoided and “extinguished.” A case 
in point was a proposal of one of the informal leaders to publicly thank the Premier for the ban, 
with the intention to support his position in the face of a looming US diplomatic offensive. The 
idea caused a flurry of opinions, with 163 postings total. I observed very little, if any, attempts at 
mutual understanding and a deeper exploration of the differences and the purposes of positions. 
In a way, two storylines of the problem clashed in the discussion – whether the government was 
the savior to whom the victims would thank or whether the citizens were the heroes who made 
the government do its job. A lot of activists were offended that “a humiliating” narrative should 
be offered publicly. There was no distinction between tactics and internal framing. The 
deliberation was peppered with conversational tactics to divert or avoid contradiction. The author 
of the idea declined to set up an online poll because “debate gives birth to truth” and in the end 
withdrew his proposal (the prevailing number of opinions supported his idea) stating he was 
“incredibly happy to be able to discuss together,” that his “secondary goal was to learn how to go 
ahead together” and he pointed to “how different we are but how united for the cause”. 
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Avoidance of controversy was also opted for when one of the leaders stepped down when 
a vote had to be made for a national petition initiative. Another leader told me how she “sensed” 
the opinions of members when she posted an idea and looked at reactions; when there was a 
number of disagreeing opinions, she would drop the proposal. At a conversational level, tactics 
to avoid or downplay contradiction included jokes, phrases in funny dialects, and “you are both 
right” statements. Very common were appeals in capital letters and with lots of exclamation 
marks of the type “while we bark at each other the rigs are working…. let us all focus our efforts 
on the essentials that unite us!” Less positive were arguments like “you are far away [abroad]… 
trust the judgment of people who look people in the eyes here”; some particular activists resorted 
to personal attacks against perceived “ego-driven” dissenters. 
 The avoidance of contradictions was sometimes achieved preventively by avoidance of 
exploration and reflection on how deliberation happened in the AFM. Proposals for discussion of 
rules of deliberation failed (at least three times). Activists from the Occupy Movement (which 
had some Bulgarian followers at the time) were labeled “windbags” for their focus on process. 
Attempts to discuss the quality of discussions were seen as distractions, ego-serving, narcissistic. 
In their majority, activists seemed to have accepted that they are “very different” and that only 
the cause, not the process, can unite them. The avoidance of reflection and contradiction was 
especially evident in the treatment of mistakes. Mistakes were either not accepted as such, in the 
fortifying myth that a greater force led activists, or criticism was dismissed with the common “do 
it yourself then” (again with a focus on action). Another negative of unstructured deliberation 
was that, according to some more reflective interviewees, many people left the movement 
because they got exhausted by a protest where, on the one hand, a lot of effort was spent on 
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negative action (protests), while on the other hand there was no internal system for supporting 
people’s voices and expression of needs. 
Relational Norms 
These arrangements of movement democracy were facilitated by certain relational norms 
(Polletta, 2002). In her study of grassroots democracy Polletta (2002) shows the crucial 
importance of norms of interpersonal conduct for ensuring “fair and fast” decisions and actions, 
i.e. both efficiency and inclusiveness. While she focused on trust, respect, and care, in the study 
of the AFM trust, tolerance, and humility stood out as very common and important norms. 
Trust was both an outcome of prolonged face-to-face contact and a threshold requirement 
for entry into collective action. Many interviewees praised personal and multiple contacts as the 
means for building trust, for “providing solder” among activists. Local groups became very 
cohesive quickly, and many activists purposefully travelled between groups to make 
acquaintances and “see what people do” because “live contact is everything.” These gradual 
processes of getting to know each other were accompanied by a somewhat paradoxical 
requirement to trust other activists from the moment of entering the movement. Participants 
shared how Facebook made it possible for “absolute strangers” to get together. Such trust, or 
“trustfulness,” was seen as characteristic for “this peculiar society, the citizen movement.” “If 
you approach something with fear nothing will come out of it. We must overcome the fact that 
there will always be provocateurs, paid agents, but we need to believe that we are good, we will 
be more, and we will be better”. Some activists explained the trustfulness with a general 
“Southern mentality”; others saw it as an intrapersonal change transpiring when becoming an 
activist; for third trust was the difference between staying and “creating tension, removing 
yourself.” In any case, trust was essential for the emergence of positions with unequal power like 
173 
 
speakers or negotiators: “The rest must simply trust what they see and know. Because, if you 
don’t trust, what are you doing with those people?” Trust made it possible for activists to 
“understand each other with a glance”; expedited decisions and made individual judgment look 
“the rightest thing in a situation,” with a generous allowance for mistakes. 
A very important function of trust according to activists was to impregnate the more 
visible participants from the slander and insinuations of media and politicians. There were indeed 
media publications claiming that particular leaders had political agendas or material interests but 
these were largely ignored because activists “knew each other from the inside, had absolute 
trust.” On a less positive note, trust seemed to privilege known faces in the movement, especially 
(and admitted by) environmental activists with exposure in previous protests. In addition, later in 
the movement’s course newcomers could not be so easily integrated into the “working core” of 
old activists; they were expected to trust without questioning. The importance of trust was very 
clear in the cases when it was undermined. The conversations and conflicts between activists 
who had lost mutual trust abound with examples of personal judgment that was interpreted as 
usurpation, of feedback that was taken as harassing criticism, of proposals that were seen as a 
promotion of hidden agendas. 
Tolerance was a norm that facilitated relationships between “very different” activists. The 
notion that participants came from very diverse backgrounds had a status of self-evident truth. In 
addition to the appeals to unity around the cause, many activists emphasized the need for 
“tolerance to all the others.” Sometimes it was the patience “to figure out what’s going on” in 
conflicts; or the awareness that “there are always many viewpoints, two at least”; or “the wisdom 
not to quarrel like a 15-year old.” As part of their notion of freedom within the movement, 
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tolerance was also the realization that “nobody owes you nothing in the group; they do what they 
can and you cannot demand anything more.” 
Finally, under humility I subsume multiple descriptions from interviews of the learned 
necessity to “overcome one’s ego.” Activists saw “the ego,” “pride,” and “personal emotion” as 
“a major problem for the building of society,” a threat for collaboration and collective action. 
“When the ego comes out… it is the worst nemesis… there is no saving from that.” The ego 
“comes out” “when your idea is not accepted by others”; it makes you “go out of your league, 
out of the boundaries of what you are good at and into other people’s work”; it also creates 
“conflicts on personal basis” when “you take things personally.” In other words, activists saw 
“the ego” as hindering decision-making (especially on strategy), the pragmatic dividing of labor 
(and power), and the focusing “on the cause” instead of “emotions” and “arguments.” Activists 
“learned to control themselves in the course of the work”; the recipe was “not to take things 
personally, even if someone offends you, because it is not about you; the cause is above all; just 
swallow it.” People should “be aware that they are not here to get something; they need to give 
for the common good.” These widely-held beliefs were linked to very common individualistic 
attributions of the source of conflicts in the movement: “it’s all from the person.” As “everyone 
of us has an ego,” conflicts were “on a very personal basis.” People left the struggle “after 
interpersonal wrangles” because “not everyone could swallow their ego, pride.” Such 
explanations made conflicts and dropping out of the movement look “natural” and left out issues 
of power imbalances and of differences in meanings of democracy. 
Democracy and Geography: The Sofia-Country Relationships 
The geographic dimension of democracy in the AFM merits its own description and 
discussion. The sections on power demonstrated that there were certain imbalances in decision-
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making and policy-making power between Sofia and the rest of the country. But these 
imbalances were not there from the start of the movement. The stories of activists and the 
examination of movement records show that the AFM started in July-August 2011 virtually 
simultaneously in several places outside of Sofia. The problem was first raised in Novi Pazar, a 
small town where the first drills had been planned. Varna and Silistra, two bigger cities in the 
region, had organized groups first, and had the first leaflets out. The first formal initiative with 
elected representatives took place in Varna; the group sent official letters and statements to 
national institutions. Silistra (with Novi Pazar) started the first signatures drive for a petition 
(which turned out void) against the Chevron concession. The group from Burgas started the mass 
Facebook group, which was the first common forum at the national level. 
In these summer months two processes were under way in Sofia: first-time protesters 
started flashmob events in front of institutions; the environmental organizations and networks 
started “a taskforce” and then a mailgroup of Green and affiliated activists in order to 
“concentrate an info base, capacity and people for this campaign… draw the first steps, to some 
extent a vision for the campaign… a parallel front with the purpose of not hijacking but building 
the basis for a future campaign, provide the information, the people.” Eventually the Sofia group 
would comprise these two flows of activists. Until the beginning of September 2011 the mass 
enthusiasm poured into loosely coordinated protests in many locations with some hints that Sofia 
and Varna were most organized and driving agendas. Then between September and November 
the Sofia group emerged as the clear leader of the AFM. A watershed event was the exclusion of 
representatives of the Varna group from the meeting with the Premier. It demonstrated both the 
power of the Sofia group and its legitimacy to influence outcomes. The event caused the leader 
from Varna to leave the movement; the Varna group was shaken and it took months to 
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reorganize. The Silistra group, a very strong collective based on an existing local citizen 
network, disbanded after their botched petition drive was severely criticized by Sofia and the 
local leaders were accused of “treachery.” The Plovdiv group, which was formed with the crucial 
help of a local Communist group, disintegrated after an intense conflict with Sofia around the 
place of politics and ideology in the movement (Communists and the Greens being the two 
warring sides). From the start of the national petition at the end of November it was a quite 
settled arrangement, a geographic division of labor, that Sofia would lead the campaign in terms 
of policy-making and strategy while the other groups would support it mostly with protests. A 
closed National Facebook group with over one hundred participants was the platform that 
ensured communication and deliberation on a national level. 
The power of the Sofia group to represent the AFM and to shape policy outcomes was 
legitimized among the great majority of my interviewees with “natural” and pragmatic 
rationales. The Sofia group was close to the institutions and was more convenient for the media 
to contact. Activists in Varna and Shumen, for example, contrasted this proximity to the total 
disregard of their protest actions by the local and regional authorities (including regional offices 
of the national government). Also, Sofia was seen as a hub of “the civil society, the active 
people,” “the economically independent” whereas most local groups had to work in “depressed 
towns” where many people had “fear” of the authorities. And finally, the people from Sofia who 
had assumed power positions were supported because they delivered results, as discussed above. 
Similar to the understanding of individual freedom in the movement, local groups felt 
autonomous because they decided on the actions they would take (within the limits of their 
means) and they secured and controlled the meager resources for those actions. The national 
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Facebook group, with its mechanisms for discussion and expression of consent, was seen as 
providing the “glasnost,” accountability and vetting of proposals at a national level. 
This balance of power was sometimes disrupted and the limits of acceptable leadership 
from Sofia revealed themselves. These were mostly situations where Sofia attempted to infringe 
on the local group’s autonomy. In some cases Sofia attempted to assign tasks to local groups, for 
example to attend a protest in Romania. In more heated confrontations, certain actions from 
Sofia were seen as “meddling in out internal work, the local level… without knowing the 
concrete situations here, without really seeing what we have done here.” In Varna, Plovdiv and 
Silistra there were activists who saw Sofia’s interference in their groups as uninformed, brash, 
and unfair. There was a clear contradiction to the movement’s ideals of freedom and of voice for 
the affected. While trust among activists lasted, many instances of interference were smoothed 
over as misunderstandings or eagerness for the cause. When trust was absent, “commanding” 
and “bossing” from Sofia led to conflicts and sometimes disintegration. 
The analysis and comparison of diverse accounts of the Sofia-country relationships 
suggests more subtle power balances, and sources that go beyond geography. In the informal, 
ruleless environment of the national group network Sofia had other ways to influence local 
groups and common decisions. While decisions were made in the national group, most of the 
time they had been discussed and “consolidated” in the environmentalist network within the 
movement. Informal members of this network had built authority from previous protests. The 
environmentalists also “suggested” to local groups, based on their own experience, that 
leaderless organizations are more stable and invulnerable. For the environmentalists the 
movement was another campaign – a big one, but still one in a row. The campaign logic relied 
on expertise, planning, managing a media presence, and dividing tasks according to experience. 
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They called this part of the movement “an operations level” (vs. “the horizon”), “a core group,” 
“the rational model.” Most of the other participants, being first-time activists, thought in mass 
movement terms like spontaneity, equality, informality. In the beginning of the protests “the 
citizens” rejected the authority of environmental non-profits; environmentalists readily accepted 
a role of “instruments” participating “in personal quality.” However, in the informal and ruleless 
milieu of the AFM the pre-existing networks exerted influence in informal ways. Thus the Sofia-
country relationship intersected with a preexisting vs. new activists dimension of power. 
Discussion 
Influences on Movement Democracy Forms 
Democracy in the anti-fracking movement in Bulgaria was shaped by diverse influences, 
some coming from activists’ experiences and meanings, some external, some reflected upon and 
some implicit. First, the visions of how the AFM should be organized were rooted in the 
understandings of activists about politics as usual, their experience with hierarchical 
organizations, and the AFM as an alternative. Movement democracy was about giving a voice to 
the affected, and not making decisions behind their backs; about empowering the people, the 
majority, and not a narrow interest group; about a direct participation in decisions and actions, 
and not fake representation; about fairness and meritocracy in the work, and not arbitrary or 
convoluted hierarchy; and finally, about personal freedom from coercion. Naturalness and 
pragmatism were the two main values for legitimating practices and new proposals within the 
movement. The understandings of movement democracy were supported by a strong experience 
of personal freedom and the elation of collective work without coercion. 
 Another shaping force for movement democracy was the influence of pre-existing activist 
groups and their experiences with previous protests. Most important in the AFM was the 
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environmentalist network – a cohesive group of non-profits, The Greens (a political party) and 
their sympathizers. This network was based in Sofia (but had members from other cities as well) 
and was hardened in protests since 2006. Roughly half of the local group in Plovdiv comprised 
of a small Communist group that staged protests on social issues in their city. The rest of the 
activists (which is the great majority) did not have experience with organized activism, and most 
were first-time activists. This fact is unsurprising given the absence of traditional organizing 
entities in Bulgaria such as unions or congregations. Instead of familiar organizational patterns, 
new activists brought in friendship as a relational base for their groups. Importantly, the 
experiences and habits of environmentalists were compatible with informal organizing – they 
were both leaderless, relied on volunteering, left space for individual self-expression, strived for 
consensual decision-making. The Communists, on the other hand, were seen as too formal, 
structured and hence “dictatorial.” The two understandings clashed in a conflict; Communists 
were eventually ousted partly because of their style of democracy. 
 Contextual demands influence movement democracy in important and sometimes 
controversial ways. In the case of the AFM, the interactions with institutions were the main 
imperative to adapt to. Institutions required representatives for negotiations, they preferred talks 
behind closed doors, and they were concentrated in Sofia. These characteristics introduced 
tension in the movement; pragmatism required the concentration of power in few activists. 
Urgency, stemming from the arbitrary manner of government by the Premier and from 
opponents’ actions, additionally granted power of personal judgment to negotiators. Finally, the 
highly sophisticated nature of the issue, with the necessity to build and use expertise, tended to 
concentrate important work in the hands of “a core.” With pragmatism favored over equality 
within the movement, the context imposed limitations on movement democracy. 
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 The particular forms of democracy were also rationalized (sometimes post factum) by the 
benefits they afforded. First of all, activists appreciated the way informality boosted motivation 
for the highly prized active participation. People felt free to act as they saw fit, to engage in what 
excited them; they also felt an urge to take on tasks because there was nobody who officially was 
responsible. In the context of the movement, activists were glad about the unpredictability 
“multiple parallel strategies” meant for opponents, and about the invulnerability of leaderless 
groups from external pressure. 
Evaluation of Movement Democracy 
 Democracy in the AFM can be evaluated against democracy’s basic normative elements 
and on its own terms as well. Starting with the first lens, we can observe that power was not 
equally distributed in the AFM. Activists were aware and appreciative of power from, or 
freedom from coercion (Hollander & Offermann, 1990; Riger, 1993) within the movement; 
however, power to act and to shape the course of the movement was less reflected upon and 
relegated to the sphere of the “natural.” Power was either understated or explained with natural 
determinants, meaning immutable, pre-existing or external circumstances such as gender, 
“charisma,” prior experience, education, locality, or government and media familiarity. Coupled 
with the strong emphasis on action and interpellation, understatement and naturalization turned 
the distribution of power into division of labor. However, in this process externally determined 
inequalities – social and individual – were reproduced in the movement (Cohen, 1989). To some 
extent, the AFM exhibited features of a “tyranny of structurelessness” (Freeman, 1973) where 
the deliberate refrainment from structures begets undemocratic practices based on personal and 
social inequalities. 
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 Another important criterion of democracy is consent. In the AFM, consensus, or 
unanimous decisions, was much desired and most often reported in my interviews. Consensus is 
indeed a valued characteristic of movement democracy (Della Porta, 2009; Polletta, 2002). In the 
AFM though it often came as a product of the drive for unity; controversies were avoided and 
“extinguished”; discussions turned to concrete activities, away from strategy and ideology. There 
were no procedural rules to ensure equality (Cohen, 1989). Deliberation was purposefully non-
structured, which privileged more confident voices, those that were ready to engage in “shouting 
matches” if needed. In this way, dissidence was onerous. In situations where voting was accepted 
(the Facebook decision-making), agreement was assumed, while disagreement had to be stated 
and justified. Leaders used such improvised polls to test the overall feeling of the group. There 
seems to be an implicit assumption that people make up their minds in advance, before 
deliberation (cf. political will formation); therefore a decision is withdrawn if enough people 
disagree, without further exploration of the sources of difference. Such notions were probably 
bolstered by the almost universal opinion that outside the AFM “we are very different – in terms 
of political views, life views, ages”. Consent was highly valued, but was not deeply probed. 
 Participation as a democracy criterion also had contradictory nuances in the AFM. First 
of all, the movement defined itself very broadly as representing “the people.” Local groups were 
indeed very inclusive and open to entry. The closed national group also had a quite porous 
boundary. The main filter for inclusion on all levels was the actions of the activist and the norm 
of self-sacrifice. Participation was very demanding. Exclusion that was rarely noticed was that of 
activists abroad, whose opinions were sometimes downplayed, and that of people without access 
to internet and Facebook – the main organizing platform. There were also higher barriers for 
participation of new activists after the consolidation of the groups and the division of labor and 
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power – there was no particular concern or procedure for newcomers and they had to figure out 
and accept the workings of the movement on their own. 
 One important outcome of movement democracy suggested by Polletta (2002) is 
experimentation with new forms of organizing and authority, or learning from movement 
practice. The AFM’s focus on pragmatism hindered collective learning. Reflection on 
controversies was avoided; internal criticism was often seen as sabotage. In some cases an 
outcome was difficult to define and the activists who contributed to it had also the power to 
frame it as the sole witnesses. Additionally, the sense of historical force led activists to interpret 
even clear mistakes as the right thing to have happened: it confused the enemies, it drew 
attention, etc. Pragmatism also left little time for deliberate efforts to create an opportunity 
structure for activists (“the puzzle fits itself”), train or mentor new activists and grow new 
leaders (Maton, 2008; Speer & Hughey, 1995). Self-sacrifice had to compensate for the lack of 
concern for the individual development of activists. But in my estimation the biggest downside 
of the lack of experimentation and learning was on the group level – the movement was not able 
to produce formats that would keep activists together beyond the fracking issue. Efforts to 
mobilize around more controversial (e.g. social) issues post-AFM dissipated in the irreconcilable 
controversies among participants. 
 A critical evaluation has the benefits of retrospective and available social movement 
theory. But judged on its own criteria, the AFM provided a beneficial venue for democracy in 
several ways. It was a vehicle for citizen participation for thousands of people who engaged for 
the first time in a political action. It gave collective voice to the affected and provided a way for 
involvement in politics that was seen as legitimate and worthy by participants disgusted by 
politics as usual. At an individual level, the movement fostered a sense of freedom and 
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empowerment (Rappaport, 1987; Riger, 1993), which is a basic condition for future engagement 
in public life. On a negative note, the pragmatic imperative of movement democracy was not 
well served by the penchant for concentration of policy-making power and the avoidance of 
deeper deliberation. More voices and more participants in important roles might have prevented 
mistakes, produced better decisions and strategies (Polletta, 2002). 
Differences and Dynamics of Democracy in the AFM 
 The description of AFM democracy suggests that there were different democratic 
practices and arrangements across time and space. The movement started as spontaneous protests 
in many locations, structureless, without division of labor. This mass protest logic of action 
remained at the level of local groups outside of Sofia: there activists interacted in informal and 
familiar ways, interchanged roles and leaders, kept open for newcomers, took the time for self-
shaping consensual decisions. But once direct interaction with government officials and 
institutions started, the movement as a whole adapted to the institutional logic of policy-making 
and then arrangements of concentrated power and less open decision-making emerged. From the 
policy-making phase of formulation of policy alternatives, the movement comprised two logics: 
mass protests and campaign; “the horizon” and “the operational”; “the crazies” and “the rational 
model.” For the environmentalist network protests and negotiations were two instruments of a 
campaign. But this arrangement roughly corresponded to the dialectics of the alternative 
prefigurative politics and the pragmatic imperatives of the issue. Key for the coexistence of these 
logics was the notion of naturalness (understood as factors extraneous to the activists’ control) 
and the legitimacy it gave to “the core.” An instrument mitigating for the division between core 
and mass was the national Facebook group. The dynamics between mass protest and campaign 
logics were most productive in the period between the acceptance of the movement into the 
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policy-making process and the voting of the moratorium in Parliament. This was a period of very 
intense mutual reinforcement of negotiations and protests. Once the moratorium was passed, four 
months of negotiations and lobbying followed when there was no apparent reason to protest and 
the movement actions were limited to meetings of committees and scuffles with opponent 
experts. For the local groups and the mass movement this period seemed more and more 
meaningless; there was no action they could undertake. Some groups wanted to move on with 
other issues; others sought guidance from Sofia on what to do with the energy that was stalled. 
The differences between the two logics became more evident and controversial. 
Conclusion 
The conclusions from this study must be qualified with regard to several limitations. This 
study of grassroots democracy unfortunately excluded activists who did not participate in online 
organizing groups. It is an important question how (and if) their voice was included in “the civic 
society.” The study also could have been stronger if data on deliberation and collaboration were 
collected via participant observation; implicit norms and understandings are often detectable in 
the comparison between text and practice, reported and observed action. In terms of 
generalizability of findings and their comparison with other studies of movements, the 
conclusions should be applied to other contexts with caution. This study applied a conceptual 
framework derived from research in quite different political and social contexts; I attempted to 
balance emic and etic understandings. So findings should be compared with caution across the 
corresponding themes and variables in other movements. 
The strengths of the study are grounded in its sources and foci. Data were collected from 
both retrospective, reconstructive accounts (the interviews) and contemporary unobtrusive 
sources (the discussions). The study was also successful in tapping the diversity of personal and 
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group perspectives of movement democracy; nuances, differences and controversies were 
explored and analyzed across individuals, locations, and activist groups. Dissident voices were 
included along with commonsensical beliefs within the AFM for a richer understanding. 
Diversity was also described across time, with the inclusion of analyses of the changes in SM 
democracy. The analytical framework allows for cross-national and cross-movement 
comparisons of grassroots democracy. 
Summing up, the anti-fracking movement in Bulgaria presents a case of grassroots 
democracy focused on a particular issue. As such, it was based on an ideal vision and 
prefigurative practice of a “civic society,” and it was also shaped by the demands of its context, 
where the issue had to be settled. Thus the democracy forms within the AFM were determined 
by multiple factors which were not always questioned, reflected upon, and navigated by activists; 
action was preferred over reflection. The movement democracy was participatory (and very 
demanding), direct, and pluralist in the sense of allowing competing actions. It provided 
thousands of first-time activists an experience of empowerment, was successful in its immediate 
goal, yet was unable to create new collective grassroots forms in a context that urgently needed 
them. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
As we cast a spanning look at the three studies of the anti-fracking movement in 
Bulgaria, we can ask again, why did it succeed? As with all successful challenges from below, 
many factors and circumstances came together to produce the desired policy outcome. Some of 
them were not examined at all in the study because that would require a new set of sources, 
methods and analyses. For example, the perspectives of politicians, government officials and 
fracking advocates could be captured to understand the motives and pressures for their actions. 
Or, a media analysis could trace the salience and valences of the issue of fracking in the public 
debate. But when we focus on the movement itself, the most salient characteristics we see are its 
flexibility and adaptability to the political environment. Indeed, although the investigation 
focused on the AFM and collected most of its data from movement sources, study one and two 
demonstrated the mutual shaping of structure and agency. The AFM’s strategy and actions were 
also reactions to the government’s actions and reactions (Alinsky, 1972). Where one tactic 
bumped into a block, another one flowed around, while sometimes the original idea was utilized 
for a different purpose. Meaning-making was also dialogical (Steinberg, 1999), reactive to cues 
and interpellations while assertively promoting the movement’s versions of key notions and 
discourses. 
Flexibility and adaptability, an accomplishment in themselves, were in turn grounded in 
the ability of the AFM to sustain and contain two different and sometimes controversial logics, 
or modi of action: an institutional one and a mass movement one. The AFM started as 
spontaneous protests in many unconnected locations, structureless, without division of labor and 
formal leaders. Activists cherished the informality, lack of firm boundaries between “we” and 
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bystanders, the freedom and equality of a leaderless initiative, the shifts in roles and 
responsibilities. Other versions of movement organization, such as the Communists’ rule-based 
democracy, some professional participants’ managerial suggestions, or “Occupy”-style 
deliberation, did not survive the prevalent notions and experiences of the activists. Contrasted to 
the mass movement modus was the institutional way of policy-making in Bulgaria: formal, 
exclusive, hierarchical, legitimated with expertise, and corrupt. The AFM, with its focus on 
policy-making, had to adapt to the exigencies of the institutional logic – to produce 
representatives, to delegate some important decisions to a closed circle of activists, to abide by 
institutional procedures and pacing, and to translate political demands into technocratic 
justifications. The adaptation of a SM to the demands of the political context are often a path to 
becoming more like your enemy, transforming a movement into a hierarchical organization (e.g. 
Andrews & Edwards, 2004; Clemens, 1996; Polletta, 2002). In the case of the AFM, the two 
logics were sustained dialectically past the initial phase, although not without conflict and 
exclusion. The mass movement was active and thriving at the local level, with protests and other 
mass actions organized autonomously. A more institutional logic was followed by “a core” in 
Sofia which negotiated with officials and politicians. The division of labor between “crazies,” or 
“the horizon,” and “the rational model,” or “the operative,” was admittedly crucial for the 
successful pressure on the institutions. These two logics were compatible within the movement 
thanks to the key understandings of pragmatism for the cause and naturalness. The latter meant 
that inequalities of power emerging from the adaptation to the institutional PMP were seen as 
extraneous, natural and legitimate. Also crucial was the trust accumulated within the mass 
movement modus where activists communicated extensively in person and from interchanging, 
informal role positions. If most activists saw the mass movement as the movement, a core of 
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environmentalists with experience in policy campaigns saw the protests as an instrument along 
with policy negotiation, lobbying and other institutional processes. 
 A remarkable accomplishment of the AFM was the extension of the mass movement 
modus and a more inclusive movement democracy to the policy-making phase of research on the 
issue; usually this phase is exclusive and centered around experts and expertise (Fischer, 2000). 
This achievement was facilitated by the rejection of experts within the movement as a facet of its 
egalitarian pathos; by the lack of experts on the novel issue (Callon [2005], cited in Eyal, 
[2010]), at least in Bulgaria; by the ready availability of US experience with fracking and science 
on it; and by the technological abilities granted by digital platforms, enabling crowdsourcing and 
structuring of information. 
 The dialectic integration of the two logics was exhausted after the first policy victory 
when the process turned to reformulation of the moratorium and the search for safe technologies 
in the parliamentary committee. Local groups and the mass of activists had nothing to protest; as 
they were not involved in the policy negotiations, their experience of (a) movement deteriorated. 
Protests as a form of solidarity, motivation, and link to “the people” were not supplanted by a 
commensurate action and the policy-making work of the “core” was not transformed into a mass 
movement form. Some activists gradually withdrew back to private lives; others demanded and 
moved to new causes, while for a third group the division of labor became problematic. 
What was the movement’s impact beyond the policy outcome? As was discussed earlier, 
the AFM did not produce new grassroots democracy organizational forms; some local groups 
members remained in a loose network (I am a member of one) and sometimes would engage in 
local issues. Quite intriguing, and possibly impactful, is a change in many activists’ 
understanding of politics and the role of citizens in it. The AFM started as an issue-focused 
193 
 
movement but in 2012 and especially in 2013 many members, including the informal leaders, 
turned their attention from policy-making to politics writ large. This shift was due to the 
experiences in the AFM: the realization of the limitations of the state as an actor; the sense of 
discovered civic agency; the lessons from movement democracy as a policy-making alternative. 
The first change in activists’ understandings was about their relationship with the government. 
At the start activists targeted the government as an actor to be persuaded to act; toward the end, 
activists thought of themselves as an alternative to the government. In the terms of political 
mediation, activists attempted to use direct institutional channels (without mediation), realized 
they were ignored, then used political and societal mediation, and finally came to the need for 
direct participation at a new level – not the afforded channels, but new and radical ones, with 
citizen participation that would supplant the government in many regards. These tendencies were 
observable in the clash of the two storylines (Paper Two), in the firm focus on policy 
formulations (and not just a negation of the government’s decision), and in other movement 
actions, but most conspicuously in the demands for a new “direct democracy” from February 24, 
2013. During this time the ruling party fell from power and the AFM, as a member of an ad hoc 
network of protest groups, saw an opportunity to promote “a restart” of the political system in 
Bulgaria. The demands were a motley list, but the AFM’s articles were longest and most 
elaborated; they focused on institutionalized “civic control” over the government and on 
“participation of the citizens in governance” in ten concrete forms that would effectively mean a 
citizen-driven PMP. 
Another important change was the emergence of a new understanding of democracy writ 
large, outside the movement. In the beginning of the AFM activists had a disdain for what 
democracy was in the politics of Bulgaria, and constructed their understandings and norms of 
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movement democracy in opposition to it. The experiences of practicing a democracy form within 
the movement that was pluralistic, competitive, direct and participatory shaped new ideas about a 
pluralistic democracy with a pre-made political will where “everyone defends their cause,” 
“everyone makes their choice first” and “cleans their house,” causes compete and should not be 
“sold” because everyone chooses theirs “with their heart.” 
While these understandings emerged, unfortunately there were no new organizational 
forms to carry them. The two big gaps were for a form that would sustain mass activism without 
a threatening issue, where a mass movement could be able to work on a policy formulation; and 
for a form that would negotiate the boundaries between “we” and “the people” (blurred in the 
AFM), so that movements and groups with different causes could work together. Regretfully, for 
reasons related to external pressures and internal understandings, experimentation with and 
reflection on democracy forms were not in focus within the AFM. 
Five years after its most active period, the contributions of the anti-fracking movement in 
Bulgaria to a more empowered civil society can be appreciated. It allowed thousands of people to 
step out of their private life and participate in a conflict about the public good. It also created 
networks and trust at local and national levels that still mobilize, albeit reactively, around 
environmental issues. The movement democratized expertise, allowed hundreds of activists to 
engage in knowledge creation, the use of science, and the navigation of arcane legal texts. At a 
broader scale, the AFM tore down the curtain of expertise that political decision-making uses to 
legitimize itself while excluding the affected. In doing so, the AFM demonstrated that politics 
can be shaped by citizens and how politicians can be pressed to act outside their habits and 
interests.  
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